Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal was a companion to another case handed down on this same date, Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Regions Bank. The appeal involved challenges only to postjudgment matters in the case. Subsequent to Chase Bank filing its notice of appeal of the circuit court's order granting summary judgment against it and posting a supersedeas bond, several parties in the case moved for attorneys' fees against Chase. The circuit court denied the motions. Additionally, one of the parties filed several additional posttrial motions, which Chase opposed. Appellants appealed, making several arguments. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the Court reversed the order granting summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings against Chase in Chase Bank USA, N.A. the arguments raised in the instant appeal were moot. View "Regions Bank v. Chase Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

Wanda Stephens purchased property in Little Rock consisting of Tract A and Tract B. In 2001, Wanda executed a quitclaim deed to the Stephens Family Limited Partnership (SFLP) and mortgaged the property to Regions Mortgage. In 2002, Wanda executed a warranty deed conveying Tract A to herself for life with a remainder to Greg Stephens and his heirs. In 2005, Wanda mortgaged Tract B of the land to Chase Bank. Regions Bank (Region) subsequently made a loan to Wanda, taking as collateral a mortgage on Tract A and Tract B. Wanda defaulted on the first mortgage, and Regions Mortgage foreclosed on both tracts. $308,828 remained from the sale. Chase and Regions asserted claims to the monies, and SFLP and the Stephens heirs intervened. All parties claimed to be first in priority. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment against Chase, finding that the interests of Regions, SFLP, and the Stephens heirs were superior to Chase's. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that because the question of whether Chase had actual notice of the Stephens heirs' claim on the property was a question of fact, summary judgment was inappropriate. View "Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Regions Bank" on Justia Law

Appellant submitted a proposal to the City of Pine Bluff Planning Commission requesting a Use Permitted on Review permit to utilize certain premises in Pine Bluff as a foster-care facility for displaced children. The Planning Commission and City Council denied Appellant's request. On appeal, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the City, concluding that, although Pine Bluff City Ordinance 29-37 conferred standing on Appellant to bring the action, the ordinance was in conflict with Ark. R. Civ. P. 17, which requires that an action be brought by the real party in interest, and Rule 17 overrode the ordinance. Consequently, the circuit court ruled that, because Appellant was not the real party in interest, she lacked standing to bring suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the record did not contain the ordinance, the record was inadequate for review. View "Coleman v. City of Pine Bluff" on Justia Law

The State appealed from a circuit court order dismissing its in rem forfeiture petition against real property located in Little Rock. The circuit court dismissed the petition based upon a finding that Ark. Code Ann. 5-42-204(c)(3) does not permit the State to pursue in rem forfeiture. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the case was moot because a settlement had been reached, and neither of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied in this case. Because the Court does not issue advisory opinions, the Court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "State v. First Serv. Bank of Greenbrier" on Justia Law

Appellant Crafton, Tull, Sparks & Associates (CTSA) appealed an order of the circuit court finding that CTSA's lien was second in priority to Appellee Metropolitan National Bank's lien on certain property. The circuit court filed an order titled "Final Judgment and Rule 65(b) certificate" stating that certain parties and actions remained unresolved. CTSA then brought this appeal. Although neither party raised the issue, the Supreme Court sua sponte raised the question of whether the order was final and subject to appeal. The Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that there was no final order or a sufficient Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certificate, and therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "Crafton Tull Sparks & Assocs. v. Ruskin Heights, LLC" on Justia Law

On November 15, 2011, Appellants filed a petition to modify a judgment entered on July 26, 2011 that granted two individuals a private road across property owned by Appellants. In Appellants' November petition they alleged that the order's failure to include the mandatory provisions required by Ark. Code Ann. 27-66-403 precluded it from being a final order from which an appeal could be taken. The county judge refused to act on Appellants' November petition, believing it was an untimely posttrial motion. On February 8, 2012, Appellants filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the county judge to rule on the November petition to modify the July order. The circuit court refused to issue the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the availability of direct appeal provided Appellants an adequate remedy at law and foreclosed their right to obtain an extraordinary writ. View "Veverka v. Gibson" on Justia Law

The Arkansas Department of Community Correction (DCC) owned a prison complex in Jefferson County that was part of several tracts of state land annexed to the City of Pine Bluff in 1999. The property was automatically zoned as residential. In 2011, DCC, with the approval of the Board of Correction, decided to use three existing buildings on its property to house persons who had been granted parole. The City objected to DCC's adding transitional housing to its prison complex. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in favor of the City, concluding that Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-1603 acted as a waiver of sovereign immunity and that DCC was subject to the zoning laws of the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the General Assembly intended to waive the State's sovereign immunity in section 16-93-1603, and therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the City's petition pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. View "Ark. Dep't of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff" on Justia Law

This matter began when the state insurance commissioner filed a petition for receivership against Signature Life Insurance Company of America, which had become insolvent. The commissioner was appointed receiver and began to rehabilitate Signature. The successor to the commissioner then filed a complaint against Frank Whitbeck, the sole shareholder and director of Signature, who obtained the loans from the company resulting in its insolvency, and several LLCs, all of which were owned by Whitbeck. This action was settled. The circuit court subsequently approved a rehabilitation plan for Signature. Due to Whitbeck's failure to perform under the rehabilitation plan, the receiver filed a petition for order of liquidation and for foreclosure and replevin. The circuit court entered an order of liquidation and a foreclosure and replevin decree ordering the sale of the real property. Whitbeck filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the receiver's alleged malfeasance and nonfeasance extinguished and released Defendants from any further liability. The circuit court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Whitbeck's claims were barred by the claim preclusion facet of res judicata, and the circuit court did not err in dismissing Whitbeck's action. View "Whitbeck v. Bradford" on Justia Law

This case involved the contest of several detachments and annexations of land from the city of Rockport to the city of Malvern. Rockpot contested the annexations. The circuit court granted Malvern's motion to dismiss, finding that the properties were contiguous and that Malvern had substantially complied with Ark. Code Ann. 14-40-2002. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of Malvern's motion to dismiss, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in its interpretation of section 14-40-2002; (2) although the lands annexed by Malvern did not compose one area, nothing in the statute provided that a municipality cannot annex the land of several separate landowners at one time; and (3) although city streets separated the annexed lands from Malvern, the circuit court did not err in finding that the land was contiguous to Malvern. View "City of Rockport v. City of Malvern" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a circuit court judgment affirming the classification of real property for tax purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that the Arkansas Constitution and the Assessment Coordination Rules and Regulations allowed the land at issue to be classified as residential and not timber land; (2) ad hoc requirements were not imposed only on Appellants by Appellee Pope County Board of Equalization (BOE); (3) Appellants failed to demonstrate that they were similarly situated to any other taxpayer or landowner within the city limits, and therefore, Appellants' equal-protection claim that the circuit court erred in denying Appellants' petition without considering similarly situated property owners with similar property classified as timber and pasture within city limits was without merit; and (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a site visit by BOE's expert witness between the first day of trial and the second day of trial. View "McWilliams v. Pope County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law