Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed four acts passed by the Arkansas General Assembly that were challenged by the League of Women Voters of Arkansas and other appellees. The acts in question were Acts 736, 973, 249, and 728 of 2021, which pertained to various aspects of the election process, including the verification of voter signatures on absentee ballots, the deadline for in-person delivery of absentee ballots, the requirement for voters to present valid photographic identification, and the prohibition of certain activities within 100 feet of a voting location. The circuit court had previously ruled these acts unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their enforcement.The circuit court's decision was based on the argument that the acts violated various provisions of the Arkansas Constitution and would burden lawful, eligible voters in the exercise of their right to vote. The appellants, including John Thurston in his official capacity as Secretary of State for the State of Arkansas and members of the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners, appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the acts were not clearly incompatible with the sections of the Arkansas Constitution as alleged by the appellees. The court found that the acts were neutral on their face and did not contain any discriminatory classifications. The court also found that the acts did not add voter qualifications beyond those contained in the constitution, nor did they violate the free and equal election clause of the Arkansas Constitution. The court concluded that the circuit court erred in its application of strict scrutiny to the acts and in its finding that the acts violated various constitutional provisions. The court's decision resulted in the reversal and dismissal of the circuit court's ruling. View "THURSTON V. THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Raymond Bailey, a probationer who signed a waiver allowing law enforcement to conduct warrantless searches of his person, residence, and vehicle. In June 2020, North Little Rock Police observed Bailey engaging in suspicious activities indicative of illegal drug transactions. They discovered that Bailey was on probation and had signed a search waiver. Upon detaining Bailey, they found a key to a motel room, which they subsequently searched, finding heroin and drug paraphernalia. Bailey was charged, but he moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the police did not have probable cause to believe that the motel room was his residence.The Pulaski County Circuit Court granted Bailey's motion to suppress, ruling that law enforcement must have probable cause to believe that the place to be searched is the probationer's residence. The court found that the police did not have probable cause to believe that the motel room was Bailey's residence, and therefore, the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. The State of Arkansas appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Arkansas disagreed with the lower court's ruling. The Supreme Court held that the correct legal standard requires law enforcement to have a reasonable suspicion, based on the totality of the circumstances, to believe the place to be searched is the probationer's residence if conducting a search under that provision. The court found that the police had a reasonable suspicion that Bailey was residing in the motel room, making the search permissible under the statute and consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision to suppress the evidence and remanded the case back to the circuit court. View "STATE OF ARKANSAS v. BAILEY" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed a case involving four acts passed by the Arkansas General Assembly concerning the election process. The League of Women Voters of Arkansas and other appellees challenged the constitutionality of these acts, which were subsequently deemed unconstitutional by the circuit court and permanently enjoined. The appellants, including John Thurston in his official capacity as Secretary of State for the State of Arkansas and members of the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners, appealed this decision.The circuit court had ruled that the acts violated various provisions of the Arkansas Constitution and would burden lawful, eligible voters in the exercise of their right to vote. The appellants argued that the acts were enacted to protect the integrity of Arkansas elections by preventing fraudulent voting and to promote public confidence in election security. The circuit court applied strict scrutiny to the acts, finding that they failed to advance a compelling government interest or were not the least-restrictive infringement on the rights guaranteed by the Arkansas Constitution.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the acts were not clearly incompatible with the sections of the Arkansas Constitution as alleged by the appellees. The court found that the acts were neutral on their face and did not contain any discriminatory classes, thus not invoking equal protection. The court also found that the acts did not violate the free and equal election clause, the voter qualifications clause, or the free speech and free assembly clauses of the Arkansas Constitution. The court concluded that the circuit court had erred in its application of strict scrutiny and in its findings that the acts violated these constitutional provisions. The case was dismissed. View "THURSTON V. THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

