Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether the proceeds from the sale of timber, which was harvested from land that was specifically devised in a will, should be considered part of the decedent's residuary estate. Appellant, the executor of decedent's will, requested that the circuit court decide whether an ademption had occurred after Appellee Gary Morgan conveyed by timber deed several trees on decedent's property and transferred a portion of the proceeds to Nancy Morgan. The court declined to rule on the issue of ademption and found that the proceeds from the sale of timber became part of the residuary estate. The Supreme Court reversed, thereby adopting the intention theory as the law in Arkansas, holding that if the property that is the subject of a specific devise is sold by an attorney in fact at a time when the testator is incompetent, and the testator does not regain testamentary capacity before his or her death, an ademption of the specific devise does not take place as to the unexpended, identifiable proceeds of the sale. Remanded. View "Rodgers v. Rodgers" on Justia Law

After Billy Machen died, his wife Julia filed a petition to probate Billy's will. Julia filed a copy of the will, which bore no changes or markings. That will bequeathed $10,000 to Billy's son Randy and established a testamentary trust for the benefit of Randy's children in the amount of $20,000. Randy opposed the probate of the will, contending that his father had made changes to it. Randy attached a copy of the same typed will, but this copy contained several handwritten changes. Randy filed a complaint against Julia, asserting that there was a family-settlement agreement and that the will was evidence of that agreement. The circuit court found that Billy, Julia, and Randy entered into a family-settlement agreement whereby Randy was to receive $100,000 for himself and $200,000 as trustee for his children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the undisputed facts showed that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Julia and Randy agreed to distribute the assets of Billy's estate in a manner different from his original, unaltered will, and Julia presented no evidence of fraud, duress, or imposition that would render her agreement with Randy unenforceable.

Appellant bank sued Appellees, a corporation and its members, after loans granted to Appellees went into default and Appellees transferred certain property into a trust. After a jury rendered its verdicts, the circuit court (1) granted foreclosure against the property securing the debts, (2) dismissed Appellant's claim to avoid the transfer of one of the properties in the trust and ruled that the deed of another property in the trust was void, and (3) denied Appellant's various post-trial motions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on direct appeal and affirmed on cross-appeal, holding (1) the circuit court erred in submitting Appellant's foreclosure and fraudulent-transfer claims to the jury because they were equitable in nature; and (2) the circuit court properly granted Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on Appellee's abuse-of-process claim. Remanded.

Hazel Frazier died, leaving behind her husband, Appellant Curtis Bridges, and her seven children, who were the stepchildren of Elree Frazier, a previous husband who died after taking the medication Vioxx. Later, one of the stepchildren brought a claim against Merck Company, the manufacturer of Vioxx, on behalf of Mr. Frazier, for the wrongful death of Mr. Frazier. The settlement proceeds were funneled into the estate of Ms. Frazier for distribution to Mr. Frazier's stepchildren. After Appellant was appointed the administrator for Ms. Frazier's estate, Appellant filed a claim stating that he was entitled to receive one-third of the proceeds obtained from the Merck settlement because of his curtesy interest. The district court rejected Appellant's claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Ms. Frazier did not have a right to the Merck proceeds during her lifetime nor an individual right to bring suit under the wrongful-death statute, Appellant had no curtesy interest in the Merck settlement proceeds.

In 1990, Roy Sharpe executed an inter vivos trust and a will containing a testamentary trust. According to both trusts, Sharpe preferred his attorney, Charles Brown, to be employed to provide legal advice regarding trust administration and to choose a successor trustee if the need arose. Bank of America eventually served as trustee of both trusts. In 2009, Brown filed a petition to change trustees, asserting that in violation of the terms of the trusts, Bank of America intended to manage the trusts from a location outside the boundaries of Little Rock. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Brown lacked standing to bring the petition. Because the trusts did not provide a means for removing a trustee, Brown obtained no authority from the trusts to bring an action to change the trustees and had no interest in the trusts that granted him standing and permitted him to enforce the terms of the trusts. Remanded with directions to dismiss the case.

