Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

David Scott Taylor owns property near Pinnacle Mountain in Pulaski County, Arkansas, adjacent to land owned and developed by Rick Ferguson and several related entities. Ferguson’s property, which is being developed into the Paradise Valley subdivision, allegedly causes increased stormwater runoff that floods Taylor’s land. Taylor claims that the development’s clearing of vegetation, paving, and planned drainage ditch will exacerbate flooding, potentially increasing it by up to 400 percent. Taylor filed suit in Pulaski County Circuit Court, seeking damages and equitable relief to require Ferguson to construct a larger storm-water detention pond to mitigate the flooding.After Taylor filed his complaint, Ferguson moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims involved matters assigned to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the county court under article 7, section 28 of the Arkansas Constitution, specifically relating to county roads, internal improvement, and local concerns. Taylor amended his complaint to remove references to county roads and public nuisance, focusing solely on private flooding. The circuit court initially denied Ferguson’s motion but later reconsidered and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the dispute fell within the county court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Ferguson then nonsuited his counterclaim, and Taylor appealed.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the circuit court’s dismissal de novo. It held that Taylor’s claims do not involve county roads, internal improvement, or local concerns as those terms are used in article 7, section 28. The court found that the dispute is a private residential matter over flooding, not a public infrastructure or county regulatory issue, and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "TAYLOR V. FERGUSON" on Justia Law

In this case, the owners of a residential property in Fayetteville, Arkansas, sought to rent their home as a short-term rental when not in residence. The City of Fayetteville had enacted an ordinance regulating short-term rentals, requiring a license for all such properties and a conditional-use permit for certain types in residential zones. The ordinance also imposed a cap on the number of these rentals. After applying for a conditional-use permit, the property owners’ application was denied by the Fayetteville Planning Commission, which found the proposed rental incompatible with the neighborhood due to the number of similar rentals nearby.Following the denial, the property owners attempted to appeal to the Fayetteville City Council, but their appeal was not sponsored by the required number of council members. They then filed an administrative appeal in the Washington County Circuit Court, along with claims for declaratory and constitutional relief. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance while their case was pending. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing the administrative appeal was untimely. The circuit court denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but left the constitutional claims pending.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed only the denial of the preliminary injunction, as the dismissal of the administrative appeal was not properly before it due to the absence of a final, appealable order. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction, finding no irreparable harm and no likelihood of success on the merits at this stage. The denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed, and the appeal of the administrative dismissal was dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. View "HAUSE v. CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS; THE FAYETTEVILLE PLANNING COMMISSION" on Justia Law

In October 2016, BAS, LLC purchased commercial property in Paragould, Arkansas, listing its mailing address as 3735 Winford Drive, Tarzana, California. BAS failed to pay property taxes for 2017 and 2018, leading the Greene County Clerk to certify the property to the Commissioner of State Lands for nonpayment. The Commissioner sent a notice of the upcoming tax sale to the Tarzana address via certified mail in August 2021, but did not receive a physical return receipt. USPS tracking data indicated the notice was delivered. In June 2022, the Commissioner sent another notice to the Paragould property, which was returned undelivered. The property was sold in August 2022, and BAS filed a lawsuit contesting the sale, alleging due process violations and unlawful taking.The Greene County Circuit Court denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Commissioner violated BAS’s due process rights, thus preventing a determination on sovereign immunity. The Commissioner appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and concluded that the Commissioner’s efforts to notify BAS were constitutionally sufficient. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and determined that the Commissioner’s actions met due process requirements. The court held that BAS failed to allege an illegal or unconstitutional act to overcome sovereign immunity. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. View "Land v. BAS, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute arising from a 2016 real estate transaction in which the Bauers sold residential property in Crawford County to the Beamons. The Beamons filed a complaint with two claims under the theory of fraud and deceit, seeking both monetary damages and equitable rescission of the contract. Before trial, the Beamons elected remedies associated with their equitable claim, leading to a bench trial. The circuit court rejected the rescission claim but awarded damages for breach of contract and granted the Beamons' motion for attorney’s fees.The Bauers appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, arguing that the circuit court erred in awarding damages for breach of contract and attorney’s fees. The Beamons cross-appealed, arguing the court erred in denying their rescission request. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s award of damages for breach of contract, affirmed the denial of rescission, and noted it lacked jurisdiction to review the attorney’s fees award due to the Bauers' failure to file an amended notice of appeal.Following the mandate, the Bauers filed motions for their own attorney’s fees and to set aside the Beamons' attorney’s-fee judgment. The circuit court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider these motions. The Bauers appealed this decision.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the circuit court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction. The court clarified that the mandate did not foreclose the circuit court from ruling on new motions for attorney’s fees, which are collateral matters, or on a motion to set aside a judgment for fraud under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(4). Consequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the Bauers' motions. View "BAUER v. BEAMON" on Justia Law

