Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of two counts of rape and three counts of sexual assault in the second degree, holding that the circuit court erred by not conducting an in camera review of a Department of Human Services (DHS) file to determine if it contained information material to Defendant’s defense.Defendant was charged with sexual misconduct involving juveniles. Among other motions, Defendant filed a motion to compel production of a DHS file, which he argued contained a report of a sexual abuse allegation an alleged victim made against her biological father that was found to be unsubstantiated. The trial court denied the motion. After a trial, Defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court properly denied Defendant’s motions for a directed verdict and for a new trial; (2) the circuit court erred by not allowing certain testimony, but the error was not prejudicial; and (3) the court erred by not conducting an in camera review of the DHS file. On remand, the circuit court must conduct an in camera review of the DHS file pursuant to the procedure set forth in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), and if the file contains information that probably would have changed the outcome of the trial, Defendant should receive a new trial unless the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Taffner v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission that one-half of Oscar Gerard’s attorney’s fees must be paid by the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission (AG&F).Gerard sustained a compensable injury, and AG&F accepted the injury as compensable and paid medical and indemnity benefits. After three surgeries related to his injury, Gerard sought additional benefits. The administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Gerard additional benefits. Gerard then requested that the ALJ find AG&F responsible for his one-half of attorney’s fees. The ALJ ordered AG&F to deduct Gerard’s one-half of attorney’s fees from the additional benefits awarded and to pay that amount to his attorneys. The full Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s findings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly found that one-half of Gerard’s attorney’s fees must be paid by the AG&F. View "Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. Gerard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court requiring the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) to provide Plaintiff, an Arkansas resident and attorney, with the pharmaceutical package inserts and labels for its supply of potassium chloride, one of the drugs in the State’s execution protocol. In so ordering, the circuit court held that the General Assembly did not intend to protect the identity of manufacturers of drugs used in the ADC’s lethal-injection protocol. On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court correctly found that the identity of drug manufacturers is not protected under the confidentiality provisions of Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-617; but (2) the ADC is still required to redact certain information such as lot, batch, and/or control numbers that could lead to the identification of other sellers and suppliers in the chain of distribution. View "Arkansas Department of Correction v. Shults" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction of capital murder, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Appellant committed capital murder, and therefore, the circuit court did not err by denying Appellant’s motion for directed verdict.After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of the capital murder of Patricia Wellington. Appellant received a sentence of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Appellant murdered Patricia, and substantial evidence supported the jury’s determination that Appellant acted with premeditation and deliberation. View "Hyatt v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the circuit court’s denial of Appellant’s petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37. Appellant, who was convicted of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm, argued in his petition that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to present certain jury instructions. The circuit court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present the proper jury instruction on justification; but (2) because the circuit court failed to make written findings in accordance with rule 37.3(a) in regards to Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present the proper jury instruction on extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter, the case must be remanded for the court to make such findings. View "Douglas v. State" on Justia Law

Article 5, section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution applies to both elected and appointed public offices and applied in this case to an appointed municipal chief of police.The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting a preliminary injunction requested by Appellee, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated Arkansas taxpayers, and finding that Chief of Police Geoffrey Herweg’s 2002 Texas conviction of lying to a police officer rendered him incapable of holding the office of Jacksonville police chief. Herweg was appointed by the mayor of Jacksonville. The Court held (1) Appellee had standing in this action and presented a justiciable controversy; (2) article 5, section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution applies to the office of the chief of police; (3) Herweg’s 2002 Texas conviction was an “infamous crime” under article 5, section 9 that precluded his eligibility to serve as Jacksonville’s police chief; and (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Appellee’s motion for preliminary injunction. View "City of Jacksonville v. Smith" on Justia Law

The circuit court correctly determined that the immunity provisions of Ark. Code Ann. 16-105-502 barred Appellants’ noise-based lawsuit against Brown-Wright Post No. 158 of the American Legion, Department of Arkansas, Inc. (the Legion) and correctly found that the immunity statute did not constitute a taking under the Arkansas Constitution.Appellants filed a complaint alleging that noise from a shooting range that the Legion had built interfered with the use and enjoyment of their land and constituted a nuisance. The Legion filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint should be dismissed because it was based only on noise, and Ark. Code Ann. 16-105-502 grants shooting ranges immunity for noise-based lawsuits if the range is in compliance with local noise-control ordinances. The circuit court granted the Legion’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Legion was entitled to immunity as long the shooting range did not violate any local noise ordinances; and (2) section 16-105-52 did not violate Appellants’ constitutionally protected property rights. View "3 Rivers Logistics, Inc. v. Brown-Wright Post No. 158 of the American Legion, Department of Arkansas, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s pro se motion for belated appeal of an order that dismissed Petitioner’s pro se petition for declaratory judgment and mandamus relief, holding that the order that Petitioner would appeal was not a final, appealable order.In his petition, Petitioner alleged that Defendants, including the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), violated his due process rights and implemented disciplinary procedures against him in violation of ADC policy. The circuit court dismissed the petition without prejudice, finding that Petitioner had failed to serve the defendants as required. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s motion for belated appeal of the order, holding that the order was not a final, appealable order because Petitioner was allowed under the procedural rules to refile his claim after his petition had been dismissed. View "McCullough v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s pro se petition and amended petition to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court ruled that Appellant was not entitled to relief under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111 because he did not establish that his sentences were illegal on their face. The court further held that, to the extent Appellant raised claims pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, his claims were untimely and successive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to relief to correct an illegal sentence because his sentence was illegal on its face; and (2) to the extent Appellant raised claims regarding the illegal imposition of sentence or of ineffective assistance of counsel, those claims should have been raised in a timely Rule 37.1 petition. View "Swift v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s petition to correct an illegal sentence, holding that Appellant’s petition failed to state a basis for relief under either Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111 or Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1.Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced as a habitual offender to seventy-five years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Almost twenty-five years after the mandate issued Appellant filed this petition alleging that his sentence was illegal. The trial court found that the petition was untimely and successive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the only timely challenge before the circuit court was Defendant’s facial challenge to his sentence, and the court did not err in denying relief. View "White v. State" on Justia Law