Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Kenneth Middleton was convicted of first-degree murder but before a judgment was entered against him in a wrongful-death suit, Kenneth conveyed property he owned in Arkansas to his brother. The sale was found to be fraudulent and was set aside by decree. Appellees, several individuals, filed a petition for writ of scire facias more than ten years later to allow more time to sell the property in an effort to satisfy the Missouri judgment. Appellants, the Middleton brothers, filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court dismissed. Appellants subsequently filed a motion for clarification as well as a notice of appeal. Appellants' motion was subsequently deemed denied. Appellees then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that a second notice of appeal was required after the denial of the consolidated motion for clarification. The Supreme Court denied Appellees' motion, holding that the notice of appeal in this case was effective.

Appellant, a former certified residential appraiser, was investigated by Appellee, the Arkansas Appraiser Licensing and Certification Board, after receiving a complaint by Loretta Lever-House concerning a number of appraisals allegedly performed by Appellant after her certification had been suspended. The Board (1) concluded that Appellant violated four of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraiser Practice by performing appraisals while her license was suspended; and (2) revoked Appellant's license and assessed a civil penalty of $4000. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's failure to raise her first three arguments before the administrative agency precluded the Court's consideration on appeal; and (2) Appellant's last argument was not ruled on by the agency or the circuit court, and thus, the Court was precluded from considering it on appeal.

Appellant bank sued Appellees, a corporation and its members, after loans granted to Appellees went into default and Appellees transferred certain property into a trust. After a jury rendered its verdicts, the circuit court (1) granted foreclosure against the property securing the debts, (2) dismissed Appellant's claim to avoid the transfer of one of the properties in the trust and ruled that the deed of another property in the trust was void, and (3) denied Appellant's various post-trial motions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on direct appeal and affirmed on cross-appeal, holding (1) the circuit court erred in submitting Appellant's foreclosure and fraudulent-transfer claims to the jury because they were equitable in nature; and (2) the circuit court properly granted Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on Appellee's abuse-of-process claim. Remanded.

Ernie and Karen Cline sued M. Jay Carter for breach of contract after Carter signed a real estate contract with the intent to purchase residential property from the Clines but was unable to do so because he failed to obtain financing approval. Carter filed a third-party complaint against the real estate agent and company that represented him in the transaction (Jones Defendants). The circuit court consolidated the two lawsuits for trial. The jury returned a verdict (1) against Carter and in favor of the Clines on their breach of contract claim, and (2) against the Jones Defendants and in favor of Carter on Carter's negligence claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by denying Carter's motion for a directed verdict and his subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was a condition precedent included in the real estate contract that required Carter to obtain financing for the purchase, which he was unable to do, and as a result, there was no contract. Remanded.

Petitioners, trustees and co-trustees of two trusts as well as several individuals, appealed from an order entered by the circuit court that modified a previous injunction to allow Respondent, Aviation Cadet Museum, to land and depart small aircraft exclusively from the north end of its airfield. Before the Supreme Court was Petitioners' request for writ of certiorari seeking additional time to complete the record. The Court denied the writ, holding that the record in this case was not filed in a timely manner, and because the timely filing of the record on appeal is a jurisdictional requirement for perfecting an appeal, the appeal was dismissed.

This appeal was the second of two appeals involving the same issue, the first of which was Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 407. At issue in the appeal was Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. Appellant Howard Curry appealed a circuit court's order finding that improvements made to his property prior to his sixty-fifth birthday were "substantial improvements" within the meaning of amendment 79 and that Appellees, the Pope County Equalization Board and the county tax assessor, would be allowed to include these improvements in the assessment of Appellant's property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in labeling the changes Appellant made to his property before he turned age sixty-five as substantial improvements, and (2) the assessor did not err in assessing Appellant's property at a higher amount than the assessment value in place when Curry turned age sixty-five due to the timing of the date of assessment value in relation to the date of property owners' birthdays.

Howard Curry's property appraisal increased on two different occasions after his sixty-fifth birthday. After the second assessment, Curry unsuccessfully petitioned the Equalization Board of Pope County to reduce the appraisal on his property. Curry then filed a petition in the county court, stating that the valuation was arbitrary and unreasonable and that the property was incorrectly assessed under Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday, unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. The county court ruled only on the assessment value and did not rule on the amendment 79 issues. Curry appealed and also filed a petition for declaratory relief and an injunction. The two cases were merged for trial. The circuit court ruled on the assessment, which was higher than the assessment in place on Curry's sixty-fifth birthday, and found that the improvements Curry made to his residence before he turned age sixty-five were "substantial improvements" within the language of the amendment. In the first of Curry's two appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed for the reasons stated in the second appeal, Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 408.

May Construction Company appealed from a circuit court order declaring a lien on real property, owned by Town Creek Construction & Development, subordinate to a mortgage filed by Chambers Bank and unenforceable against a lien bond issued by Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. For reversal, May argued that the circuit court erred in (1) interpreting the materialmen's lien statute, (2) ruling that construction commenced after the execution of Chambers's mortgage, and (3) finding that May could not recover against the lien bond. Town Creek cross-appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in ruling that May was entitled to a lien in the amount of $353,000. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the direct appeal, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that construction had not commenced prior to the recording of Chambers's lien because the ruling was based on the intent of the parties contrary to that plain language of the materialmen's lien statute. The Court then affirmed the cross-appeal, finding that the circuit court did not err in calculating the amount Town Creek owed May.

John Kelly appealed a divorce decree granting Christy Kelly a divorce, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in finding that Christy's stock in Tarco Roofing Materials (TRM) was nonmarital property, and (2) the circuit court erred in finding John liable for one-half of the deficiency resulting from the sale of the marital home. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding Christy acquired an enforceable right when she acquired her shares of TRM stock during her marriage, and therefore the circuit court erred in finding that the TRM stock was nonmarital property. Because the case was reversed for further proceedings relating to the division of property, the Court did not address John's second issue.

Jay Carter appealed an order of the circuit court awarding Ernie and Karen Cline money damages pursuant to a jury verdict, in addition to attorneys fees and costs, on the Clines's complaint for breach of contract to purchase real estate. On appeal, Carter argued that Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) was not complied with, that the circuit court erred in denying Carter's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and that the award of costs and attorneys fees was warranted based on the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court remanded, holding it was precluded from reaching the merits of Carter's arguments due to a deficient abstract pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(5) and ordering Carter to file a substituted brief.