Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Second Injury Fund appealed the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) finding that the Fund was not entitled to a statutory offset for Appellee Cleveland Osborn's Veterans Administration (VA) benefits. The Supreme Court found that the Commission made its decision based on the "plain language" of the statute: "the legislature intended for the amount of workers' compensation benefits payable to an injured worker to be reduced 'dollar-for-dollar' by the amount of benefits that the worker has previously received for the same medical services under any of the listed group plans." Veterans Administration benefits are not listed as one of the "group plans" in the statute. The Court found that the Fund was not entitled to the offset.

Appellant, the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department (ASHTD), appealed an order from the circuit court that reversed its denial of a billboard permit to Appellee Lamar Advantage Holding Company (Lamar). Lamar sought a hearing with ASHTD, and the hearing officer affirmed ASHTDâs denial, citing several reasons, most notably, the billboardâs conflict with âComprehensive Zoningâ that governed the area where the billboard would be placed. Lamar appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the hearing officerâs decision. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit courtâs decision, finding that âsubstantial evidence existedâ to support the denial of the permit because of the comprehensive zoning set for the billboardâs proposed setting. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Harrill & Sutter, PLLC, filed a complaint in Saline County Circuit Court alleging a violation of the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Appellant had filed a medical-malpractice action against three doctors that worked for the University of Arkansasâ Medical Center. Mariam Hopkins was a partner of Anderson, Murphy and Hopkins, LLP, and was hired to represent the doctors. Appellant subsequently filed a FOIA request seeking Ms. Hopkinsâ file. Appellant argued that because Ms. Hopkins represented public employees, her file was also public record. Ms. Hopkins disputed that her file was subject to FOIA, and refused to allow Appellant the right to inspect it. Appellant filed suit with the circuit court and named the doctors, Ms. Hopkins, and her firm as defendants. At trial, Appellant moved to ânonsuitâ all of its claims. The court granted the motion, but no written order to that effect was ever entered on the record. The final opinion of the court reflected the fact that Appellant withdrew its FOIA request. It did not mention whether the nonsuit was granted, nor did it explicitly dismiss Appellantâs claims. Under state law, an order that fails to adjudicate all of the claims as to all parties is not a final order. The Supreme Court can only review final orders from the lower courts. With no final order before it, the Supreme Court dismissed this appeal.

Appellee, the City of Russelville (City), filed a complaint in November, 2008, that sought to condemn a property which fronts a public roadway in order to improve the surrounding drainage and flood control mechanisms. The property was owned by Appellant, the Lois Marie Combs Revocable Trust (Trust). The circuit court issued an eminent domain order to take possession of the property in December 2009 and a jury awarded the Trust compensation for the taking in June 2010. The Trust asked the court to award it the mandatory attorneyâs fees as set out in the state law that governs condemnation proceedings. The court ruled that the Trust had not brought the case and it was, therefore, not entitled to fees. The Trust appealed this decision to the Supreme Court alleging that any award of attorneyâs fees as a result of an eminent domain or condemnation action balances on the land use categorization of the property at the time it was condemned. Attorney fees had been, previously, awarded in similar cases where the government taking was deemed to involve the improvement of public waterworks. The Trust argued that the improvement of a roadwayâs drainage and flood control mechanism was analogous to a waterworks project and it was, therefore, entitled to attorney's fees. The Supreme Court disagreed finding that the primary reason for this eminent domain action by the City was for road improvement and not the improvement of the City's supply of drinking water. Subsequently, the Court held that the lower court correctly denied the Trustâs motion for attorneyâs fees.