Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant's decedents were passengers in a 1979 Beechcraft Baron airplane when, in 2008, the left engine lost power and the plane crashed, killing all persons on board. Appellant filed suit on behalf of his decedents' estates, claiming wrongful death based on negligence and products liability. Appellant named as defendants the manufacturers of the airplane (Appellees), among others. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Appellant's suit was barred by the eighteen-year statute of repose set forth in the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA). The circuit court granted summary judgment to Appellees, finding that Appellant's claims were barred by GARA and that neither the fraud exception nor the new-part rolling provision of GARA applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to Appellees where (1) a genuine issue of material fact did not exist with respect to whether the fraud exception to GARA applied here; and (2) Appellant's allegations that the publication of an allegedly defective flight manual were insufficient to invoke GARA's new-part rolling provision as a matter of law. View "Tillman v. Raytheon Co." on Justia Law

Decedent was a resident of Searcy Healthcare Center (SHC) from January 7 to January 29. On January 8, Decedent executed a written arbitration agreement with SHC that was binding on Decedent's children, personal representatives, and administrators of Decedent's estate. Decedent died on February 12. The next year, Appellee filed a nursing-home-malpractice action against SHC as administrator of Decedent's estate and on behalf of the statutory wrongful-death beneficiaries. The circuit court denied SHC's motion to compel arbitration against the wrongful-death beneficiaries, concluding that Decedent had not extinguished the substantive rights of the wrongful-death beneficiaries by signing the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in finding that the wrongful-death beneficiaries were not bound by the arbitration agreement executed by Decedent. Remanded. View "Searcy Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Les Marlow filed a complaint against Glenn Petkovsek and United Systems of Arkansas, Inc. for breach of contract and breach of the duties of good faith and fair dealing. Additionally, Appellants, Les Marlow and other individuals, filed claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy against Petkovsek and United Systems. Various counterclaims were filed against Appellants, including breach of contract and conversion. The jury (1) entered verdicts in favor of United Systems on its claims but awarded zero damages, and (2) entered defense verdicts for Petkovsek and United Systems, finding Plaintiffs failed to prove their claims. The circuit court subsequently found United Systems and Petkovsek were entitled to attorney's fees and costs but awarded them only to Petkovsek. Appellants appealed the award. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's award, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) finding that Petkovsek was a prevailing party; and (2) finding that attorney's fees and costs are available to a prevailing party in a wrongful-discharge against public-policy case. View "Marlow v. United Sys. of Ark., Inc." on Justia Law

Bobbie Troup, in her capacity as the administrator of the estate of Easter Dawkins, filed suit alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against Petitioners. During the trial proceedings, Troup filed a petition requesting that Petitioners be required to pay for the cost of five expert witnesses who had appeared to testify on her behalf on the scheduled trial date but did not testify because the circuit court had granted a motion for continuance made by Petitioners. The circuit court entered an order directing Petitioner to pay Troup for expert-witness costs associated with the continuance of the trial. Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of certiorari, against the circuit court, contending that the court exceeded its authority and abused its discretion in ordering them pay the expert-witness costs of Troup. The Supreme Court denied the petitions, as Petitioners had an adequate remedy in the form of an appeal. View "Moore v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After L.C. died, the probate court appointed his son, Bobby, as special personal representative of L.C.'s estate for the limited purpose of investigating and prosecuting all claims relating to nursing home abuse. On behalf of the estate, Bobby subsequently sued Appellees in a wrongful-death action. During the wrongful-death action proceedings, it was revealed that Bobby was a convicted felon who was not qualified to serve as a special personal representative by law. Bobby filed a motion to substitute his brother Ronnie as special personal representative, which the trial court granted. The probate court, however, later vacated its order appointing Bobby, finding the order was invalid from its inception. At issue on appeal was whether Bobby's acts prior to his removal, including his motion to substitute Ronnie, remained valid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Bobby's acts as a special personal representative were valid until the date of his removal as special personal representative; and (2) accordingly, the probate court erred by finding that the order of appointment was void ab initio. Remanded. View "Taylor v. MCSA, LLC" on Justia Law

