Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellees were prisoners under sentences of death for capital murder. Appellees filed an amended complaint against the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) challenging the constitutionality of Act 1096 of 2015, which establishes the current method by which executions are to be conducted in Arkansas. The circuit court granted summary judgment in part to ADC but denied ADC summary judgment on Appellees’ substantive due-process claim and cruel-or-unusual-punishment claim, concluding that these issues could not be decided as a matter of law because material questions of fact remained in dispute. ADC appealed, arguing that Appellees failed sufficiently to plead and prove the alleged constitutional violations in order to overcome ADC’s defense of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Appellees’ amended complaint, holding that the Act does not offend the Constitution. View "Kelley v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Drew May worked for Integrated Direct Marketing, LLC (IDM) as an executive vice president until his termination. May later began working for Merkle, Inc., a competitor of IDM. IDM filed a complaint against May and Markle alleging breach of contract and conversion, among other claims. The federal district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims except conversion. The court then certified to the Supreme Court the question whether, under Arkansas’s tort of conversion, intangible property such as electronic data, standing alone and not deemed a trade secret, can be converted. The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that, under Arkansas law, intangible property such as electronic data, standing alone and not deemed a trade secret, can be converted “if the actions of the defendant are in denial of or inconsistent with the rights of the owner or person entitled to possession.” View "Integrated Direct Mktg. Inc. v. May" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with one count of rape. When Gerald Crow was a circuit judge he authorized the issuance of an arrest warrant for Appellant. Crow also presided over Appellant’s plea-and-arraignment hearing. Crow then left his position as circuit judge. Crow subsequently entered an appearance as an attorney for Appellant. The State moved to disqualify Crow based on his former participation in the case as a judge. The circuit court concluded that Crow was prohibited from representing Floyd. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Crow previously participated in the case “personally and substantially” as a judge, Rule 1.12 of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct applied, and the State’s consent was required before Crow could participate as a lawyer. View "Floyd v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate, was convicted in 2008 of aggravated robbery. Petitioner was sentenced as a habitual offender to 600 months’ imprisonment. In 2016, Petitioner filed pleadings that the Supreme Court treated as a motion for rule on clerk, asking the Court to direct a circuit judge and circuit clerk to permit him to file pro se petitions for writs of habeas corpus and petitions for writs of mandamus. Petitioner contended that because he had not been granted indigent status, he was ordered to submit a filing fee that he could not afford, and because his pleadings and accompanying orders were not filed, he was prevented from appealing them. The Supreme Court noted that because it did not have a certified record, it was unable to determine what precisely occurred and whether Petitioner’s motion was moot. The Court then appointed a special master to ascertain what occurred in this case and the current status of Petitioner’s petition. View "Dunahue v. Dennis" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant contended that his trial counsel erroneously informed him regarding his parole eligibility under a plea offer, and, as a result, he rejected the plea offer and went to trial, where he received a less favorable outcome. The circuit court denied Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s findings were clearly erroneous. Remanded. View "Beavers v. State" on Justia Law

After the circuit court adjudicated the three children of Appellee to be neglected, the circuit court found that it was not in the best interest of the children to return to Appellee and granted permanent custody of the children to family members. The court of appeals reversed. The Department of Human Services filed a petition for review. The Supreme Court granted the petition and affirmed the circuit court, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that it was in Appellee’s three minor children’s best interest to be placed in the permanent custody of relatives and that there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s findings. View "Ponder v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Respondent Cindy Clough, as personal representative of the estate of Joyce Vinson, filed an amended complaint against Petitioners Capital SeniorCare Ventures, LLC, et al. (Capital SeniorCare) alleging the same claims as the original complaint she filed in this case and later voluntarily dismissed. Clough did not file a new civil cover sheet or pay a filing fee, and no new summonses were issued to Capital SeniorCare. The circuit court concluded that the case was closed. Clough subsequently filed a new complaint as a new case. Capital SeniorCare filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of service. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the amended complaint was void because it had been filed in a closed case. Capital SeniorCare filed the instant petition for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the petition for the writ on the ground that Capital SeniorCare had an adequate remedy in the form of an appeal. View "Capital SeniorCare Ventures LLC v. Circuit Court of Pulaski County" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant was convicted of two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant now filed a motion to recall the mandate entered following his direct appeal, asserting that the Court’s failure to raise sua sponte the issue of the submission of a single set of penalty-phase verdict forms following his conviction constituted a defect or breakdown in the appellate process sufficient to justify recall of the mandate. The Supreme Court granted the motion and reversed Appellant’s sentence of death, holding that the Court’s failure to raise the issue of the erroneous submission to the jury of a single set of forms constituted a defect in the appellate process. Remanded for resentencing. View "Wertz v. State" on Justia Law

In 1996, Appellant entered a guilty plea to charges of first-degree murder, arson, and first-degree battery. Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of forty years. The Department of Correction calculated Appellant’s earliest possible date for parole eligibility as being August 21, 2023. Appellant filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, asserting that the Department incorrectly calculated his parole-eligibility date because it was required to calculate the date based on his presumptive sentence, not the sentence imposed. The circuit court denied Appellant’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that the petition counted as a “strike” pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-68-607. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Appellant’s petition, but (2) erred in concluding that the petition fell within those that would constitute a “strike” under section 16-68-607. View "Waller v. Kelley" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was ordered to serve five years’ probation after pleading guilty to attempted delivery of cocaine. The circuit court ultimately revoked Defendant’s probation, finding that he had violated the conditions of his probation by committing offenses punishable by imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. In 2013, Defendant filed a Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 petition, alleging several claims of error. The circuit court granted Appellant’s Rule 37 petition, set aside his sentence, and ordered him released from custody. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, where the State failed to file the record within ninety days of the filing of the first notice of appeal. View "State v. Bragg" on Justia Law