Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Zachary Oxley and Tiffani Davis are the natural parents of MC1, born in June 2011. They were never married and had a brief relationship. After their separation, Davis had another child, MC2, with an unknown father and later married Patrick Davis. In 2016, during their divorce proceedings, Larry Lumpkins intervened, seeking custody of MC1 and MC2, claiming in loco parentis status. The court granted Lumpkins temporary custody, and Oxley later intervened to establish paternity of MC1, which was confirmed through DNA testing.The Lonoke County Circuit Court awarded custody of MC1 and MC2 to Lumpkins in 2018, granting Oxley visitation rights. Oxley did not appeal this initial custody order. In 2020, Oxley filed a petition to modify custody, alleging Lumpkins failed to comply with the visitation schedule and neglected MC1’s hygiene and care. The circuit court held a hearing in 2021, where Oxley presented evidence of Lumpkins’s neglect and obstruction of visitation. Despite expressing concerns, the court denied Oxley’s petition, citing the ad litem’s recommendation to keep MC1 and MC2 together and reinstated visitation for Oxley.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred by not applying the presumption in favor of Oxley as MC1’s fit, natural parent. The court held that a fit, natural parent is entitled to custody unless proven unfit, which was not established in this case. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision, remanded with instructions to award Oxley sole primary custody of MC1, and vacated the court of appeals opinion. The mandate was issued immediately to facilitate MC1’s transition to Oxley’s custody. View "OXLEY v. LUMPKINS" on Justia Law

Terry Break was convicted in 2021 of multiple child sexual abuse offenses, including rape, second-degree sexual assault, and sexual indecency with a child, involving three minor victims. He received six life sentences plus 488 years in prison and $425,000 in fines. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Break then filed a Rule 37 petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds.The Boone County Circuit Court denied Break's petition. The court found that the State had provided sufficient evidence of "sexual gratification or desire" for the offenses, and thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge this element. The court also found that the prosecutor's comment during closing arguments, referring to Break as a "proven liar," was based on Break's own admissions and was not improper. Additionally, the court determined that the prosecutor's opening statement did not shift the burden of proof, as it referred to Break's demeanor during a recorded interview rather than his silence at trial. Lastly, the court acknowledged that the prosecutor's biblical reference during closing arguments was improper but concluded that Break failed to show that trial counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that Break failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of his trial. The court emphasized that Break did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of ineffective assistance and that the decisions made by his trial counsel fell within the range of reasonable professional judgment. View "BREAK v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Ronald Russell was charged with internet stalking of a child after engaging in online conversations with a police detective posing as a fourteen-year-old girl. The detective, using the Whisper social media app, arranged a meeting with Russell, who was subsequently arrested. During discovery, it was revealed that the State did not possess earlier communications between Russell and the detective, as they had been deleted by the detective. Russell filed a motion in limine to exclude the preserved communications, arguing that without the context of the deleted messages, the evidence would be misleading and prejudicial.The Benton County Circuit Court granted Russell’s motion in limine, ruling that the preserved messages were inadmissible. The court did not find a Brady violation but analyzed the issue under due process principles from California v. Trombetta and Arizona v. Youngblood. The court concluded that the State failed to show the deleted messages had no exculpatory value, were available by other means, or were deleted in good faith according to standard procedures.The State of Arkansas appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, arguing that the circuit court erred in its ruling. However, the Supreme Court of Arkansas dismissed the appeal, stating that it lacked jurisdiction under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Criminal 3(a). The court determined that the appeal was from an order granting a motion in limine, not a motion to suppress seized evidence as required by Rule 3(a)(1). Consequently, the appeal did not meet the criteria for interlocutory review, and the motion to dismiss the appeal was granted. View "STATE OF ARKANSAS v. RUSSELL" on Justia Law

