Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the Garland County elected treasurer, Jo West Taylor, had received monthly retirement checks for over a year from the Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System (APERS), the APERS executive director terminated Taylor's benefits. The APERS Board of Trustees upheld the decision, determining (1) Taylor had not terminated her employment and her benefits were thus forfeited, and (2) Taylor was ineligible to receive additional service credits after the time she began receiving benefits. The circuit court (1) affirmed the Board's determination that Taylor had failed to terminate her employment, but (2) reversed the Board's finding that Taylor was ineligible to receive additional service credit. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the Board's decision, holding that substantial evidence supported the Board's conclusions. View "Ark. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Taylor" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a medical helicopter accident in Arkansas. Employer was the owner and operator of the helicopter and provided air-ambulance services to the area. Nurse and EMT (collectively, Appellants) and Pilot (Appellee) were all employees of Employer. On the day of the accident, Appellants picked up the victim of an automobile accident in Arkansas, and Pilot piloted the helicopter toward the hospital. However, the helicopter crashed. Nurse and EMT brought a negligence suit against Pilot, alleging their injuries were caused by Pilot's negligent operation of the helicopter. The circuit court dismissed the suit based on the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Appellants appealed, and the case was transferred to the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission concluded that, at the time of the accident, Pilot was performing his employer's duty to provide a safe work place for Appellants and was therefore entitled to immunity under the workers' compensation statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Miller v. Enders" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, Employee filed a claim for benefits after receiving an injury to his left great toe. An ALJ found that Employee had sustained a compensable injury to his left great toe, either as an accidental "specific incident" injury or as an injury caused by rapid-repetitive motion. The Workers' Compensation Commission reversed and denied Employee's claim for benefits because he failed to prove that he sustained a compensable injury to his left great toe. The court of appeals reversed the Commission's decision on the ground that Employee had established a claim for rapid-repetitive injury. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the Commission, holding that the injury Employee suffered at work was caused by a specific incident, and therefore, his injury was compensable as a specific-incident injury. View "Pearson v. Worksource" on Justia Law

Following her resignation as a dental assistant in the dental office of Appellee, Appellant sued Appellee for sexual harassment and outrage. On remand, the circuit court granted Appellee's motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that Appellant's state-law claim for sexual harassment failed because the material facts established that Appellee did not have enough employees for a cause of action to exist against him pursuant to the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA). On interlocutory appeal, Appellant claimed the numerosity requirement of the ACRA violated the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court dismissed without prejudice Appellant's appeal, holding that the circuit court's order was not final and appealable because it did not satisfy the requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). View "Pepper v. Garrett" on Justia Law

Appellants, a clinic study center and three medical doctors, filed an action against Appellees, Dr. Samuel and Marilyn Boellner, alleging breaches of contract for a covenant not to compete, tortious inteference with a business expectancy, defamation, and injunctive relief. Appellees counterclaimed for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and declaratory judgment on the noncompete agreement. The trial court returned verdicts in favor of both Appellants and Appellees. Appellants later caused a writ of garnishment to be issued to reach assets of Marilyn Boellner held in an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). Appellants moved to declare the IRA statute unconstitutional. The circuit court denied Appellants' motion and quashed the writ of garnishment. Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute was constitutional, as the IRA exemption provided in Ark. Code Ann. 16-66-220(a)(1) is not an absolute exemption of all personal property, and, as such, does not offend Ark. Const. art. IV, section 2. View "Clinical Study Ctrs. Inc. v. Boellner" on Justia Law

Appellee Cory Duffy filed a complaint alleging that he was shot twice while standing outside The Entertainer, Inc. waiting for a taxi. Appellee named as defendants The Entertainer, an Arkansas corporation, and Charles Wells, the alcohol-permit holder. Appellee asserted claims for breach of high duty of care, negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision and training. Appellee also sought punitive damages. The district court subsequently granted default judgment against both Defendants. Appellants filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial; (2) The Entertainer did not show that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in entering the default judgment against it; and (3) the circuit court's award of punitive damages was not clearly erroneous. View "Entertainer, Inc. v. Duffy " on Justia Law

The Arkansas School for the Deaf's Board of Trustees terminated Appellant Darleen Tripcony from her employment with the School as part of a reduction in force (RIF). The Arkansas State Employee Grievance Appeal Panel (SEGAP) upheld the Board's RIF of Tripcony's position. Tripcony subsequently filed a complaint in circuit court requesting judicial review of the decision by SEGAP upholding the denial of her appeal and further sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the School. The circuit court dismissed the complaint on the basis that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that Tripcony's claim against the School's Board of Trustees was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court also dismissed Tripcony's claims against several members of the Board in their individual capacities based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of the termination of a state employee; and (2) it necessarily followed that the Court also lacked jurisdiction to decide the appeal issues relating to the immunity issues. View "Tripcony v. Ark. Sch. for the Deaf" on Justia Law

Employer began withholding a portion of wages from Employee's paycheck as the result of an income-withholding order stemming from child-support arrearages. Employee filed a complaint against Employer, asking the circuit court to enjoin Employer from withholding further amounts and that he be awarded damages for all amounts wrongfully withheld. The circuit court dismissed Employee's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly dismissed the case with prejudice, as Employee was barred from bringing this civil action against Employer, who was required to comply with the withholding order; and (2) the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act was constitutional. View "Schultz v. Butterball, LLC" on Justia Law

Donnell Richard filed a complaint in the federal district court in Texas against Union Pacific alleging that, during the course and scope of his employment, he suffered physical injuries because of Union Pacific's negligence. Richard then filed a notice of nonsuit without prejudice, which the district court granted. Richard refiled his cause of action in the circuit court. Union Pacific moved to dismiss Richard's complaint. After finding that Richard's summons and service of summons was defective, the circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that in light of Richard's prior voluntary dismissal of his suit in Texas, the case should be dismissed with prejudice under Ark. R. Civ. P. 41 because the parties did not enter into a joint agreement regarding dismissal of the first complaint. The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal with prejudice, holding that the circuit court erred in its interpretation and application of the two-dismissal rule in Rule 41 to the facts of this case. Remanded. View "Richard v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Employee had previously been injured on the job and was working on light duty when Employer terminated Employee's employment due to insubordination and gross misconduct. The ALJ denied Employee's claim for temporary-total disability for the remainder of his disability period. The Workers' Compensation Commission reversed on the grounds that termination for misconduct is not a sufficient basis for a finding that the employee refused suitable employment under Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-526, which provides that an injured employee who refuses suitable employment shall not be entitled to compensation during the period of his refusal. Accordingly, the Commission found that Employee was entitled to temporary-total-disability benefits for the remainder of his disability period, that he was entitled to wage-loss benefits at the rate of five percent, and that he was thus entitled to attorney's fees. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the decision of the Commission, holding that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and correct statutory interpretation. View "Tyson Poultry Inc. v. Narvaiz" on Justia Law