Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee was injured in an automobile accident while working for Employer. Employer had a state-certified workers' compensation plan in effect that provided coverage to Employee, and some of Employee's medical bills were paid by the workers' compensation carrier. Employee had a policy with State Farm that included no-fault medical coverage. State Farm, however, denied coverage to Employee under a policy exclusion that denied coverage for an insured if any workers' compensation law applied to the insured's bodily injury. Employee filed an action against State Farm, seeking recovery of benefits under the no-fault medical provision. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law where, in accordance with previous precedent, the exclusion clearly applied in all scenarios where workers' compensation benefits either had been paid in whole or in part or could be paid in whole or in part.

Teresa Broussard brought a medical malpractice action against, inter alia, Dr. Stephen Seffense and Dr. Michael Coleman, Jr. after she developed and was treated for a burn following a surgery. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Broussard appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding that Ark. Code Ann. 16-114-206(a), which requires that proof in medical malpractice cases must be made by expert testimony by medical care providers of the same speciality as the defendant, was constitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute violated the separation-of-powers doctrine and the inherent authority of the courts to protect the integrity of proceedings and the rights of litigants. Remanded.

SSW Holding filed a complaint against BDO Seidman and other defendants, asserting several causes of action and seeking damages arising from a tax-advantaged investment strategy involving investments in distressed debt that SSW entered into and utilized on its federal tax returns for the 2001-2005 tax years. BDO filed an amended motion to compel arbitration and stay the motion, asserting that it and SSW entered into two consulting agreements that provided for arbitration before the American Arbitration Association. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) SSW's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration provisions; and (2) the circuit court erred in finding that the arbitration provisions were unenforceable and invalid due to fraud and procedural and substantive unconscionability. Remanded.

After Kenneth Middleton was convicted of first-degree murder but before a judgment was entered against him in a wrongful-death suit, Kenneth conveyed property he owned in Arkansas to his brother. The sale was found to be fraudulent and was set aside by decree. Appellees, several individuals, filed a petition for writ of scire facias more than ten years later to allow more time to sell the property in an effort to satisfy the Missouri judgment. Appellants, the Middleton brothers, filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court dismissed. Appellants subsequently filed a motion for clarification as well as a notice of appeal. Appellants' motion was subsequently deemed denied. Appellees then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that a second notice of appeal was required after the denial of the consolidated motion for clarification. The Supreme Court denied Appellees' motion, holding that the notice of appeal in this case was effective.

Bayer CropScience LP developed LibertyLink Rice (LLRice), a genetically engineered rice, which Bayer subsequently used in outdoor field tests. The USDA later found that trace amounts of LLRice in the U.S. long-grain rice supply. Due to the contamination, several countries slowed or banned the import of all American rice. Appellees, several rice farmers and farming entities, sued Bayer, claiming (1) Bayer was negligent in allowing the accidental release of LLRice into the nation's rice supply by not taking adequate precautions during field trials to prevent cross-pollination or the commingling of genetically modified rice seed with conventional seed; and (2) Bayer's negligence caused economic harm by driving down the market price for American long-grain rice. The circuit court awarded $5,975,605 in compensatory damages and $42,000,0000 in punitive damages to Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) ruling that Ark. Code Ann. 16-55-208, which establishes limits on awards of punitive damages, is unconstitutional; (2) concluding that Appellees' claims were not barred by the economic-loss doctrine; (3) allowing certain expert testimony; and (4) rejecting Bayer's legal argument advanced in its motion for a directed verdict.

Respondents, two individuals, filed a complaint against Petitioner, Advance Fiberglass, LLC, alleging that due to Advance's negligence an explosion occurred that resulted in both property damage and personal injury to them. Respondents served the summons and complaint on a registered agent for Advance by certified mail. The postal service delivered the summons and complaint to the agent, but through an error on the part of the postal service, the agent did not sign the certified mail. Instead, an employee of the agent signed the receipt for the certified mail. Advance moved to dismiss on the basis of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court denied Advance's petition for writ of certiorari, holding that the circuit court, in correctly interpreting Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(d) and denying Advance's motion, did not act in excess of its jurisdiction, nor did it commit and plain and manifest abuse of discretion.

Hazel Frazier died, leaving behind her husband, Appellant Curtis Bridges, and her seven children, who were the stepchildren of Elree Frazier, a previous husband who died after taking the medication Vioxx. Later, one of the stepchildren brought a claim against Merck Company, the manufacturer of Vioxx, on behalf of Mr. Frazier, for the wrongful death of Mr. Frazier. The settlement proceeds were funneled into the estate of Ms. Frazier for distribution to Mr. Frazier's stepchildren. After Appellant was appointed the administrator for Ms. Frazier's estate, Appellant filed a claim stating that he was entitled to receive one-third of the proceeds obtained from the Merck settlement because of his curtesy interest. The district court rejected Appellant's claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Ms. Frazier did not have a right to the Merck proceeds during her lifetime nor an individual right to bring suit under the wrongful-death statute, Appellant had no curtesy interest in the Merck settlement proceeds.

In 2009, a car collided with a bus driven by Angela Austin, causing several passengers' deaths and serious injuries to others. Austin drove the bus as a transport vehicle for a nonprofit called Focus. Focus was insured by appellant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, who filed a complaint for interpleader indicating its willingness to pay insurance-policy proceeds in the total amount of $1 million as per its policy and requesting to be discharged from further liability. The circuit court entered an order interpleading appellant's funds. Appellees, the injured passengers and administrators of the deceased passengers' estates, filed counterclaims against appellant, alleging that Focus negligently failed to restrict Austin from using her cell phone while driving and arguing they were entitled to a judgment against appellant for a share of the interpleaded funds. Appellant filed a motion for declaratory judgment and a motion to dismiss, stating it had paid the full amount as stated in the insurance policy. The circuit court denied appellants' motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly concluded that the language of the policy was ambiguous.

After appellant Stephanie Riley, who was insured by State Farm, was involved in a car accident, Riley settled with the tortfeasor's insurer, GEICO. Riley asserted that State Farm filed a lien on her settlement before it knew whether she would be made whole by the settlement. After taking her case to trial court, Riley appealed with a Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification the dismissal of count one of her amended petition for declaratory judgment and complaint, which sought a declaratory judgment that appellee State Farm had failed to establish a legal lien or right to subrogation under Arkansas law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court erred in interpreting Ark. Code Ann. 23-89-207 and the state's subrogation law. The subrogation lien cannot arise, or attach, until the insured has received the settlement proceeds or damage award and until there is a judicial determination that the insured has been made whole.

Plaintiffs Mark and Karla Gibbs brought claims in the federal district court against, among other defendants, Corinthian Title, Jeffrey Brown, Shelley Hickson, and Christine Tueckes, for civil conspiracy. The above defendants argued that the federal district court did not have in personam jurisdiction over them because Arkansas's long-arm statute does not allow application of conspiracy jurisdiction. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction violates the state's long-arm statute. The Court answered in the negative. Arkansas's long-arm statute does not limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction to certain enumerated circumstances and is therefore limited only by federal constitutional law. Because jurisdiction based on the conspiracy theory does not violate due process, the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction does not violate Arkansas's long-arm statute.