Lavoyce Wilder was convicted of two counts of rape, three counts of first-degree sexual assault, and two counts of sexual indecency with a child. He was sentenced to two life terms, three thirty-year terms, and two six-year terms, all to run concurrently. Wilder appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. Wilder then filed a petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1, which was denied and dismissed by the Pike County Circuit Court.In his petition, Wilder argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for various reasons, including failing to preserve the record, provide witness statements, and introduce evidence. He also claimed prosecutorial misconduct, denial of a fair trial, and a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court found that most of Wilder’s claims were related to trial strategy and did not demonstrate entitlement to relief. The court specifically addressed two claims: the inability of a witness to testify due to a stroke and the alleged impact of trial counsel’s hearing-aid malfunction, finding neither would have changed the trial's outcome.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court noted that most of Wilder’s claims on appeal were not raised in the lower court and thus could not be addressed. The court also found that Wilder’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel were either not substantiated or were matters of trial strategy. The court concluded that Wilder failed to demonstrate he was entitled to postconviction relief and affirmed the denial of his Rule 37.1 petition. View "WILDER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Aaron Spencer was charged with second-degree murder and a firearm enhancement for the shooting death of Michael Fosler. Fosler had been charged with sexual offenses against Spencer’s daughter and was out on bond. On the night of the incident, Spencer found his daughter in Fosler’s truck and forced it off the road, resulting in an altercation where Spencer shot Fosler, who died at the scene. The case garnered significant media attention, leading the State to request a gag order to preserve the integrity of the jury pool and ensure a fair trial.The Lonoke County Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for a gag order without holding a hearing. The order restricted various parties, including attorneys, public officials, and Spencer’s family, from making public statements about the case. Spencer opposed the gag order, arguing it violated his constitutional rights to a fair and public trial and free speech. He filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Arkansas Supreme Court, seeking to vacate the gag order.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the gag order was overly broad, vague, and lacked a factual basis. The court held that the order constituted a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion. The court emphasized that gag orders should be a last resort and must be narrowly tailored based on specific factual findings. The court granted Spencer’s petition for writ of certiorari, issued the writ, and vacated the circuit court’s gag order. The court did not preclude the possibility of a subsequent, more narrowly tailored gag order after an evidentiary hearing. View "SPENCER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

The Attorney General of Arkansas sued the Arkansas Board of Corrections for violating the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The complaint alleged that the Board violated the open-meetings provision of the FOIA and failed to adequately respond to the Attorney General’s open-records request. The Attorney General sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including enjoining the Board’s employment of special counsel. The circuit court ordered the Attorney General to either certify special counsel for the Board or reach an accommodation regarding the Board’s legal representation within thirty days, or the complaint would be dismissed without prejudice. The Attorney General argued that he could not legally comply with the court’s order.The Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice after the Attorney General failed to comply with the order. The court found that the Attorney General had not made material and good faith efforts to help the Board obtain special counsel and cited email correspondence showing a lack of communication with the Board’s current special counsel. The Attorney General appealed the dismissal, arguing that he could not legally comply with the court’s order.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and held that the Attorney General could not legally comply with the circuit court’s order. The court found that the Attorney General had no statutory duty to represent the Board until the Board certified its need for representation. Additionally, the Attorney General alone could not authorize or pay for special counsel without approval from the Governor and the Legislative Council. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order dismissing the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also denied the Attorney General’s motion to disqualify the Board’s special counsel without prejudice, allowing the circuit court to address the issue on remand. View "GRIFFIN v. ARKANSAS BOARD OF CORRECTIONS" on Justia Law

