Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant failed to state a claim for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus because he failed to demonstrate that his sentence was illegal on its face.Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and kidnapping and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In his habeas petition, Appellant argued that his sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree murder was illegal because the order did not abide by the requirements set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-804. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, section 16-90-804 does not apply; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to habeas relief on the claims presented. View "Owens v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se third petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate in the petition that the writ should issue.Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree. The court of appeals affirmed. In his third coram nobis petition Petitioner argued that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose favorable treatment granted to a key witness in exchange for her trial testimony and by failing to disclose the transcript of a 911 call made by the witness, and that exculpatory findings from his codefendant's trial would have changed the outcome in Petitioner's trial. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the writ should issue and that some of his claims were successive. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's denial of Appellant's petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5, holding that Appellant's trial attorneys were ineffective.Appellant was convicted of capital murder, kidnapping, and abuse of a corpse. In his petition for postconviction relief, Appellant argued, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective because they abandoned their objection to instructing the jury that the death of the victim's unborn child could be considered an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. The circuit court rejected Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in presenting to the jury the death of the victim's unborn child as an aggravating factor, and Appellant's trial attorneys were ineffective when they abandoned their objection to this instruction; and (2) there was a reasonable probability that the fact-finder's decision would have been different absent counsels' errors. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) miscalculated his parole eligibility, holding that the circuit court failed to address Appellant's primary claim that the ADC erred in applying a 2007 amended version of Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-120(e) requiring defendants sentenced to a firearm enhancement to serve seventy percent of the enhanced sentence.Defendant was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment for aggravated robbery and an additional fifteen years' imprisonment for use of a firearm in the robbery pursuant to section 16-90-120. In dismissing Appellant's mandamus petition, the circuit court agreed with the State's argument that Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-911(a)(1)(c) authorized the ADC to require Appellant to serve seventy percent of his aggregate sentence of forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that remand was required for the circuit court to address whether the seventy-percent requirement was applicable to the fifteen-year sentence enhancement and to address the language found in the amendment to section 16-90-120. View "Rogers v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying and dismissing the petition on the basis that issues surrounding parole eligibility are not cognizable in habeas proceedings.Appellant appeared before the parole board on September 5, 2019 and was denied parole for two years. The parole board affirmed the two-year denial. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus Appellant argued that the parole board's actions were illegal and in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-615. The circuit court denied and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not meet his burden of establishing probable cause that he was detained without lawful authority. View "Cervantes v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the grounds raised in Appellant's petition were not grounds for habeas relief.Appellant pleaded guilty to capital murder, first-degree terroristic threatening, and second-degree battery. Appellant later petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court denied relief, concluding that none of the allegations were cognizable in a habeas proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying habeas relief on Appellant's claims. View "Millsap v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Appellant's petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it treated the petition as an untimely Rule 37.1 petition and denied it because the grounds raised in the petition were distinctly covered by that Rule.Appellant pleaded guilty to several offenses and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 300 months' imprisonment. In his coram nobis petition, Appellant argued that his counsel conspired with the prosecutor to mislead him with respect to the sentences he received for his guilty pleas and that his trial counsel acted in bad faith. The circuit court treated the petition as an untimely Rule 37.1 and denied it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's ruling that Defendant's allegations should have been raised in a timely petition under Rule 37.1 was a correct statement of law. View "Ward v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the Pulaski County Assessor's denial of the Little Rock Municipal Airport Commission's tax exemption for three land parcels, holding that because the Airport used the unleased properties exclusively for public purposes, they were exempt from taxation.After the Assessor denied the Airport's application for tax exemptions the Airport filed four amended complaints. The circuit court granted the Assessor's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the properties were not exempt from taxation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Airport directly used the subject properties exclusively for public purposes when the properties were unleased; and (2) therefore, the properties exempt from taxation during the periods were they were unleased. View "City of Little Rock v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court denying the motion for summary judgment filed by Appellant Bear Chaney, in his official capacity as the Director of the Arkansas Assessment Coordination Division (AACD) of the State of Arkansas, holding the the circuit court erred as a matter of law in finding that Appellant was not entitled to sovereign immunity.Appellees appealed the county court's rulings denying their claims challenging the assessed values of their working interests as determined by the county assessor and added claims for injunctive relief against Chaney in his official capacity as the director of the AACD. Chaney moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims against him were barred. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred as a matter of law in finding that Chaney was not immune from suit; and (2) Chaney's argument that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award injunctive relief against him was outside the scope of this interlocutory appeal. View "Chaney v. Union Producing, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against Arkansas Development Finance Authority (ADFA), holding that Ark. Const. art. V, 20 immunized ADFA from Plaintiffs' claims.Plaintiffs sued the ADFA, alleging breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and unjust enrichment. ADFA filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that it was entitled to sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the relief Plaintiffs sought would control the action of the State their claims were barred by article 5, section 20, and ADFA was entitled to sovereign immunity. View "Arkansas Development Finance Authority v. Wiley" on Justia Law