The case involves Little Scholars of Arkansas, AP Consolidated Theatres II L.P., CSRC Charter LISA, LLC, and KLS Leasing LLC (collectively, appellants) who appealed against Pulaski County, Arkansas, and its officials (collectively, appellees). The appellants operate charter schools and lease properties for their schools. The appellees assessed real-property taxes against the schools, which the appellants contested, arguing that the properties used for school purposes are exempt from taxes under the Arkansas Constitution. The appellants also sought a declaration that Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-118, which they claimed the appellees relied on for the tax assessment, is void under the constitution.The case was initially brought before the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The appellees moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the county courts have exclusive jurisdiction over county tax matters. The circuit court agreed with the appellees, dismissing the case on the grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the appellants' claims.The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of Arkansas. The appellants argued that the circuit court did have subject-matter jurisdiction over their illegal-exaction claims. They also argued that their request for a declaration that Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-118 is void does not fall within the county court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellants, affirming the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the appellants' claim was not an illegal-exaction claim but an assessment dispute, which falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the county court. The Supreme Court also held that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appellants' request for declaratory judgment. View "LITTLE SCHOLARS OF ARKANSAS FOUNDATION v. PULASKI COUNTY, ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Fred and Sandra Monaco took legal action against the Faulkner County Assessor and the Faulkner County Tax Collector concerning the 2021 assessment of their property. Sandra Monaco had purchased a parcel of timberland in 2005 and later built a home on it. The property was assessed as agricultural without a building until 2020 when the Assessor's office discovered the improvement and reassessed the property's value. In July 2021, Sandra deeded the property to herself and her husband, Fred, and subsequently filed a form asserting a homestead right on the property and her right to an assessment freeze under amendment 79 of the Arkansas Constitution. Following the Board's upholding of the Assessor's valuation and assessment, Fred filed a petition for writ of mandamus in circuit court, which was denied.The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the circuit court's decision on several grounds. Firstly, Fred's attempt to represent Sandra's interests was deemed unauthorized practice of law, rendering the petition null with respect to Sandra's claims. Secondly, Fred could not claim a writ of mandamus as there were other remedies available to him such as appealing the Board's decision. The court found that a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy only issued to enforce an established right or the performance of a duty, and it requires the petitioner to show a clear and certain right to the relief sought and the absence of any other remedy. In this case, Fred failed to meet these requirements. View "MONACO v. LEWIS" on Justia Law

In September 2021, Aaron Welch died intestate, leaving behind a widow, Kristin Welch, and two minor children from his previous marriage. Kristin Welch, appointed as the administratrix of Aaron Welch's estate, filed an application for reservation of homestead & dower with the Pope County Circuit Court, claiming a homestead interest in the mortgaged home she had lived in with her late husband. Katelyn Gipson, the natural guardian of the minor children, argued that Kristin Welch did not have such an interest based on Arkansas Code Ann. § 28-39-201. This statute requires a surviving spouse to have been continuously married to the deceased for more than a year to have a homestead interest. Kristin Welch challenged the constitutionality of this statute, but the circuit court found it constitutional and ruled that she did not have a homestead interest in the property.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court noted that the Arkansas Constitution's provision on homestead rights was gender-based and had been previously declared unconstitutional for violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, the statutory provision, Ark. Code Ann. § 28-39-201(d), which is gender-neutral and requires the continuous marriage condition, stands as the controlling law. The court found no error in the circuit court's application of this statute and concluded that Kristin Welch, having been married to the decedent for less than a year, did not have a statutory homestead interest in the property. View "WELCH ex rel. ESTATE OF AARON WELCH v. GIPSON" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute arising from a real estate transaction between appellants Donnell and Marilyn Bauer and appellees Jesse Lee and Mary A. Beamon. The Bauers sold Lot 24A to the Beamons, failing to disclose certain defects and issues related to the property. After the sale, the Beamons discovered a mold issue in the residence and soil instability on an adjacent lot, Lot 18, which the Bauers had also owned. The Beamons attempted to remediate these issues, incurring significant costs. They ultimately sought to rescind the contract, alleging fraud and deceit by the Bauers.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's denial of the Beamons’ rescission claim, finding that the Beamons had waived their right to rescission by taking possession of the property, engaging in mold eradication, and attempting to remediate the soil conditions on the hillside. These actions were found to be inconsistent with an intent to rescind.However, the court reversed the lower court's award of damages to the Beamons for breach of contract. The court found that the Beamons had not alleged breach of contract in their complaint, and thus could not recover damages on that basis. Furthermore, the court found that the Bauers' constitutional right to a jury trial had been violated, as the Beamons’ claim for rescission, an equitable remedy, had been tried without a jury, and the Bauers were not given a jury trial on the legal claim for damages. View "BAUER V. BEAMON" on Justia Law

In this case presenting four questions of law concerning the constitutionality of Act 1108 of 2021, which amended section 18-50-116 of the Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act, the Supreme Court held that Act 1108 cannot apply retroactively to a mortgagor whose claim has vested and declined to answer the remaining certified questions.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Act 1108 was unconstitutional (1) because it applies retroactively; (2) because the term “substantially comply” in section 2(d)(2)(D) is void for vagueness; (3) because it deletes Section 2(d)(2)(C)(ii); or (4) for any other reason the Court may find. The Supreme Court held that Act 1108 cannot apply retroactively to mortgagors with pending claims and declined answer the remainder of the certified question because the answer would not be dispositive of any issue between the parties. View "Alpe v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's illegal exaction complaint with prejudice under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to allege facts upon which relief can be granted, holding that the circuit court erred.Appellant, a taxpayer, filed a complaint against Preferred Family Healthcare, Inc. (PFH), a provider of healthcare services, alleging that a significant portion of the funds PFH received from the State between 2010 and 2017 were acquired using unlawful means. The circuit court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Appellant did not allege any wrongdoing on the State's part. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a plaintiff is not required to allege wrongful state action in every case in order to state a claim for a "public funds" illegal exaction. View "Parsons v. Preferred Family Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law