Deric Smith was convicted by a jury in the Jefferson County Circuit Court of capital murder for the shooting death of Emmanuel Foster and first-degree battery for wounding Jason Anderson. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder and fifteen years for the battery, with additional firearm enhancements. Smith appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the capital murder conviction and that the State failed to disprove his justification defense.Smith was charged with premeditated and deliberate capital murder and first-degree battery, with firearm enhancements. He claimed justification as a defense. Smith and his girlfriend, Lamiesha Toney, were tried together. The victims were shot while in Smith’s car, and Smith and Toney later surrendered to the police. Toney initially claimed she shot the victims in self-defense, but other witnesses suggested Smith was the shooter. Smith testified that he shot Anderson and Foster in self-defense during a struggle over a gun.The circuit court denied Smith’s motion for a directed verdict, and the jury convicted him. Smith argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in denying his directed-verdict motion and that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation. The Arkansas Supreme Court declined to consider the directed-verdict argument because Smith presented evidence in his defense after the State rested. The court found substantial evidence supporting premeditation, noting Smith’s testimony and the nature of Foster’s fatal wound.Smith also argued that the State failed to disprove his justification defense. The court held that the jury was instructed on justification and was within its authority to reject Smith’s self-defense claim. The jury could reasonably conclude that shooting Foster in the back of the head was not justified. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "SMITH v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Boyle Ventures, LLC (Boyle) operates franchised retail pet stores selling cats and dogs from USDA-regulated breeders. After obtaining a business license in Fayetteville, the City Council passed Ordinance No. 6587, prohibiting such sales unless the animals were obtained from approved shelters or rescue organizations. Boyle filed suit against the City, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance violated Arkansas statutes, injunctive relief, and damages under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. The parties agreed to a temporary restraining order, preventing the Ordinance from taking effect. Before the circuit court could rule, the City repealed the Ordinance, rendering the declaratory relief moot. The circuit court ultimately ruled in favor of the City, finding the Ordinance conflicted with state law but that the City was protected by qualified immunity.The Benton County Circuit Court dismissed Boyle's complaint, finding that the Ordinance conflicted with state law but that the City was immune from damages as it did not violate clearly established constitutional rights. Boyle appealed, arguing the Ordinance violated the Arkansas Constitution and that the City was not immune from damages. The City cross-appealed, arguing the Ordinance did not violate state law.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and held that the circuit court erred in finding the Ordinance violated state law because it never went into effect and did not deprive Boyle of any rights or cause damages. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit court's decision on the cross-appeal and remanded for dismissal. The direct appeal and any remaining issues were dismissed as moot. View "BOYLE VENTURES, LLC V. CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE" on Justia Law

In 2018, Jodeci K. Norvel entered a negotiated guilty plea and received an eighteen-year sentence for battery in the first degree and possession of firearms by certain persons. His sentencing order included a note that he had two prior residential burglaries and should serve flat time. Norvel later filed a petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and a writ of mandamus, arguing that under Act 683 of 2023, he was eligible for parole because his sentencing order did not expressly designate that he was sentenced under the relevant statute.The Pulaski County Circuit Court granted Norvel’s petition, finding that Act 683 applied to him and that he was eligible for parole. The court determined that Norvel’s sentencing order did not contain an express designation under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B), as required by the statute.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the notation on Norvel’s sentencing order did not constitute an express designation that he was sentenced under section 16-93-609. The court emphasized that the statute requires a clear and unmistakable reference to the specific section, which was not present in Norvel’s sentencing order. The court also rejected the appellants’ argument that the circuit court’s interpretation of Act 683 led to absurd results contrary to legislative intent, citing its previous decision in Rodgers v. Arkansas Parole Board. Consequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order, granting Norvel the relief he sought. View "ARKANSAS POST-PRISON TRANSFER BOARD v. NORVEL" on Justia Law

Amber Dawn Waterman was charged in Benton County, Arkansas, with two counts of premeditated and deliberated capital murder for the deaths of Ashley Bush and her unborn child, Valkyrie Grace Willis. Waterman had previously pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri to kidnapping resulting in death and kidnapping resulting in the death of an unborn child. She was sentenced to two life sentences in federal court.In the Benton County Circuit Court, Waterman entered pleas of not guilty and former jeopardy, and filed a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-114 and the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court denied her motion, finding that the state charges were not barred by double jeopardy.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the federal and state charges each required proof of different facts and were intended to prevent substantially different harms or evils. The federal charges required proof of kidnapping and interstate transport, while the state charges required proof of premeditated and deliberated intent to cause death. Therefore, the prosecution in Arkansas was not barred by Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-114.Additionally, the court declined Waterman's request to interpret the Arkansas Constitution's double jeopardy provision more broadly than the federal provision, thereby upholding the dual sovereignty doctrine. The court concluded that the Arkansas Constitution does not prohibit Waterman’s state prosecution under these circumstances. The decision of the Benton County Circuit Court was affirmed. View "WATERMAN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law