Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Daimante, LLC was the operator of a golf course that contained two subdivisions. Gary and Linda Dye, property owners within one subdivision, filed a declaratory-judgment complaint seeking a declaration that certain obligations and restrictions were unenforceable. Diamante moved to compel arbitration with the Dyes. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration, finding that Diamante had waived arbitration by unnecessary delay that prejudiced the Dyes. Class members were subsequently added to the lawsuit upon class certification and filed a second amended motion for declaratory judgment. The circuit court denied Diamante’s motion to compel arbitration based on the court’s previous ruling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals’ decision was not conclusive on the issue of whether Diamante had waived arbitration as to the class members who were subsequently added to the lawsuit, and therefore, this argument does not compel dismissal of this appeal; and (2) because the circuit court did not issue on order as to whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate between Diamante and the unnamed class members, the case must be reversed for the circuit court to make that determination. View "Diamante LLC v. Dye" on Justia Law

The circuit court entered a decree of foreclosure giving a suburban improvement district ("HISID") a lien against certain pieces of property for unpaid assessments. Appellant owned one of those properties. The decree stated that the redemption of the properties would be governed by a statute that grants a two-year period in which to redeem the property. HISID was granted the property formerly owned by Appellant subject to Appellant’s redemption rights. HISID then executed a limited warranty deed granting the property to Appellee. More than one year later, Appellant filed a petition to redeem property. Appellee moved for summary judgment, arguing that, although the decree applied the two-year redemption period for draining improvement districts, the thirty-day period applicable to suburban improvement districts should apply. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, concluding that Appellant’s petition was untimely because Appellant’s right of redemption was governed by the thirty-day period applicable to suburban improvement districts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellee’s collateral attack on the foreclosure decree based upon her allegation that the redemption period cited in the decree could not be sustained. View "Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n. v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Metropolitan National Bank agreed to finance construction of a residential subdivision. As security for the note, Ruskin Heights executed a mortgage on the real property in favor of Metropolitan. The afternoon after construction commenced, Metropolitan filed its mortgage. Approximately two years later, Crafton, Tull, Sparks & Associates, Inc. (CTSA) filed an engineering lien against the property. Metropolitan filed a foreclosure complaint against Ruskin Heights and others. CTSA then filed a complaint asserting an engineer’s lien against Ruskin Heights and an amended complaint against Ruskin Heights and Metropolitan, requesting that its lien be declared superior to Metropolitan’s mortgage lien. The cases were consolidated. The circuit court concluded that CTSA’s lien was second in priority to Metropolitan’s lien. CTSA appealed, arguing that its lien should relate back to the commencement of construction and have priority over Metropolitan’s mortgage pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 18-44-110. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Metropolitan’s lien did not have priority over CTSA’s engineer’s lien because section 18-44-110 does not allow for an engineer’s lien to relate back to the date of construction. View "Crafton Tull Sparks & Assocs., Inc. v. Ruskin Heights, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2007, Men Holdings 2, LLC began construction on a half-million-dollar building on property that was assessed as being entirely on property owned by Men Holdings. Due to a mistake in the description of the real-estate contract when Men Holdings purchased the property, Men Holdings did not receive the tax bills for the property. The property was subsequently sold at public auction to Rylwell, LLC. Rywell filed a complaint for confirmation of the tax sale, quiet title, ejectment, and trespass. Men Holdings answered and brought in the Commissioner of State Lands as a third-party defendant, asserting that it was denied due process because it received inadequate notice and asking that the tax sale be set aside. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Men Holdings, finding that Men Holdings had received inadequate notice and that the lack of notice violated Men Holdings’ due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State was required to take additional reasonable steps to verify whether Men Holdings had an interest in the property before depriving it of its ownership. View "Rylwell, LLC v. Men Holdings 2 LLC" on Justia Law

