Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Central Oklahoma Pipeline successfully bid for the construction of a natural gas pipeline. Appellant subsequently sued the companies that engaged it (the Hawk defendants), and an engineering company (CTS), asserting (1) against the Hawk defendants, claims for breach of contract and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA); and (2) against CTS, negligence or failing to give notice of its requirement to inform Appellant of the necessity of having a contractor's license. Appellant then filed an amended complaint adding Lee Hallmark and several John Does as defendants, contending that they were employees of the Hawk defendants and that their negligence was imputed to the Hawk defendants under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The circuit court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) ruling that Ark. Code Ann. 17-25-103(d) barred Appellant's claims for breach of contract and a violation of the ADTPA; (2) determining that section 17-25-103(d) was constitutional; and (3) ruling that Ark. Code Ann. 17-25-313 does not impose a tort duty on engineers who fail to inform prospective bidders that they must have a contractor's license. View "Cent. Okla. Pipeline, Inc. v. Hawk Field Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Donnell Richard filed a complaint in the federal district court in Texas against Union Pacific alleging that, during the course and scope of his employment, he suffered physical injuries because of Union Pacific's negligence. Richard then filed a notice of nonsuit without prejudice, which the district court granted. Richard refiled his cause of action in the circuit court. Union Pacific moved to dismiss Richard's complaint. After finding that Richard's summons and service of summons was defective, the circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that in light of Richard's prior voluntary dismissal of his suit in Texas, the case should be dismissed with prejudice under Ark. R. Civ. P. 41 because the parties did not enter into a joint agreement regarding dismissal of the first complaint. The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal with prejudice, holding that the circuit court erred in its interpretation and application of the two-dismissal rule in Rule 41 to the facts of this case. Remanded. View "Richard v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

This case began as a dispute over construction costs between Appellee TriBuilt Construction Group, LLC and Appellants NISHA, LLC and Centennial Bank. After Appellee filed suit against Appellants, the circuit court ordered arbitration with regard to Appellee's claims. Appellee subsequently decided to represent itself in the arbitration and circuit court proceedings. Appellants filed a petition for a permanent injunction requesting the circuit court to enjoin the corporation's officers, director, or employees from representing Tribuilt in the circuit court or arbitration proceedings. The circuit court denied Appellants' petition so far as it pertained to arbitration proceedings, holding (1) nonlawyer representation in an arbitration proceeding does not constitute the practice of law; and (2) an arbitrator, rather than the court, should determine issues regarding legal representation during arbitration proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a corporate officer, director, or employee who is not a licensed attorney, engages in the unauthorized practice of law by representing the corporation in arbitration proceedings; and (2) issues regarding legal representation during arbitration proceedings fall squarely within the ambit of the court's constitutional powers and may not be decided by an arbitration body. View "NISHA LLC v. TriBuilt Constr. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

In the early 1990s Appellant Kenneth Middleton was convicted of murdering his wife and sentenced to life in prison. In 1992, a default judgment was entered against Appellant in a wrongful death action brought by Appellees, Appellant's wife's siblings. In 1999, a chancery court entered a decree finding that a conveyance Appellant had made to Appellant Lynn Middleton after the 1992 judgment was fraudulent. In 2009, Appellees filed a petition for writ of scire facias to revive the 1999 decree. The circuit court denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment and ordered that the 1999 decree be revived for another ten-year period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the 1999 decree, which was entered in the chancery court prior to the adoption of an amendment merging law and equity, was entitled to "the same footing" as a judgment, and the circuit court did not err in concluding it could be revived by a writ of scire facias; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that Appellees timely revived the 1999 decree where they filed their writ of scire facias on May 13, 2009, within ten years from May 25, 1999, the effective date of the decree. View "Middleton v. Lockhart" on Justia Law

