Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee, as special administrator of the estate of Rufus Owens and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Owens, filed a lawsuit against Pine Hills Health and Rehabilitation, LLC and others for injuries Owens sustained during his care and treatment at Pine Hills. Appellants moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement. Appellee argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because there was no evidence of mutual assent where the agreement was signed by Appellee as the "responsible party" but did not bear the signature of a representative of Pine Hills. The circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no objective evidence of mutual assent, and therefore, the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. View "Pine Hills Health & Rehab., LLC v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Truck Insurance Exchange (TIE) issued an apartment-owners insurance policy to appellant Jeanne Estates Apartments (JEA) that became effective in 1998. In 2006, Farmers Insurance Exchange (FIE) renewed the policy and continued to provide coverage. In 2008 and 2010, JEA became involved in three underlying lawsuits, which involved several appellants. JEA submitted claims for coverage to TIE/FIE in regard to those cases. TIE/FIE filed a complaint requesting that the circuit court declare that they owed no coverage to any person for any of the alleged misconduct which formed the basis of the claims in the underlying lawsuits and that they had no duty to provide a defense to any person or entity who was a defendant in the underlying lawsuits. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of TIE/FIE. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the apartment-liability contract issued by TIE/FIE did not provide an insured coverage for the type of harm alleged by the plaintiffs in the underlying suit. View "Kolbek v. Truck Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

Dan and Brenda Billingsley owned and operated Floors and More, Inc. on certain property (“West Bank Property”). Benton NWA Properties purchased the property across from the West Bank Property in 2008 (“East Bank Property”). Appellants, the Billingsleys and Floors and More, filed a second amended complaint against Benton NWA, alleging that Appellants suffered damages after the West Bank Property flooded due to the owners of the East Bank Property placing fill material in the floodplain. The parties settled, and the circuit court subsequently granted a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in favor of Benton NWA. Appellants appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in ordering that the settlement agreement should contain a release of all liability for future flooding of property owned by the Billingsleys. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice because the circuit court’s order failed to contain specific factual findings in accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). View "Billingsley v. Benton NWA Props., LLC " on Justia Law

Following the bankruptcy of BioBased Technologies, LLC, certain members of BioBased (Appellants) brought an action against other members, the members’ lawyers, and the managers of the corporation for fraud, breach of duty to disclose company information, conversion of membership interest, civil conspiracy, and breach of contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment on some claims, dismissed some claims, and found that the remainder of the claims were barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on Appellants’ claims for fraud, breach of duty to disclose company information, and conversion of membership interest claims based on Appellants’ lack of standing, as Appellants had standing to assert their claims; (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on Appellants’ fraud claim against certain defendants on the basis that Appellants “failed to meet proof with proof” to show that the defendants made false representations of fact; (3) the circuit court erred in dismissing claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (4) the circuit court erred in concluding that the bankruptcy proceeding had res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on Appellants’ state-law claims. Remanded. View "Muccio v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Arloe Designs, LLC proposed to build a building at an airport. Arkansas Capital Corporation (ACC) and National Bank of Arkansas (NBA) allegedly worked together to procure a loan for the building’s construction. After the NBA approved financing for the project, Arloe entered into a thirty-year lease for the new hangar. Later that month, Arloe learned that NBA would not close the loan without a bond as collateral, which Arloe did not give, and therefore, the loan was not closed. Arloe sued ACC and NBA, alleging breach of contract, violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trades Practices Act, negligence, and promissory estoppel. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Defendants as to all but Arloe’s promissory estoppel claim, and limited damages for that claim to the money Arloe had spent in reliance on the claimed promise. At trial, a jury found Arloe had not proved that either defendant had made a promise to loan Arloe money. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Arloe’s claims that the circuit court erred in denying it recovery for lost profit damages and limiting its damages on its promissory-estoppel claim were moot; and (2) summary judgment was proper in regard to the remainder of Arloe’s claims. View "Arloe Designs LLC v. Ark. Capital Corp." on Justia Law

After an automobile accident, Fran Biba sued Trevor Taylor and his employer, Rick Taylor, Inc. The district court awarded Biba damages and assigned Biba ten-percent fault, resulting in a judgment of $9,140. Taylor appealed by filing a certified docket sheet with the circuit court, but the docket sheet did include an entry for Biba’s “Answer to Counterclaim.” Biba filed a motion to dismiss the appeal due to Taylor’s failure to strictly comply with Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9 because the certified docket sheet did not contain an entry for all the pleadings that had been filed. The circuit court granted Biba’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Rule 9(b) requires strict compliance, not substantial compliance, and that Taylor’s appeal had failed to comply with the rule. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Taylor strictly complied with Rule 9(b), and therefore, the circuit court erred in granting Biba’s motion to dismiss. View "Taylor v. Biba" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a motion for rule on clerk to have his appeal docketed. The clerk refused to docket the appeal because the order of the circuit court granting an extension of time to lodge the record on appeal did not contain the findings required by Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 5(b)(1). The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the circuit court for compliance with Rule 5(b)(1), holding that because the circuit court’s order contained none of the findings required by Rule 5(b)(1), the matter must be remanded for compliance with the rule. View "Coleman v. Strom" on Justia Law

Appellants filed complaints alleging claims for malpractice and wrongful death against Appellees Dr. Jeffrey Kirchner, Arkansas Health Group, Baptist Health, and Baptist MedCare, Inc. for medical injury and the wrongful death of Alfred Spires. The circuit court dismissed Appellants' complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) granting judgment in favor of Appellees before the completion of discovery; (2) dismissing the complaint against Kirchner for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; and (3) dismissing the complaint against Arkansas Health, Baptist Health, and Baptist MedCare on the ground that Appellants' claims were barred by the statute of limitations. View "Worden v. Kirchner" on Justia Law

Johnny Washington died after his 1994 Ford Explorer was struck by another vehicle driven by Karah Williams and rolled over twice. Johnny suffered a fatal head injury when his head exited the vehicle during the rollover and was crushed. Paulette Washington, Johnny's wife, filed a complaint against Ford Motor Company, asserting claims for, among other things, negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, and breach of warranties. A jury returned a verdict finding that both Ford and Williams, equally, had been the proximate cause of Johnny's death. Following a second remand, the circuit court entered an order awarding judgment against Ford in the amount of $7,152,125. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in excluding evidence of Johnny's nonuse of a seat belt; (2) did not err in determining that the defective-glass claim was not preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 205; (3) did not err in denying Ford's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of punitive damages; (4) did not err in failing to reduce the jury's compensatory-damages award; and (5) erred in including a nunc pro tunc provision for postjudgment-interest purposes. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Washington" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the Firefighter's Rule, which provides that a professional firefighter may not recover damages from a private party for injuries he or she sustained while putting out a fire even if the private party's negligence caused the fire and injury. Appellant, individually and as executrix of the estate of Decedent and on behalf of Decedent's wrongful-death beneficiaries, filed a wrongful-death and survival claim against Appellee. Decedent, a roadside-assistance worker, had stopped to assist Appellee, whose truck was stalled on the interstate, when Decedent was hit by another truck driving on the interstate. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Appellee, concluding that the Rule precludes a professional rescuer from recovering for injuries inherent in the types of dangers "generally associated with that particular rescue activity." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the risk Decedent undertook was part of his employment as a roadside assistance worker, and therefore, the Rule barred Appellant's claims against Appellee; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact did not exist as to whether Appellee's running out of fuel constituted willful or wanton misconduct. View "Nowicki v. Pigue" on Justia Law