Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant pled guilty to one count of misdemeanor domestic battering in the third degree and three counts of felony terroristic threatening in the first degree. Appellant was placed on probation and ordered to serve 120 days in confinement. Thereafter, Appellant pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his probation. Two years later, Appellant again pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his probation. At issue during sentencing was whether Appellant was entitled to jail-time credit for the time he previously served in confinement when he was first placed on probation. The circuit court ultimately awarded Petitioner thirty-one days’ jail-time credit to account for the time he spent incarcerated between his arrest and the final hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to jail-time credit under either Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-404 or Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-309(c). View "Burgess v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery, residential burglary, and third-degree battery and sentenced to an aggregate term of 540 months’ imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner later filed the instant motion seeking at public expense a copy of the transcript lodged on direct appeal, stating that he was preparing a petition for writ of habeas corpus to be filed in federal court. Petitioner appended an affidavit of indigency to the motion. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that Petitioner failed to establish a compelling need for a copy of the transcript from the direct appeal. View "Bowerman v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences. Appellant subsequently filed a timely postconviction petition alleging that the trial court was biased and that his two attorneys failed effectively to represent him. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under Strickland v. Washington, Appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by his attorneys’ performance; and (2) the trial court did not err when it denied Appellant’s claim for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. View "Stover v. State" on Justia Law

Corina Mendoza was a passenger in the backseat of a vehicle operated by Anthony Adams when Adams ran into the back of a parked excavator. Mendoza filed a complaint against Adams and WIS International, Inc. and Washington Inventory Services, Inc. (collectively, WIS) seeking damages for her injuries and alleging that Adams was acting in the course of his employment with WIS at the time of the accident. WIS and Adams pled the affirmative defense of comparative fault, citing Mendoza’s failure to wear a seat belt at the time of the accident. WIS and Adams then filed motions challenging the constitutionality of Ark. Code Ann. 27-37-703, which restricts the admissibility of seat belt nonuse in civil actions. The Supreme Court accepted a request from the district court to determine the certified question of whether section 27-37-703 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that section 27-37-703 is procedural and therefore offends the principle of separation of powers under article 4, section 2 of amendment 80, section 3 of the Arkansas Constitution. View "Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants filed a complaint for breach of contract, non-disclosure, rescission, damages, and negligence against Appellees. Appellants obtained a default judgment. Appellees moved to set aside the default judgment on the grounds that the summons was defective on its face. The circuit court granted the motion and set aside the default judgment due to the defective summons and resulting lack of personal jurisdiction over Appellees. Appellees then filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice on the grounds that service was never completed and that the savings statute did not apply. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s ruling setting aside the default judgment, as the summons failed strictly to comply with the requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(b); and (2) reversed the dismissal with prejudice, holding that Appellants were entitled to the benefit of the savings statute. View "Jones v. Douglas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of capital murder ad sentenced to death. The jury sentenced Appellant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying an instruction on the extreme-emotional-disturbance formulation of manslaughter, as there was no rational basis to warrant an instruction of manslaughter; (2) the circuit court did not err by denying Appellant access to certain Arkansas Department of Correction records, as Appellant failed to meet the requirements of Ark. R. Crim. P. 17.4; and (3) no reversible error was determined to exist under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(i) or Ark. R. App. P.-Crim. 10(b). View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Appellant was found guilty of internet stalking of a child and sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. After the court of appeals’ mandate was issued, Appellant filed in the trial court a pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. The original petition was not properly verified. The trial court nonetheless held a hearing on the petition and denied it. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal without reaching its merits on the grounds that the petition filed in the trial court was subject to dismissal because Appellant did not comply with Rule 37.1(c) because he failed to file a properly verified petition within the time allowed by the Rule. View "Hendrix v. State" on Justia Law

Dale Ladd hired Hammerhead Contracting & Development, LLC to build a house. After a dispute arose regarding the amount owed for the construction of Ladd’s home, Brandon Holmes filed a Laborer’s, Mechanic’s, or Materialman’s Lien on behalf of the LLC for the amount of $101,676, the additional amount Hammerhead asserted that Ladd owed. Ladd filed suit against Holmes to remove the lien. Hammerhead then filed an amended complaint against Ladd seeking judgment for the $101,676. The cases were consolidated. The circuit court (1) granted Ladd’s motion to dismiss Hammerhead’s complaint because of its failure to give the notice required by Ark. Code Ann. 18-44-115; (2) granted summary judgment in favor of Ladd on Ladd’s complaint and ordered the lien canceled; and (3) found that Ark. Code Ann. 18-44-115(a)(4), which bars suit by a contractor who fails to provide statutory notice, is constitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the direct-sales exception in Ark. Code Ann. 18-44-115(a)(8) to the residential preconstruction-notice requirement can never apply to a contractor. View "Hammerhead Contracting & Dev. v. Ladd" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an application for in-forma-pauperis status. Because the circuit court denied Appellant’s in-forma-pauperis petition, the circuit court would not file mark the relevant pleadings until Appellant paid the assessed fees. Instead of paying the fees, Appellant appealed. The clerk of the Supreme Court rejected the record tendered on appeal because it lacked a file-marked copy of the order denying Appellant’s application for in-forma-pauperis status. Appellant then filed a motion for rule on clerk. The Supreme Court granted Appellant’s motion for rule on clerk and remanded the record with directions for the circuit court to submit all relevant pleadings properly file marked and certified by the circuit clerk. When the circuit court returned the record to the Supreme Court, the relevant documents were stamped “received” rather than “filed.” The Supreme Court issued an order to show cause why the circuit clerk should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the Supreme Court’s unambiguous direction to provide a record that was file marked in accordance with Administrative Order 2(b)(2). View "Halfacre v. Kelley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. Defendant was sentenced to ten years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel failed to object to testimony that allegedly bolstered the victim’s credibility. The circuit court denied Defendant’s claim, concluding that defense counsel’s failure to object was based on trial strategy and that his performance was not deficient. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that counsel’s failure to object was based on trial strategy. View "Fukunaga v. State" on Justia Law