Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants were retired police officers who did not receive the benefit of all the monthly benefit increases for retired members of a municipal police pension and relief fund. The increases were authorized by the fund's Board of Trustees. Appellants mounted a multi-pronged challenge to the increase in benefits. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in (1) ruling that the additional payments were authorized by Ark. Code Ann. 24-11-102(a); (2) finding that the statute did not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority; (3) finding that the Board did not breach its fiduciary duties by increasing benefits to current retirees and not to future retirees, an action that was expressly authorized by statute; and (4) in ruling that the statute, as applied, did not violate the equal protection clause of the state Constitution as there was a rational basis for the Board's disparate treatment of current and future retirees.

Petitioners, who were all employed by Respondent as public school bus drivers or dispatchers, claimed that Respondent failed to compensate them for regular and overtime wages in weeks in which they worked more than forty hours. Petitioners filed a class-action complaint in federal district court, alleging violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA). Respondents opposed Petitioners' motion to amend their complaint, contending the amendment would be futile because Petitioners' AMWA claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 16-56-105. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer what the appropriate statute of limitations was for a private cause of action pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 11-4-218(e), which allows an employee to bring a private cause of action for relief against an employer for minimum wages, including overtime wages, but does not include a specific limitations provision. After acknowledging the Court's long history of applying section 16-56-105's three-year limitation period for statutorily created liabilities that do not contain an express limitations period, the Court answered that a three-year statute of limitations would apply to private causes of action brought pursuant to AMWA.

Comcast of Little Rock filed three petitions for review with the Arkansas Public Service Commission, asserting that Comcast's ad valorem tax assessment for the years 2006-08 erroneously included the value of its intangible personal property. The Commission's ALJ dismissed Comcast's petitions. Comcast subsequently filed a complaint for refund of taxes in the county court, asserting that it was entitled to a refund of taxes erroneously assessed against it and arguing that the Commission's tax division improperly included the value of Comcast's intangible personal property when calculating its assessments. The county court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction in the matter and dismissed the claims. The circuit court also dismissed Comcasts's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Comcast's challenge to its assessment; and (2) because Comcasts's claim did not challenge the validity of the underlying tax, but rather alleged that the assessment was carried out in an illegal fashion, the suit did not come within Arkasnas's illegal-exaction provision, and therefore, Comcast's avenue of relief for its assessment grievance lay with the Commission.

This appeal was the second of two appeals involving the same issue, the first of which was Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 407. At issue in the appeal was Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. Appellant Howard Curry appealed a circuit court's order finding that improvements made to his property prior to his sixty-fifth birthday were "substantial improvements" within the meaning of amendment 79 and that Appellees, the Pope County Equalization Board and the county tax assessor, would be allowed to include these improvements in the assessment of Appellant's property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in labeling the changes Appellant made to his property before he turned age sixty-five as substantial improvements, and (2) the assessor did not err in assessing Appellant's property at a higher amount than the assessment value in place when Curry turned age sixty-five due to the timing of the date of assessment value in relation to the date of property owners' birthdays.

Howard Curry's property appraisal increased on two different occasions after his sixty-fifth birthday. After the second assessment, Curry unsuccessfully petitioned the Equalization Board of Pope County to reduce the appraisal on his property. Curry then filed a petition in the county court, stating that the valuation was arbitrary and unreasonable and that the property was incorrectly assessed under Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday, unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. The county court ruled only on the assessment value and did not rule on the amendment 79 issues. Curry appealed and also filed a petition for declaratory relief and an injunction. The two cases were merged for trial. The circuit court ruled on the assessment, which was higher than the assessment in place on Curry's sixty-fifth birthday, and found that the improvements Curry made to his residence before he turned age sixty-five were "substantial improvements" within the language of the amendment. In the first of Curry's two appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed for the reasons stated in the second appeal, Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 408.