Petitioners, trustees and co-trustees of two trusts as well as several individuals, appealed from an order entered by the circuit court that modified a previous injunction to allow Respondent, Aviation Cadet Museum, to land and depart small aircraft exclusively from the north end of its airfield. Before the Supreme Court was Petitioners' request for writ of certiorari seeking additional time to complete the record. The Court denied the writ, holding that the record in this case was not filed in a timely manner, and because the timely filing of the record on appeal is a jurisdictional requirement for perfecting an appeal, the appeal was dismissed.

Appellee First Community Bank loaned $175,000 to Catherine Warbington and two Warbington family trusts, listing the property in the trusts as security. After Catherine died, the bank later filed a foreclosure complaint, asserting that payments were not being made on the loan and naming as defendants the unknown heirs of Catherine, the trusts, the trustee of the trusts, and others. Later, a foreclosure judgment was entered finding that the parties before the court had consented to the judgment and were indebted to the bank for the principal amount. The heirs and trusts then filed a motion to vacate the foreclosure, asserting (1) that the judgment was void by operation of law because Bert Warbington had not been personally served as trustee, and (2) Bert was not named individually in the complaint though he was a known heir and as such Ark. R. Civ. P 4 and due process required the bank name him as a party. The circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court found (1) the circuit court did not clearly err in finding from the evidence that there was personal service and (2) that the circuit court did not err in finding that Bert was an unknown heir. Affirmed.

In 2009, a car collided with a bus driven by Angela Austin, causing several passengers' deaths and serious injuries to others. Austin drove the bus as a transport vehicle for a nonprofit called Focus. Focus was insured by appellant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, who filed a complaint for interpleader indicating its willingness to pay insurance-policy proceeds in the total amount of $1 million as per its policy and requesting to be discharged from further liability. The circuit court entered an order interpleading appellant's funds. Appellees, the injured passengers and administrators of the deceased passengers' estates, filed counterclaims against appellant, alleging that Focus negligently failed to restrict Austin from using her cell phone while driving and arguing they were entitled to a judgment against appellant for a share of the interpleaded funds. Appellant filed a motion for declaratory judgment and a motion to dismiss, stating it had paid the full amount as stated in the insurance policy. The circuit court denied appellants' motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly concluded that the language of the policy was ambiguous.

Appellant Darrell Brown appealed an order of the circuit court probate division modifying its previous order authorizing distribution of net remaining settlement proceeds and declaring that, as a disbarred attorney, Brown was not entitled to any attorneys fees from the remaining settlement proceeds paid by Libya as a result of an airplane crash over Scotland to appellees Melvin Bell and Velma Wilson, as heirs of the estate of Charlotte Stinnett. For reversal, Brown argued that he was not properly served with appellees' motion for modification or with appellees' discovery requests and therefore the circuit court erred in striking his response and entering the order of distribution. The court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court for clarification of the law. However, as the only argument advanced on appeal was a challenge to the order striking Brown's response, and as Brown did not timely file a notice of appeal from the order striking his response, the Court dismissed the appeal with prejudice.

Appellant Hunter Crenshaw appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit against Steven Ayers. The case was dismissed because it fell outside the applicable statute of limitations. Appellant and Mr. Ayers were involved in an automobile accident, in which Mr. Ayers died. Appellant filed a complaint against Mr. Ayers days after Mr. Ayers had died. The summons was never returned. One month later, "Steven Ayers" responded to the complaint by asserting a lack of jurisdiction and defective service of process. In August, Appellant filed a motion to get more time to properly serve the complaint on Mr. Ayers' estate. In September, "Mr. Ayers" responded again, this time asserting the defense of limitations. Four days before the statute would expire, Appellant filed a response, asserting that he properly served an appointed "special administrator" of Mr. Ayers' estate. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's complaint for defective service. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court, and affirmed its decision to dismiss Appellant's case.