After foreclosure proceedings were instituted against Petitioners, Petitioners filed an amended class-action complaint against the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the owner of their mortgage and note, arguing that Fannie Mae was not “authorized to do business” in the state, as required by the Statutory Foreclosure Act, because it had failed to obtain a certificate of authority from the Arkansas Secretary of State. A federal district court certified to the First Circuit the question of whether the Act allows authorization under federal law. The First Circuit answered that the Act does contemplate authorization under federal law and that Fannie Mae’s federal charter was sufficient to allow it to proceed under the statute. View "Dickinson v. SunTrust Nat'l Mortgage Inc." on Justia Law

Ozark Mountain Regional Public Water Authority filed a complaint for condemnation and declaration of taking, seeking to take property owned by Appellants. That same day, Ozark deposited $66,986, the fair-market-appraisal amount of the property, with the clerk of court. Appellants challenged the amount deposited, claiming it was not sufficient compensation. After a trial, the jury awarded Appellants $341,500 in compensation for the property. Thereafter, Appellants filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 18-15-605(b). The circuit court denied the motion, finding that section 18-15-605(b) was not applicable to Appellants’ case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that section 18-15-605(b) was not applicable to Appellants’ case and in thereby denying Appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees. View "Giles v. Ozark Mountain Reg'l Pub. Water Auth." on Justia Law

CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Co., a gas pipeline company that has the power of eminent domain, filed a petition to condemn an easement on property owned by GSS, LLC. The circuit court entered an order of possession, and, after a trial, awarded GSS $64,000 as just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of value of a contiguous parcel of land from a separate case; (2) did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of CenterPoint on GSS’s counterclaims; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment to CenterPoint. View "GSS, LLC v. Centerpoint Energy Gas Transmission Co." on Justia Law

Dan and Brenda Billingsley owned and operated Floors and More, Inc. on certain property (“West Bank Property”). Benton NWA Properties purchased the property across from the West Bank Property in 2008 (“East Bank Property”). Appellants, the Billingsleys and Floors and More, filed a second amended complaint against Benton NWA, alleging that Appellants suffered damages after the West Bank Property flooded due to the owners of the East Bank Property placing fill material in the floodplain. The parties settled, and the circuit court subsequently granted a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in favor of Benton NWA. Appellants appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in ordering that the settlement agreement should contain a release of all liability for future flooding of property owned by the Billingsleys. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice because the circuit court’s order failed to contain specific factual findings in accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). View "Billingsley v. Benton NWA Props., LLC " on Justia Law

Debtors executed a promissory note in favor of First State Bank to purchase a condominium. After Debtors defaulted on their loan, First State subsequently filed a complaint against Debtors, the loan’s guarantor, and the condominium property owners’ association (Metro POA), claiming that it was entitled to collect money owed it from the Debtor and guarantor, and that any interest Metro POA had in the real property related to unpaid assessments was inferior to and subject to State Bank’s mortgage. The circuit court granted First State judgment against Debtors and the guarantor, gave First State the right to foreclose on the property, and ruled that Metro POA’s interest would survive the foreclosure action and become the liability of the purchaser. Thereafter, First State purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. On appeal, First State argued that the circuit court erred in refusing to extinguish Metro POA’s lien for unpaid assessments and in awarding Metro POA attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in refusing to extinguish Metro POA’s interest and in awarding attorney’s fees to Metro POA. View "First State Bank v. Metro Dist. Condos. Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1989, Steve Rose and Harbor East, Inc. entered into a consent judgment that awarded Rose $176,000. In 2009, Rose filed a motion to revive the judgment, and an order reviving the judgment was entered. Rose then filed a complaint in foreclosure against Harbor East Property Owners Association (the POA) and Recreational Management, Inc. (Recreational) maintaining that the judgment had not been satisfied. In 2012, the POA filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that because no writ of scire facias had been issued prior to the 2009 order of revivor, Rose's judgment was not revived under the terms of Ark. Code Ann. 16-65-501, and therefore, the 2009 order of revivor was void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court granted the summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the POA and Recreational were allowed to collaterally attack Rose's 2009 order of revivor because the order was void due to Rose's failure to satisfy the requirements of section 16-65-501. View "Rose v. Harbor E., Inc." on Justia Law