Robert Robinette was arrested for suspicion of driving while intoxicated. After Robinette received notice of suspension of his driving privileges, Robinette requested an administrative hearing before the Department of Finance and Administration's Office of Driver Services (DFA). After a hearing the hearing officer allowed the suspension. Robinette appealed, alleging that (1) the notice was deficient because rather than stating that a hearing be requested within seven "calendar" days, the notice stated seven days, thus violating Ark. Code Ann. 5-65-402 or -403; and (2) the omission of the term "calendar" rendered the notice, and any action to suspend his license, void. The circuit court denied Robinette's motion for summary judgment and sustained the decision of the DFA. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order, holding that because Robinette was granted the opportunity to be heard, he did not demonstrate any prejudice resulting from want of strict compliance in the notice provided him, and therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robinette's summary-judgment motion.

After approving a fall wild turkey hunting season, the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission (AGFC) amended its codes approving the season and closed wild turkey hunting for the season. Appellant David Clark filed a complaint in the circuit court, requesting a temporary injunction directing AGFC not to implement the action until a full hearing on the merits had been held and a permanent injunction directing AGFC not to close the season until it gave the public proper notice and opportunity to be heard. The circuit court denied Clark's request for a temporary injunction and later dismissed Clark's amended complaint, concluding that the claim was moot because the dates for which the season would have been open had passed. As to future seasons, the court held that the issue was not ripe for review. Clark appealed, but Clark's counsel failed to make the necessary financial arrangements with the court reporter as represented in his notice of appeal. On this basis, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as the notice of appeal did not substantially comply with Ark. R. App. P. 3(e).

After a separation in the legal ownership of Mountain Pure and Gold Star Dairy, Mountain Pure was required to install a new representative sampling point and wastewater-flow-measurement system pursuant to a compliance order. Mountain Pure installed a new sampling point and sewer meter. Little Rock Wastewater (LRW) determined the sampling point and meter had been improperly installed and required corrective measures. LRW informed Mountain Pure that unless it was in compliance with the ordinances, legal action would be taken. A show-cause hearing was then held, in which the hearing officer found that Mountain Pure had violated its permit, compliance order and applicable ordinances. Mountain Pure appealed, and the circuit court affirmed the administrative decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the administrative decision was not arbitrary and capricious and that it was supported by substantial evidence. Affirmed.

The Harrisburg School District No. 6 and the Board of Education (the District) appealed an order from the circuit court that granted Appellee Byron Neal's motion for summary judgment. Mr. Neal was elected to one of five positions on the District's board of directors. His term did not expire until September, 2014. In February, 2010, the Weiner School District faced declining enrollment, and as a result, the Harrisburg and Weiner Districts entered into an agreement for an administrative annexation of the two districts. Mr. Neal was present at the February, 2010 meeting of the Harrisburg board of directors and voted in favor of the annexation. In March, an interim school board was formed from the annexed districts. The Harrisburg District chose its interim board members by selecting four of its five members to serve. Mr. Neal lost his position. In June, Mr. Neal filed his complaint with the circuit court to stop the District from removing him as a board member. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the District argued that state law gave it the authority to agree on how the board of directors would be staffed, and therefore the circuit court erred in granting Mr. Neal summary judgment. The Supreme Court found no error by the circuit court and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Mr. Neal.

Three questions of law were certified to the Supreme Court from the federal district court. The certified questions arose from a complaint from Petitioner Hempstead County Hunting Club, Inc. (Hempstead). Hempstead contended that Respondent Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) violated multiple public utilities statutes in the construction of its "Turk Plant." The first question from the federal court involved whether Hempstead was required to bring its claims before the state Public Service Commission (PSC) before suing in federal court. The Supreme Court concluded that under Arkansas law, Hempstead was first required to bring its claims before the Arkansas PSC. A court review of its claims should be precluded until Hempstead exhausted its administrative remedies. As a result, the Supreme Court did not address the remaining two certified questions.