Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Gerber Products Company d/b/a Nestle Infant Nutrition d/b/a Nestle Nutrition USA d/b/a Nestle Nutrition USA-Infant Nutrition d/b/a Nestle Nutrition USA-Performance Nutrition (“Gerber”) appealed a circuit court order granting partial summary judgment in favor of appellees in their case alleging Gerber’s liability for failure to pay certain overtime wages in violation of the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (“AMWA”). Appellees were employed by Gerber at its baby food processing and manufacturing facility located in Fort Smith. Specifically, the employees alleged that Gerber failed to compensate the employees for their time spent donning and doffing clothing and protective gear, sanitizing clothing and equipment, washing their hands, and walking to and from their work stations. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The employees argued that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Gerber did not pay the employees for their time spent donning, doffing, washing, walking, and waiting. Both parties’ motions for summary judgment were initially denied. However, a hearing was held on the cross-motions for summary judgment, and the circuit court orally announced from the bench that it was changing its earlier order in favor of the employees, finding that the AMWA required Gerber to “treat the time required by employees to complete the mandatory donning and doffing activities at issue in this lawsuit as compensable work time, notwithstanding any contrary custom or practice under a collective bargaining agreement applicable to those employees or any express agreement.” On appeal, Gerber argued that the circuit court erred in granting the employees’ motion for partial summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment. View "Gerber Prods. Co. v. Hewitt" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Randle was found guilty by jury of capital murder in the death of Ranson Harrison, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Randle appealed, and his conviction and sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Randle filed a timely petition under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2008); however, the petition was not verified. In October 2015, the trial court denied relief, and Randle appealed. The State petitioned that the appeal be dismissed, arguing that Randle’s Rule 37.1 petition was not verified, which required dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Rule 37.1(d). The State additionally argued that Randle’s claim on appeal arose out of a pleading he filed challenging the State’s response to his Rule 37.1 petition. Because he had not sought leave to amend, Randle’s responsive pleading could not be considered an amended Rule 37.1 petition. Consequently, the State contended that appellate review of the claim was precluded because it was raised for the first time on appeal. After review, the Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with the State’s claims regarding dismissal of Randle’s appeal. View "Randle v. Arkansas" on Justia Law

In 2013, appellant Roy Russell was found guilty by a jury of second-degree battery and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to serve 180 months’ imprisonment and 480 months’ imprisonment, respectively, to be served consecutively for a total of 660 months. The circuit court entered the sentencing order and stated each offense and sentence. The order also stated that the aggregate term of imprisonment to be served by Russell was 480 months, rather than the 660 months. A few weeks later, the circuit court entered an amended sentencing order that stated that a total sentence of 660 months’ imprisonment had been imposed. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. In 2016, Russell, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was being illegally held on an invalid conviction. Russell alleged that his 2013 sentencing order was invalid on its face and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order. The circuit court denied Russell’s petition on the ground that Russell had not stated a ground for the writ. Russell appealed, contending the circuit court erred in denying his requested relief. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Russell v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Appellant Shawn Whiteside was an inmate incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC). Whiteside filed a petition for judicial review of a decision by the Arkansas Parole Board (Parole Board). Whiteside alleged that the Parole Board considered him for parole and made a final decision declining to grant a transfer to the Department of Community Correction (DCC). He attached a copy of a document in support of that claim, a “Record of Release Consideration,” reflecting a hearing on May 24, 2015, and the denial of a request for reconsideration. Whiteside alleged deprivation of a conditional liberty interest in that the controlling statutes did not allow the ADC discretion in deferring a transfer for the offenses for which he was incarcerated. The circuit court dismissed the petition and counted it as a “strike” under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-68-607 (Repl. 2005). The court found that Whiteside failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted in that Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-15-212(a) did not allow actions by persons incarcerated in the ADC and Whiteside had failed to demonstrate the requisite liberty interest in order to raise a due-process exception. Whiteside appealed the order, contending he indeed established a liberty interest to support his claim. The Arkansas Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that there is no liberty interest in parole in Arkansas." State statutes may create liberty interests that are entitled to the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause, but not every statute creates a liberty interest for due-process purposes. The Supreme Court found that even if Whiteside were correct in his claim that those inmates who meet the statute’s criteria have a statutorily created liberty interest in transfer or parole, he did not state facts to demonstrate that he has satisfied the statute’s criteria to be qualified for a mandatory transfer. Therefore, the Court affirmed dismissal of Whiteside's petition. View "Whiteside v. Ark. Parole Bd" on Justia Law

