Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission’s denial of Appellant’s claim that she sustained a compensable brain injury while working in a Kroger store. The Commission found that Appellant’s injury was the result of a syncope, which was caused by an arrhythmic heart condition, rather than a slip and fall or an unexplained fall. On appeal, Appellant argued that substantial evidence did not support the Commission’s finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s stated reason for denying benefits that Appellant’s injury was caused by an idiopathic condition and not an unexplained, compensable fall. View "Asking v. Kroger Limited Partnership I" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the circuit court’s order certifying a class action filed by Employees failed to comply with Ark. R. Civ. P. 23(b). In their complaint, Employees alleged claims of breach of contract and unjust enrichment based on Employer’s failure to compensate Employees for earned but unused vacation time. The circuit court granted Employees’ motion for class certification. Appellants filed this interlocutory appeal arguing that Employees failed to demonstrate commonality, predominance, and superiority as to their breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the circuit court’s bare conclusion that “Plaintiffs have satisfied all elements of Rule 23 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and class certification is appropriate in this case” was clearly insufficient for the Supreme Court to conduct a meaningful review. View "Industrial Welding Supplies of Hattiesburg, LLC v. Pinson" on Justia Law

Hence forth, all briefed cases submitted to the court of appeals must be disposed of by full, written majority opinions. Thus, In re Memorandum Opinions, 700 S.W.2d 63 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985), in which the court of appeals promulgated its memorandum-opinion policy, is hereby overruled.In this workers’ compensation case, Appellants filed a petition asking the Supreme Court to review an opinion handed down by the court of appeals. Neither the full commission nor the court of appeals issued a formal opinion, as the full commission adopted the administrative law judge’s findings and the court of appeals issued a memorandum opinion. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’s opinion and remanded the case to that court to properly analyze this case, as the opinion provided no meaningful analysis. Because Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 5-2(e) has previously allowed the court of appeals to issue memorandum opinions, the rule is hereby amended to state that opinions of the court of appeals shall only be in conventional form. View "Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Morgan" on Justia Law

In this wrongful termination case, Peggy Cryer, who was sued individually and in her official capacity as executive secretary of the Arkansas State Medical Board, was entitled to statutory immunity on some, but not all, of Plaintiff's claims.Kristi Byers was terminated from her employment with the Board for allegedly not using leave time on days that she did not come to work. Byers filed suit against the Board and Cryer for wrongful termination, alleging race discrimination and retaliation under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA) and seeking damages and injunctive relief. The circuit court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds, concluding that Defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity and Cryer was not entitled to statutory immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Cryer was entitled to statutory immunity on Byers’s individual-capacity race discrimination and retaliation claims under the ACRA but statutory immunity did not bar Byers’s federal civil rights claims against Cryer in her individual capacity. Remanded. View "Arkansas State Medical Board v. Byers" on Justia Law

Statutory postjudgment interest on attorney’s fees accrues when the fees were actually quantified in dollars and cents rather than when the right thereto was first established.Plaintiff was granted judgment on her claim for retaliation under the Arkansas Whisteblower Protection Act. The circuit court entered judgment “plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to be determined by the court.” Three months later, the court entered a second order quantifying attorney’s fees. Defendant paid postjudgment interest on the attorney’s fees from the date that the award was entered. Plaintiff argued that she was entitled to attorney’s fees when the underlying judgment was entered. The circuit court granted the Department’s motion to compel entry of complete satisfaction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that postjudgment interest on an attorney’s-fee award accrues from the order setting the fee amount in dollars and cents. View "Daniel v. Arkansas Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a question certified to it by the court of appeals regarding the suspension, discharge, or reduction in rank for certain civil-service officers. The Court answered (1) appeals from civil-service commissions under Ark. Code Ann. 14-51-308(e) are not required by law to be heard by the Supreme Court pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(8); and (2) therefore, civil-service-commission appeals shall continue to be filed in the court of appeals unless there is another basis for Supreme Court jurisdiction under Rule 1-2. View "Bales v. City of Fort Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class-action implant against the Arkansas State Police Retirement System (ASPRS) and its Trustees, in their official capacity, on behalf of certain members of the Arkansas State Police Retirement System Deferred Option Plan (DROP). Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Act 404 of 2007, which amended Ark. Code Ann. 24-6-304(b) to provide that that the ASPRS Board of Trustees shall set the interest rate and that the interest rate “shall not be greater than the actuarially assumed investment rate of return for that time,” was unconstitutional as applied to those officers who had elected to enter the DROP prior to the effective date of the Act. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on all claims, concluding that retroactive application of Act 404 would impair and disturb contractual vested rights of the officers regarding the interest rate on their DROP contributions. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity. View "Arkansas State Police Retirement System v. Sligh" on Justia Law

Teresa Jones filed claims against Truman Arnold Companies (TAC) for negligent supervision, retention, and hiring of a store manager, claiming that she was a victim of sexual assault and harassment while employed by TAC and that she was exposed to this harm due to TAC’s negligence. TAC moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Jones’s sole remedy was through the Workers’ Compensation Act and that the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Act. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the Act did not provide coverage for Jones’s claims because her alleged injuries amounted to “mental injury or illness,” which is not compensable under workers’ compensation. The TAC subsequently filed a petition for writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the issue of jurisdiction resided exclusively with the Workers’ Compensation Commission because the facts, as presented in the complaint, could not be determined to fall outside the Act as a matter of law. View "Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Patricia Adams filed claims against Truman Arnold Companies (TAC) for negligent supervision, retention, and hiring of a store manager, claiming that she was a victim of sexual assault and harassment while employed by TAC and that she was exposed to this harm due to TAC’s negligence. TAC moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Adams’s sole remedy was through the Workers’ Compensation Act and that the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Act. The circuit court denied TAC’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the allegations fell outside of the Commission’s jurisdiction. TAC then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to preclude the circuit court from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over Adams’s claims against TAC. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, holding that the writ was warranted for the reasons stated in Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court, handed down this same date. View "Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

A class of police officers and firefighters employed by the City of Conway brought a class-action complaint alleging that the City breached its employment contract with them when it failed to allocate sales tax revenues to fund salary increases. The circuit court certified the class action, finding that there were overarching, common questions that could efficiently be determined on a class-wide basis. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s class-certification order, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when if found the prerequisites of a class action. View "City of Conway v. Shumate" on Justia Law