Employee had previously been injured on the job and was working on light duty when Employer terminated Employee's employment due to insubordination and gross misconduct. The ALJ denied Employee's claim for temporary-total disability for the remainder of his disability period. The Workers' Compensation Commission reversed on the grounds that termination for misconduct is not a sufficient basis for a finding that the employee refused suitable employment under Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-526, which provides that an injured employee who refuses suitable employment shall not be entitled to compensation during the period of his refusal. Accordingly, the Commission found that Employee was entitled to temporary-total-disability benefits for the remainder of his disability period, that he was entitled to wage-loss benefits at the rate of five percent, and that he was thus entitled to attorney's fees. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the decision of the Commission, holding that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and correct statutory interpretation. View "Tyson Poultry Inc. v. Narvaiz" on Justia Law

Metropolitan National Bank (MNB) loaned Grand Valley Ridge several million dollars for the completion of a subdivision. After Grand Valley failed to make its interest payments, MNB filed a petition for foreclosure. Grand Valley and Thomas Terminella, a member of Grand Valley (collectively, Appellants), filed an amended counterclaim alleging various causes of action. During the trial, the circuit court granted Appellants' motion to take a voluntary nonsuit of their claims of negligence and tortious interference with contract. The circuit court held in favor of MNB. The court subsequently granted MNB's petition for foreclosure and awarded a judgment against Appellants. Thereafter, Appellants filed a complaint alleging their original nonsuited counterclaims and adding additional claims. MNB moved to dismiss Appellants' complaint and filed a motion for sanctions. The circuit court granted both motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) because Appellants brought claims clearly barred by the statute of limitations, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for MNB on Grand Valley's nonsuited issues based on the applicable statute of limitations. View "Grand Valley Ridge LLC v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Ketan Bulsara filed a medical-malpractice and wrongful-death action against Dr. Julia Watkins stemming from the stillbirth of his child. A jury returned a judgment in favor of Dr. Watkins. The trial court subsequently denied Bulsara's motion for new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Bulsara's motion for a new trial where Bulsara demonstrated a reasonable possibility of prejudice in light of defense counsel's continued representation of Dr. Watkins after the filing of Bulsara's lawsuit while in possession of confidential information from an expert who previously consulted with Bulsara and his former counsel, in contravention of the Court's rules. View "Bulsara v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Appellants, Little Rock Healthcare (LRHC), a nursing care facility; Donald Bedell, the sole member of the governing body for LRHC; and Heartland Personnel Leasing, appealed from a judgment in favor of Appellee Brenda Williams, as personal representative of the Estate of Minnie Valentine, who died after being discharged from LRHC. The Supreme Court reversed, dismissing Bedell and remanding for a new trial as to LRHC and Heartland, holding (1) the circuit court erred by denying Bedell's directed-verdict motion and judgment notwithstanding the verdict as Bedell owed no personal duty to Valentine; and (2) the circuit court erred in excluding Valentine's post discharge medical evidence, which error was prejudicial and warranted a new trial. View "Bedell v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellants, Theresa and Eddie Paulino, filed an action against Appellees, QHG of Springdale and NorthWest Arkansas Hospitals (collectively, NMC), for negligent credentialing and negligent retention after three surgeries left Mrs. Paulino unable to walk. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of NMC, concluding that, inter alia, the Medical Malpractice Act did not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing, nor did a cause of action for negligent credentialing exist in Arkansas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that (1) the Medical Malpractice Act did not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing; (2) there did not exist nor was it necessary to create a tort for negligent credentialing; and (3) because the nurse that monitored the surgeries was the employee of an independent contractor, NMC could not be held liable for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of the nurse.

Rudolph Slater was killed while operating a Yanmar tractor he purchased from Chris Elder Enterprises. The tractor had been manfactured by Yanmar Japan and later sold to Chris Elder Enterprises. Slater's wife, Wanda, filed a wrongful-death action against, among others, Yanmar Japan and Yanmar America, alleging claims for, inter alia, fraud, strict liability, breach of implied and express warranties, and negligence. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Wanda, awarding her damages in the amount of $2.5 million. The Yanmar defendants appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding (1) the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Yanmar Japan, as there was no evidence to establish that Yanmar Japan had the requisite minimum contacts with the forum to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction, and there was insufficient proof to show that personal jurisdiction could be predicated on the relationship between Yanmar Japan and its subsidiary, Yanmar America; and (2) the jury's finding that Yanmar America was negligent was not supported by substantial evidence, as Yanmar America owed no duty of care to Rudolph.