The City of Russellville created the City Corporation to operate, maintain, and improve the city’s municipal waterworks system. The City Corporation managed a water treatment plant that provided potable drinking water to the residents of Russellville. In 1998, Carrothers Construction Company of Arkansas, LLC (Carrothers) constructed an expansion of the water-treatment plant. Carrothers purchased several items of machinery and equipment for the project. Carrothers installed this machinery and equipment for an extensive three-phase water treatment process at the Russellville plant. In 2004, the auditor for the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DFA) conducted an audit of Carrothers’s records pertaining to its activities and purchases in 1999 and 2000 in performing its contractual obligations to expand the Russellville water treatment plant. The auditor determined that Carrothers purchased personal property from out-of-state vendors and that these purchases were subjected to Arkansas’s state and local use taxes, plus interest. Carrothers objected to the assessments, resulting in a lawsuit to challenge the tax assessments, and to demand refund of additional use taxes paid. Carrothers filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that, as a matter of law, it qualified for a manufacturing exemption. In 2015, the circuit court granted Carrothers’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that Carrothers was entitled to the manufacturing exemption. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "Carrothers acquired materials and constructed a facility to treat and clean the water, but it did not manufacture the water. Thus, Carrothers is not entitled to the manufacturing exemption," and therefore not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. View "Walther v. Carrothers Constr. Co. of Ark." on Justia Law

Dion Robinson was charged by information with committing four counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of felony theft of property, and one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Robinson was incarcerated following a guilty plea, and the circuit court sentenced Robinson to a twenty-year sentence. All of the sentences were set to run concurrently. Robinson appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the circuit court erred in not granting a hearing on his petition. Finding no error in the circuit court’s summary denial of Robinson’s petition, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Robinson v. Arkansas" on Justia Law

Appellant Edward Reynolds appealed after a jury found him guilty of kidnapping and aggravated assault. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and fifteen years’ imprisonment, respectively. On appeal, Reynolds contended that the circuit court erred by: (1) denying his directed-verdict motions on both charges; (2) allowing the victim to testify about her injuries despite the prosecutor’s failure to provide her medical records in discovery; and (3) overruling his objection to remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Reynolds v. Arkansas" on Justia Law

Convent Corporation brought an interlocutory appeal of a circuit court’s order denying Convent’s motion for class certification; dismissing without prejudice Convent’s trespass claim and its federal and state statutory claims; and denying Convent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment, after concluding that there remained genuine issues of material fact. Of these findings, however, only the circuit court’s denial of Convent’s motion for class certification was appealable on an interlocutory basis. On that issue, the circuit court found that because Convent did not present any evidence at a hearing, there was no basis on which to determine whether Convent met the requirements set forth by Rule 23 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure for class certification. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court found that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Convent’s motion solely on Convent’s failure to present evidence at the hearing without considering the evidence in the record, which would have included any admissible evidence submitted as exhibits by the parties in support of their contentions that the motion for class certification should have been granted or denied. View "Convent Corp. v. City of N. Little Rock" on Justia Law

In 1994, Petitioner was convicted of the rape of a boy and sentenced to thirty years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed. In 2016, Petitioner filed a petition seeking reinvestment of jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the case. Petitioner also filed a motion asking that the petition be granted. The Supreme Court denied the petition and the motion, holding (1) with the exception of the allegations that could possibly be construed as claims that certain material was omitted from the trial record by the State, Petitioner failed to state a ground under which a writ of error coram nobis could issue; and (2) as to Petitioner’s allegations that material was omitted from the trial court, there was no ground for the writ. View "Ashby v. State" on Justia Law

The circuit court granted Janet Autry’s petition to be appointed temporary guardian of Louise Sheperd. Pam and Don Beckham were allowed to intervene. The circuit court appointed the Beckhams guardians of Sheperd and First Community Bank of Searcy as the guardian of Sheperd’s estate. The court of appeals reversed. Before the mandate issued, Timothy Whaley filed an ex parte petition to be appointed temporary guardian and permanent guardian of Sheperd. Before the circuit court took action, the Beckhams filed another petition to intervene and for appointment as guardians. The circuit court denied Whaley’s motion to dismiss the Beckhams’ motion to intervene, granted the Beckhams’ intervention, and reappointed the Beckhams as temporary guardians of the person of Sheperd and First Community Bank as guardian of the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Whaley’s motion to dismiss the Beckhams’ motion for leave to intervene in the probate proceedings. View "Whaley v. Beckham" on Justia Law