Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gregory Pelts and Shelly Pelts divorced in 2014. In the divorce decree, the circuit court granted Shelly a marital portion of Gregory’s military retirement and ordered Gregory to pay for a survivor-benefit option for Shelly from whatever retirement payments he ended up receiving. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in treating Gregory’s nonvested active-duty retirement interest as divisible property and in ordering him to maintain a survivor-benefit plan out of his retirement income for Shelly’s sole benefit without providing sufficient justification for why Gregory must participate in the cost of the benefit. Remanded. View "Pelts v. Pelts" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a complaint against twenty-two employees of the Arkansas Department of Corrections alleging violations of his civil rights. Specifically, Appellant claimed that he was denied access to certain religious publications and the right to lead Nation of Islam religious services. Appellant filed a pro se motion for a preliminary injunction, summary judgment, and default judgment seeking to enjoin Defendants from violating his rights. The circuit court denied the motion without holding a hearing on the merits. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment and a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed Appellant’s appeal from the motion for summary judgment, as a denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final, appealable order; and (2) reversed and remanded to the circuit court to hold a hearing on Appellant’s motion for preliminary injunction, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the complexity and the rights in question warranted a hearing below. View "Muntaqim v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of fifty-five years’ imprisonment. Defendant later filed a petition to correct an illegal sentence under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111, alleging that the sentence reflected on the judgment imposed for second-degree murder was outside of the statutory range, that the judgment was facially invalid, and that the sentence must be corrected. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded with instructions, holding (1) the trial court’s findings that Appellant was sentenced as a habitual offender and that the sentence imposed was not illegal were not clearly erroneous; but (2) because the trial court found that Appellant was sentenced as a habitual offender, and the box that would indicate that Appellant was sentenced as a habitual offender was not checked on the judgment, the trial court should have corrected the judgment to accurately reflect Appellant’s habitual-offender status. View "Mohammed v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 420 months’ imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed on appeal. Thereafter, Defendant filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing on the ground that Defendant had not stated a ground for the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly denied the writ because Defendant did not state a ground on which a writ of habeas corpus could be issued. View "Fulton v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of criminal-attempt first-degree murder and two counts of committing a terroristic act. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences. Appellant later filed in the trial court an amended petition seeking scientific testing under Act 1780 of 2001 Acts of Arkansas specifically requesting as relief that a pair of shoes be tested to prove that he never wore or touched them. The trial court denied Act 1780 relief, finding that the amended petition was not timely and that there was no new scientific testing that was not available at the time of trial or that has since developed that would entitle Appellant to relief. Appellant lodged an appeal and filed a pro se motion for an extension of time to file a complete record on appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that Appellant was not entitled to Act 1780 relief. View "Wells v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition seeking judicial review of a decision of the Arkansas Parole Board that denied Appellant’s application for parole. In his petition, Appellant contended that the Board had deprived him of liberty without due process and had retroactively applied a parole statute in violation of the ex-post-facto prohibition in the United States and Arkansas Constitutions. Appellant filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis in connection with his petition for judicial review. The circuit court summarily denied Appellant’s petition to proceed in forma pauperis on the basis that Appellant had not stated a colorable claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that Appellant failed to state a colorable claim based on the allegation that the denial of his parole eligibility constituted a violation of his right to due process but did state sufficient non-conclusory facts to assert a colorable claim for judicial review of an alleged violation of the ex-post-facto prohibition, and therefore, Appellant was entitled to proceed in forma pauperis. View "Ruiz v. Felts" on Justia Law

On January 19, 2016, the Board of Directors of the City of Hot Springs passed an ordinance annexing certain land. The City of Hot Springs then published the ordinance. On February 23, 2016, a petition sponsor delivered a referendum petition in opposition to the ordinance to the city clerk of Hot Springs, who rejected the petition as untimely. Appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting a writ commanding the city clerk and/or the City to accept and certify the petition. The circuit court denied the petition for writ of mandamus, concluding that the petition was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Ordinance No. 4533 governs the time for filing a referendum petition and that the deadline for filing a referendum petition is thirty days after the passage of an ordinance. View "Pritchett v. Spicer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of second-degree sexual assault. Petitioner was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment. No appeal was taken from the judgment of conviction. Petitioner then sought leave from the Supreme Court to proceed with a belated appeal, asserting that he notified his appointed attorney in a timely manner that he desired to appeal and that he was unaware until nearly eighteen months later that no appeal had been perfected. The Supreme Court remanded this matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether petition informed counsel within the time period allowed for filing a notice of appeal that he desired to appeal. The Supreme Court denied the motion for belated appeal after accepting the trial court’s findings that Petitioner did not articulate a desire to appeal within the time allowed for counsel to file a timely notice of appeal. View "Lyons v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking release from custody. An order was entered denying the petition. Thirty-five days later, Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal. Now before the Supreme Court was Petitioner’s pro se motion seeking to proceed with a belated appeal of the order denying his petition. Petitioner argued that his notice of appeal should be considered timely pursuant to Houston v. Lack, which stands for the proposition that a notice of appeal in some federal-court matters is considered filed by a pro se prisoner when he delivers it to prison authorities for mailing. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that the record did not support Petitioner’s contentions. View "Howard v. Webber" on Justia Law

In 2013, Felicia Farris filed an amended complaint alleging that, in 2005, she entered into a contract with Cynthia Conger, d/b/a Conger Wealth Management (Conger), entitled “Wealth Management Agreement.” In 2008, Farris sought to have Conger transfer sufficient funds from Farris’s Fidelity Investment Account to Farris’s personal checking account so that Farris could purchase certain property prior to a foreclosure sale. Conger failed to transfer the funds, and the property was sold to a third party. Farris ultimately obtained the parcel at additional costs. Farris brought this action against Conger in 2013. Conger moved for dismissal and for summary judgment, asserting that the cause of action sounded in the tort of negligence and, therefore, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for tort actions. Farris argued that her cause of action was for breach of contract, and thus the five-year statute of limitations applied. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding that Farris’s complaint sounded in negligence and, consequently, was time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to apply the five-year statute of limitations for contract claims, making Farris’s cause of action timely. View "Farris v. Conger" on Justia Law