Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Civitan Center, Inc. brought a declaratory judgment action against the Division of Developmental Disabilities Services of the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DDS). Civitan, a corporation licensed by DDS to operate an adult developmental center, requested a declaratory judgment stating that DDS could not lawfully license a new provider in the county Civitan was servicing pursuant to a proposed policy authorizing DDS to initiate the expansion of the number of service providers in a specific county until the policy was properly promulgated. The circuit court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Civitan, ruling that DDS failed to comply with its own procedures and state law, that DDS denied Civitan due process, and that Civitan was denied a hearing in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Civitan failed to present a justiciable controversy, declaratory judgment in Civitan's favor was not proper, and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in granting Civitan's motion for summary judgment.

The Arkansas Health Services Permit Commission awarded Hospitality Care Center a permit of approval (POA) for a nursing facility. Gracewood Nursing and Rehabilitation Center subsequently requested approval from the Commission to transfer the POA to it from Hospitality. Twin Rivers Health and Rehab opposed the transfer. The Commission ultimately granted the transfer of the POA. Twin Rivers sought judicial review of the Commission's decision and declaratory relief, naming as defendants the Commission, the Arkansas Health Services Permit Agnecy (AHSPA), Gracewood, and Hospitality. The circuit court granted the summary judgment motion of the Commission and the AHSPA and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and remanded the matter with directions to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law because the Commission did not set forth any findings of fact or conclusions of law to support its decision to grant the transfer of the POA; and (2) dismissed without prejudice that portion of the appeal relating to Twin Rivers's request for summary judgment, as the Court does not hear appeals piecemeal.

Appellant Taxpayers were the owners of all or a portion of the oil, gas and other minerals in, on, and under each of their real property located in the counties party to this lawsuit. Taxpayers filed a complaint against the Counties, seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that an ad valorem property tax was an illegal exaction. The circuit court concluded that Taxpayers had failed to make a proper illegal-exaction challenge and dismissed their lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the Taxpayers' complaint where (1) the crux of Taxpayers' argument was that the tax assessed against them was illegal because the assessment was flawed; and (2) the Taxpayers' avenue of relief for its assessment grievance lay with each county's equalization board.

Appellant, a former certified residential appraiser, was investigated by Appellee, the Arkansas Appraiser Licensing and Certification Board, after receiving a complaint by Loretta Lever-House concerning a number of appraisals allegedly performed by Appellant after her certification had been suspended. The Board (1) concluded that Appellant violated four of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraiser Practice by performing appraisals while her license was suspended; and (2) revoked Appellant's license and assessed a civil penalty of $4000. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's failure to raise her first three arguments before the administrative agency precluded the Court's consideration on appeal; and (2) Appellant's last argument was not ruled on by the agency or the circuit court, and thus, the Court was precluded from considering it on appeal.

Appellants were retired police officers who did not receive the benefit of all the monthly benefit increases for retired members of a municipal police pension and relief fund. The increases were authorized by the fund's Board of Trustees. Appellants mounted a multi-pronged challenge to the increase in benefits. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in (1) ruling that the additional payments were authorized by Ark. Code Ann. 24-11-102(a); (2) finding that the statute did not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority; (3) finding that the Board did not breach its fiduciary duties by increasing benefits to current retirees and not to future retirees, an action that was expressly authorized by statute; and (4) in ruling that the statute, as applied, did not violate the equal protection clause of the state Constitution as there was a rational basis for the Board's disparate treatment of current and future retirees.

Petitioners, who were all employed by Respondent as public school bus drivers or dispatchers, claimed that Respondent failed to compensate them for regular and overtime wages in weeks in which they worked more than forty hours. Petitioners filed a class-action complaint in federal district court, alleging violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA). Respondents opposed Petitioners' motion to amend their complaint, contending the amendment would be futile because Petitioners' AMWA claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 16-56-105. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer what the appropriate statute of limitations was for a private cause of action pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 11-4-218(e), which allows an employee to bring a private cause of action for relief against an employer for minimum wages, including overtime wages, but does not include a specific limitations provision. After acknowledging the Court's long history of applying section 16-56-105's three-year limitation period for statutorily created liabilities that do not contain an express limitations period, the Court answered that a three-year statute of limitations would apply to private causes of action brought pursuant to AMWA.

Comcast of Little Rock filed three petitions for review with the Arkansas Public Service Commission, asserting that Comcast's ad valorem tax assessment for the years 2006-08 erroneously included the value of its intangible personal property. The Commission's ALJ dismissed Comcast's petitions. Comcast subsequently filed a complaint for refund of taxes in the county court, asserting that it was entitled to a refund of taxes erroneously assessed against it and arguing that the Commission's tax division improperly included the value of Comcast's intangible personal property when calculating its assessments. The county court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction in the matter and dismissed the claims. The circuit court also dismissed Comcasts's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Comcast's challenge to its assessment; and (2) because Comcasts's claim did not challenge the validity of the underlying tax, but rather alleged that the assessment was carried out in an illegal fashion, the suit did not come within Arkasnas's illegal-exaction provision, and therefore, Comcast's avenue of relief for its assessment grievance lay with the Commission.

This appeal was the second of two appeals involving the same issue, the first of which was Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 407. At issue in the appeal was Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. Appellant Howard Curry appealed a circuit court's order finding that improvements made to his property prior to his sixty-fifth birthday were "substantial improvements" within the meaning of amendment 79 and that Appellees, the Pope County Equalization Board and the county tax assessor, would be allowed to include these improvements in the assessment of Appellant's property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in labeling the changes Appellant made to his property before he turned age sixty-five as substantial improvements, and (2) the assessor did not err in assessing Appellant's property at a higher amount than the assessment value in place when Curry turned age sixty-five due to the timing of the date of assessment value in relation to the date of property owners' birthdays.

Howard Curry's property appraisal increased on two different occasions after his sixty-fifth birthday. After the second assessment, Curry unsuccessfully petitioned the Equalization Board of Pope County to reduce the appraisal on his property. Curry then filed a petition in the county court, stating that the valuation was arbitrary and unreasonable and that the property was incorrectly assessed under Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday, unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. The county court ruled only on the assessment value and did not rule on the amendment 79 issues. Curry appealed and also filed a petition for declaratory relief and an injunction. The two cases were merged for trial. The circuit court ruled on the assessment, which was higher than the assessment in place on Curry's sixty-fifth birthday, and found that the improvements Curry made to his residence before he turned age sixty-five were "substantial improvements" within the language of the amendment. In the first of Curry's two appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed for the reasons stated in the second appeal, Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 408.

Robert Robinette was arrested for suspicion of driving while intoxicated. After Robinette received notice of suspension of his driving privileges, Robinette requested an administrative hearing before the Department of Finance and Administration's Office of Driver Services (DFA). After a hearing the hearing officer allowed the suspension. Robinette appealed, alleging that (1) the notice was deficient because rather than stating that a hearing be requested within seven "calendar" days, the notice stated seven days, thus violating Ark. Code Ann. 5-65-402 or -403; and (2) the omission of the term "calendar" rendered the notice, and any action to suspend his license, void. The circuit court denied Robinette's motion for summary judgment and sustained the decision of the DFA. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order, holding that because Robinette was granted the opportunity to be heard, he did not demonstrate any prejudice resulting from want of strict compliance in the notice provided him, and therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robinette's summary-judgment motion.