A group of online travel companies (OTCs), including Hotels.com, Expedia, and Priceline, were found liable by the Jefferson County Circuit Court for unpaid taxes under several Arkansas tax statutes. The court ordered the OTCs to pay the unpaid taxes, along with penalties, interest, and attorney's fees. The OTCs appealed, arguing that the court erred in imposing the taxes and awarding penalties.The case began in 2009 when the Pine Bluff Advertising and Promotion Commission and Jefferson County, Arkansas, filed a declaratory-judgment action against the OTCs, seeking a declaration that the OTCs were liable for local gross receipts tax and local tourism tax. The City of North Little Rock intervened in the case in 2011, alleging a similar claim. The circuit court granted class certification in 2013. In 2018, the circuit court denied the OTCs' motion for summary judgment and granted the class appellees' motion, finding that the OTCs were liable for the taxes.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that the OTCs were not entities subject to the pre-2019 versions of the state and local gross receipts tax and the state tourism tax. The court also found that the OTCs did not rent, lease, or furnish rooms under the plain meaning of the local tourism tax statute. Therefore, the court held that the OTCs were not liable for the pre-2019 hotel taxes. The court did not address the OTCs' remaining arguments for reversal. View "HOTELS.COM, L.P. V. PINE BLUFF ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION COMMISSION" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Maurice Richardson, who was convicted of second-degree murder, rape, and abuse of a corpse. The victim, Tonia Tran, was found suffocated to death, severely beaten, and with vaginal injuries. Evidence linked Richardson to the crime, including Tran's blood found in his bedroom and her car, her body wrapped in a bedspread matching pillow shams from his home, and a cigarette butt with his DNA near her body. Richardson had initially denied his relationship with Tran but later admitted to living with her and having sex recently. However, he denied involvement in the murder.Richardson was initially charged with first-degree murder, rape, and abuse of a corpse. He moved for a directed verdict on all charges, arguing insufficient evidence to prove he caused Tran's death, that Tran was alive during the sexual activity, or that it was done for sexual gratification. He also argued that there was no evidence he knowingly mistreated or concealed a corpse in an offensive manner. The circuit court denied the motions, and the jury convicted him of second-degree murder, rape, and abuse of a corpse. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to sixty years’ imprisonment, life imprisonment, and thirty years’ imprisonment, respectively.In the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Richardson argued that insufficient evidence supported his murder and rape convictions. The court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, found substantial evidence to support the convictions. The court noted that Richardson's DNA was found near Tran's body, her blood was found in his bedroom and her car, and her body was wrapped in bedding matching items from his home. The court also noted Richardson's attempts to conceal the crime, including moving a blood-stained mattress and Tran's belongings, buying new bedding, and lying about his relationship with Tran. The court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Richardson v. State" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the appellant, Jacovan Bush, who was convicted of capital murder, aggravated residential burglary, aggravated robbery, and theft of property. The charges stemmed from an incident where men broke into Devon Howard's apartment and killed him. Bush was arrested after his blood was found at the crime scene and matched the DNA samples. Bush's defense argued that the blood stains were dry when found, suggesting they were shed before the murder. However, a crime-scene specialist testified that a specific blood sample was fresh when she arrived but had dried by the time law enforcement finished clearing the scene.Prior to the trial, Bush had moved to exclude the crime-scene specialist's testimony, arguing it was improper expert testimony. The circuit court denied this motion. During the trial, the State presented several witnesses, including the crime-scene specialist, who testified about the blood evidence. After the State rested, Bush moved for a directed verdict on all counts, which the circuit court denied. The jury found Bush guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, plus an additional forty years.On appeal, Bush argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict due to insufficient evidence and in denying his motion to exclude the crime-scene specialist's testimony. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the convictions and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the crime-scene specialist's testimony. The court noted that the jury could have reasonably concluded that Bush was in the apartment around the time of the murder based on the DNA evidence and the testimony about the blood's condition. View "BUSH v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Union Pacific Railroad Company and its employee, Randy G. Franklin. Franklin, a long-time employee of Union Pacific, brought a gun to work and stored it in his locked vehicle, which was parked in Union Pacific's parking lot. This action was in compliance with Arkansas law, but violated Union Pacific's company policy that bans employees from carrying firearms onto its property. As a result, Union Pacific terminated Franklin's employment, which was later reduced to a lengthy suspension by an arbitration panel.Union Pacific filed a declaratory-judgment action in federal court, seeking a declaration that Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-5-117, which allows employees to store firearms in their vehicles on their employer's property, is preempted by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) when applied to Union Pacific parking lots in Arkansas. Franklin counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that Union Pacific must allow him to bring his firearm onto railroad property, as long as the firearm is legally possessed for a lawful purpose and stored out of sight in his locked car.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas certified a question to the Supreme Court of Arkansas: whether the prohibitions in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-5-117 are severable from the liability-immunity provisions in section 16-120-802(a) such that section 11-5-117 would still apply when the liability-immunity provisions of section 16-120-802(a) cannot apply.The Supreme Court of Arkansas answered the certified question in the affirmative. The court found that section 11-5-117, which protects the rights of employees to store firearms in their vehicles on their employer's property, is not dependent on the liability-immunity provisions of section 16-120-802. Therefore, even if the latter is preempted by FELA, section 11-5-117 is not likewise preempted. The court concluded that regardless of whether FELA preempts section 16-120-802(a), section 11-5-117 still applies. View "UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY V. FRANKLIN" on Justia Law

