Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After appellant Stephanie Riley, who was insured by State Farm, was involved in a car accident, Riley settled with the tortfeasor's insurer, GEICO. Riley asserted that State Farm filed a lien on her settlement before it knew whether she would be made whole by the settlement. After taking her case to trial court, Riley appealed with a Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification the dismissal of count one of her amended petition for declaratory judgment and complaint, which sought a declaratory judgment that appellee State Farm had failed to establish a legal lien or right to subrogation under Arkansas law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court erred in interpreting Ark. Code Ann. 23-89-207 and the state's subrogation law. The subrogation lien cannot arise, or attach, until the insured has received the settlement proceeds or damage award and until there is a judicial determination that the insured has been made whole.

Megan Bradley, who was insured by State Farm, was injured in a motor-vehicle accident. State Farm paid $3844 in medical benefits to Bradley. State Farm then pursued a subrogation claim against the tortfeasor's insurer, Farmers Insurance. Bradley responded that the settlement with Farmers Insurance was not sufficient for her to be made whole. State Farm refused to release its subrogation claim. Bradley filed a petition for declaratory judgment and complaint for bad faith against State Farm and later filed an amended declaratory action to invalidate lien and complaint for injunctive relief, deceptive trade practices, bad faith and tortious interference with a contract. The circuit court dismissed count one of Bradley's amended pleading, finding (1) State Farm had a valid but unenforceable lien for sums paid to Bradley, (2) State Farm's right of subrogation arose at the time State Farm paid the medical benefits by operation of law, and (3) State Farm's right of subrogation is not enforceable until a subsequent judicial determination that Bradley was made whole by the settlement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the reasons set forth on the same day in Riley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

Steve Baxter, who was insured by State Farm, was injured in a motor-vehicle accident. State Farm paid medical coverage in the amount of $5000 and informed the tortfeasor's insurer carrier, Farmers Insurance, of its notice of subrogation rights. Baxter informed State Farm that the amount of his settlement with Farmers was not sufficient for him to be made whole and filed a petition for declaratory judgment and complaint for bad faith against State Farm. Later Baxter filed an amended declaratory action to invalidate lien and complaint for injunctive relief, deceptive trade practices, bad faith, and tortious interference with a contract. The circuit court found that State Farm had a valid but unenforceable lien against any settlement paid to Baxter and dismissed count one of Baxter's complaint with prejudice. Baxter appealed, arguing the court erred in dismissing the first count of his complaint because, pursuant to the Supreme Court's case law, an insurer's right to subrogation only arises once the insured has been made whole. The Court reversed and remanded for the reasons set forth on the same day in Riley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

Appellants Bunn Builders, Inc. (Bunn) hired Appellees Richard Womack and Roy Turner (Womack & Turner) to paint the ground floor office of the Bunn Building in Arkadelphia. On August 19, 2004, a fire was reported at the building. The building sustained major structural damage as a result of the fire. Bunn insured the building through Employers Mutual Casualty Company (EMC). Within a few days, EMC hired investigators to find the cause and origin of the fire. The investigators asked Womack & Turner's liability insurance carrier Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Arkansas, Inc. (Farm Bureau) to preserve certain items for testing. In particular, they requested to test a halogen work lamp that the painters used on the Bunn job. EMC later sent a letter to Farm Bureau stating that EMC believed that the electrical components from the "electrical tools" used on the job were eliminated as a possible cause for igniting the fire. Testimony at trial by Womack & Turner revealed that EMC believed that the halogen lamp had been eliminated as a possible cause. However, EMC's investigators submitted reports identifying the lamp as the possible source of ignition. These reports were not sent to Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau wanted to do its own independent testing and asked EMC for the tools. EMC admitted that it had destroyed the items once its investigation was complete. Bunn and EMC sued Womack & Turner for negligence, alleging that the halogen lamp started the fire. In their response, Womack & Turner raised the issue of "spoliation," arguing that Bunn and EMC had a duty to preserve the evidence if they intended to sue for negligence. A trial was held, and the jury was given an instruction on "spoliation." The jury returned a verdict in favor of Womack & Turner. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Bunn and EMC argued that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to instruct the jury on spoliation. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and affirmed the decision in favor of Womack & Turner.

Appellant Jane Henry, as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband Ernest, sued multiple parties, including Continental Casualty Company (Continental), Washington Regional Medical Center (Washington), Irma De La Cruz R.N., and Amber Hefner R.N. Among other things, Mrs. Henry asserted that Washington was vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees, including nurses De La Cruz and Hefner. Mrs. Henry proceeded against the hospital's insurer, Continental, under the state's "direct-action" statute. All Defendants moved to dismiss, because Mrs. Henry failed to obtain service of process on the nurses before the statute of limitations expired. Because Washington's alleged negligence arose from its vicarious liability based on the actions of the nurses, Defendants argued that claims against Washington and Continental must also be dismissed. The circuit court granted Defendants' motion, and Mrs. Henry appealed. The Supreme Court held that "because direct-action statutes are remedial in nature, we liberally construe them for the benefit of the injured parties and to effectuate the intended purposes." On review of the applicable case law, the Court found that failing include the nurses in this case was not fatal. Appellant could still pursue the hospital and its insurance carrier for the alleged negligence of its employees. The Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and remanded the case for further proceedings.