L.C. was a nursing home patient when he died. Bobby, L.C.'s son and the special personal representative of L.C.'s estate, filed suit against several nursing home defendants for negligence and medical malpractice. After it was discovered during a deposition that Bobby was a convicted felon and not qualified to serve as special personal representative, the circuit court dismissed with prejudice the complaints against the defendants, concluding that Bobby lacked the authority to act on behalf of the estate because of his disqualification as a felon and that the complaints he filed were nullities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that the actions of Bobby were invalid and that the complaints filed by Bobby were nullities. Remanded. View "Taylor v. MCSA, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant and her two uncles each owned as tenants in common an undivided one-third interest in two tracts of farmland. Both of Appellant's uncles separately sold their interest in the property to Appellee. Appellee subsequently sold one of the farms. Appellant filed a complaint seeking a partition of the lands and damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a tenant in common, tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices. Appellant claimed that Appellee prevented a family partnership from entering into seven-year renewal leases with farmers who leased the farmland and prevented the partnership from implementing a long-term plan for improving the farms. The circuit court granted summary judgment in Appellee's favor and dismissed the action with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Appellant's three claims, as Appellant failed to meet proof with proof that she sustained any damages as a result of Appellee's alleged breach of fiduciary duty, alleged tortious interference, and alleged deceptive trade practice. View "Skalla v. Canepari" on Justia Law

Randy Wardlaw lived in a rental house on India Bishop's property. Wardlaw, who occasionally helped Bishop with tasks, was burning dead vegetation in a drainage ditch on Bishop's property when the fire burned out of control. The fire spread onto the premises of a building owned by Charlotte Hardin and rented to Troy Guthrey for his business, where it caused a $326,000 loss. Hardin and Guthrey filed a complaint against Bishop and Wardlaw alleging that Wardlaw was negligent and seeking to recover damages, including double-damage recovery. The circuit court (1) entered a default judgment against Wardlaw, ordering him to pay Hardin $228,900 and Guthrey $453,750; and (2) granted Bishop's motion for summary judgment on the ground that no agency relationship existed between Bishop and Wardlaw. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court improperly granted Bishop's motion for summary judgment, as a factual question regarding Bishop's authorization and control over Wardlaw remained to be answered. Remanded. View "Hardin v. Bishop" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute among the owners of an oil-drilling rig. Donald Buffington owned 62.5 percent of the rig. Newton Dorsett, through his company, Diamond Transport & Drilling, owned the remaining 37.5 percent of the rig. Two lawsuits brought by the owners were resolved when the parties entered into a compromise agreement. The third case was brought by Buffington against Diamond and Dorsett in the Lafayette County circuit court and alleged causes of action for breach of contract and conversion arising out of the agreement. The fourth case was filed by Diamond in Louisiana seeking an order enforcing the agreement. Thereafter, Louisiana court found, inter alia, that the compromise agreement remained in effect. Subsequently, the Lafayette County circuit court found that, in light of the Louisiana judgment, res judicata applied to a majority of the issues brought by Buffington in the Lafayette County circuit court. The case proceeded to trial, and the circuit court entered judgment against Dorsett. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) res judicata did not bar Buffington's action in Arkansas court; and (2) there was substantial evidence to support the jury's award of damages. View "Dorsett v. Buffington" on Justia Law

Petitioner Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company petitioned for a writ of prohibition with the Supreme Court, arguing the circuit court did not have jurisdiction after ninety days to set aside its previous order in this case. This matter stemmed from a motorcycle accident in which Stuart Parsons was injured with an uninsured driver. Parsons had uninsured-motorist coverage with Farm Bureau. He made a claim against that coverage, and signed a release allowing farm bureau to obtain his medical bills, and received a personal-injury protection payment. Parsons' medical bills exceeded the policy limit. Farm Bureau them filed a complaint for interpleader, requesting the circuit court disburse its uninsured-motorist limits. At that time, no other party had filed a lien nor claimed any interest in the policy proceeds. Acting pro se, Parsons answered and requested his policy be paid to him. The circuit court ordered Farm Bureau to deposit the funds into the court's registry and to disburse the money accordingly. Then Parsons filed a counterclaim seeking a statutory penalty, interst and attorney's dees, and to dismiss Farm Bureau's interpleader. After a hearing, the circuit court vacated an earlier order thereby allowing Parsons to proceed with his counterclaims against Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau then filed for a writ of prohibition, arguing the circuit court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order after ninety days from entry of the order. The Supreme Court considered Farm Bureau's petition for a writ of prohibition as a request for a writ of certiorari, and found that Farm Bureau had another adequate remedy. As such, the Court denied Farm Bureau's petition for certiorari, and dismissed the petition for the writ of prohibition as moot. View "S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Parsons" on Justia Law