The appellant, Daryl Jason Scarbrough, was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery by the Pulaski County Circuit Court and sentenced to life imprisonment with an additional forty-year term. Scarbrough appealed the decision, arguing that the circuit court erred in granting the State's motions for continuance, denying his motion for continuance, denying his motion to suppress, allowing prejudicial remarks by the prosecutor, and admitting a map into evidence.The case revolved around the murder of David Dunn. Scarbrough was identified as a suspect and was arrested on an active parole-absconder warrant. He was found hiding in a flower bed, and his jeans, which had blood stains, were seized and sent for DNA testing. The DNA matched that of the victim and an unknown male. The State charged Scarbrough with capital murder and aggravated robbery.Scarbrough filed a motion to suppress the DNA evidence, arguing that the police had collected and examined the evidence without a search warrant. The State countered that Scarbrough was lawfully arrested on active warrants and that the clothes were seized pursuant to a search incident to arrest. The circuit court denied Scarbrough's motion to suppress the blood evidence.At trial, the prosecutor referred to Scarbrough as a "homicidal hitchhiker" during the opening statement. Scarbrough objected and moved for a mistrial, which was denied by the circuit court. The court also admitted into evidence a map made by AT&T showing the location of cell-phone pings made from the victim's phone shortly after his murder.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court's decision. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motions for continuance and denying Scarbrough's motion for continuance. It also found that the circuit court did not err in denying Scarbrough's motion to suppress the blood evidence, allowing the prosecutor's remarks, and admitting the map into evidence. The court reviewed the record for all errors prejudicial to Scarbrough, as required by Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a), and found no reversible error. View "SCARBROUGH v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

In 2018, John Patrick Cullen pleaded nolo contendere to second-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to seventy-two months' imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction or sentence. In 2021 and 2022, Cullen filed petitions for writ of error coram nobis and writ of habeas corpus in the Garland County Circuit Court, alleging his innocence based on new evidence. This evidence included statements from the victim, Kathi Brinkley, which Cullen claimed contained factual errors, and an admission from a second individual, Kati Knight, that she did not witness the assault. Cullen also argued that the affidavit supporting his arrest contained fabrications by Brinkley.The Garland County Circuit Court denied Cullen's petitions, finding that he had failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted and had not asserted any grounds for which he could successfully pursue these claims. Cullen appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Arkansas.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Cullen's claim of actual innocence was not cognizable under current law and that his allegations regarding Knight's admissions had been abandoned on appeal. Therefore, the court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cullen's petition for writ of error coram nobis. Regarding the writ of habeas corpus, the court found that Cullen had failed to state a colorable claim under the relevant statute and had not alleged that his sentence was illegal or that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court concluded that the lower court did not have personal jurisdiction to issue a writ even if Cullen had stated a legitimate ground for relief, as his second habeas petition was not filed in the correct jurisdiction. View "CULLEN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

The case involves Damien Echols, one of the "West Memphis Three," who was convicted for the murder of three eight-year-old boys in 1993. Echols, along with Jason Baldwin and Jessie Misskelley, were found guilty, with Echols receiving a death sentence. In 2011, Echols entered an Alford plea, maintaining his innocence but acknowledging the prosecution's evidence, and was released from prison. Echols sought further DNA testing of the evidence using new technology, arguing that it could potentially identify the true perpetrator(s) of the crime.Previously, the Crittenden County Circuit Court denied Echols's petition for additional DNA testing under Act 1780, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction as Echols was not in State custody. The court interpreted Act 1780 as a form of habeas corpus relief, traditionally available only to those in State custody. Echols appealed this decision, arguing that the plain language of Act 1780 allows any person convicted of a crime to petition for additional DNA testing to demonstrate actual innocence, regardless of their custody status.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. The court found that the plain language of Act 1780 unambiguously permits "a person convicted of a crime" to petition for additional DNA testing to demonstrate actual innocence. The court held that the lower court had misinterpreted the plain language of Act 1780 by imposing a requirement that a petitioner must be in State custody to seek relief under the Act. The court concluded that Echols, as a person convicted of a crime, was entitled to seek relief under Act 1780, regardless of his custody status. View "ECHOLS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law