Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee had previously been injured on the job and was working on light duty when Employer terminated Employee's employment due to insubordination and gross misconduct. The ALJ denied Employee's claim for temporary-total disability for the remainder of his disability period. The Workers' Compensation Commission reversed on the grounds that termination for misconduct is not a sufficient basis for a finding that the employee refused suitable employment under Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-526, which provides that an injured employee who refuses suitable employment shall not be entitled to compensation during the period of his refusal. Accordingly, the Commission found that Employee was entitled to temporary-total-disability benefits for the remainder of his disability period, that he was entitled to wage-loss benefits at the rate of five percent, and that he was thus entitled to attorney's fees. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the decision of the Commission, holding that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and correct statutory interpretation. View "Tyson Poultry Inc. v. Narvaiz" on Justia Law

The City filed a complaint in eminent domain against Zara Thomas, trustee of two revocable trusts, and a motion for an order of immediate possession, seeking to procure a portion of Thomas's property for the purpose of constructing a bike trail. The circuit court granted the City's motion for order of immediate possession, and the City commenced construction on Thomas's property. Thomas appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the order did not conclude the parties' rights as to the subject matter in controversy, and therefore, was not a final and appealable order, as the circuit court had not yet addressed the issue of Thomas's right to just compensation and the amount of damages. View "Thomas v. City of Fayetteville" on Justia Law

Civitan Center, Inc. brought a declaratory judgment action against the Division of Developmental Disabilities Services of the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DDS). Civitan, a corporation licensed by DDS to operate an adult developmental center, requested a declaratory judgment stating that DDS could not lawfully license a new provider in the county Civitan was servicing pursuant to a proposed policy authorizing DDS to initiate the expansion of the number of service providers in a specific county until the policy was properly promulgated. The circuit court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Civitan, ruling that DDS failed to comply with its own procedures and state law, that DDS denied Civitan due process, and that Civitan was denied a hearing in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Civitan failed to present a justiciable controversy, declaratory judgment in Civitan's favor was not proper, and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in granting Civitan's motion for summary judgment.

The Arkansas Health Services Permit Commission awarded Hospitality Care Center a permit of approval (POA) for a nursing facility. Gracewood Nursing and Rehabilitation Center subsequently requested approval from the Commission to transfer the POA to it from Hospitality. Twin Rivers Health and Rehab opposed the transfer. The Commission ultimately granted the transfer of the POA. Twin Rivers sought judicial review of the Commission's decision and declaratory relief, naming as defendants the Commission, the Arkansas Health Services Permit Agnecy (AHSPA), Gracewood, and Hospitality. The circuit court granted the summary judgment motion of the Commission and the AHSPA and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and remanded the matter with directions to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law because the Commission did not set forth any findings of fact or conclusions of law to support its decision to grant the transfer of the POA; and (2) dismissed without prejudice that portion of the appeal relating to Twin Rivers's request for summary judgment, as the Court does not hear appeals piecemeal.

Appellant Taxpayers were the owners of all or a portion of the oil, gas and other minerals in, on, and under each of their real property located in the counties party to this lawsuit. Taxpayers filed a complaint against the Counties, seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that an ad valorem property tax was an illegal exaction. The circuit court concluded that Taxpayers had failed to make a proper illegal-exaction challenge and dismissed their lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the Taxpayers' complaint where (1) the crux of Taxpayers' argument was that the tax assessed against them was illegal because the assessment was flawed; and (2) the Taxpayers' avenue of relief for its assessment grievance lay with each county's equalization board.

Appellant, a former certified residential appraiser, was investigated by Appellee, the Arkansas Appraiser Licensing and Certification Board, after receiving a complaint by Loretta Lever-House concerning a number of appraisals allegedly performed by Appellant after her certification had been suspended. The Board (1) concluded that Appellant violated four of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraiser Practice by performing appraisals while her license was suspended; and (2) revoked Appellant's license and assessed a civil penalty of $4000. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's failure to raise her first three arguments before the administrative agency precluded the Court's consideration on appeal; and (2) Appellant's last argument was not ruled on by the agency or the circuit court, and thus, the Court was precluded from considering it on appeal.

Appellants were retired police officers who did not receive the benefit of all the monthly benefit increases for retired members of a municipal police pension and relief fund. The increases were authorized by the fund's Board of Trustees. Appellants mounted a multi-pronged challenge to the increase in benefits. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in (1) ruling that the additional payments were authorized by Ark. Code Ann. 24-11-102(a); (2) finding that the statute did not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority; (3) finding that the Board did not breach its fiduciary duties by increasing benefits to current retirees and not to future retirees, an action that was expressly authorized by statute; and (4) in ruling that the statute, as applied, did not violate the equal protection clause of the state Constitution as there was a rational basis for the Board's disparate treatment of current and future retirees.

Petitioners, who were all employed by Respondent as public school bus drivers or dispatchers, claimed that Respondent failed to compensate them for regular and overtime wages in weeks in which they worked more than forty hours. Petitioners filed a class-action complaint in federal district court, alleging violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA). Respondents opposed Petitioners' motion to amend their complaint, contending the amendment would be futile because Petitioners' AMWA claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 16-56-105. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer what the appropriate statute of limitations was for a private cause of action pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 11-4-218(e), which allows an employee to bring a private cause of action for relief against an employer for minimum wages, including overtime wages, but does not include a specific limitations provision. After acknowledging the Court's long history of applying section 16-56-105's three-year limitation period for statutorily created liabilities that do not contain an express limitations period, the Court answered that a three-year statute of limitations would apply to private causes of action brought pursuant to AMWA.

Comcast of Little Rock filed three petitions for review with the Arkansas Public Service Commission, asserting that Comcast's ad valorem tax assessment for the years 2006-08 erroneously included the value of its intangible personal property. The Commission's ALJ dismissed Comcast's petitions. Comcast subsequently filed a complaint for refund of taxes in the county court, asserting that it was entitled to a refund of taxes erroneously assessed against it and arguing that the Commission's tax division improperly included the value of Comcast's intangible personal property when calculating its assessments. The county court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction in the matter and dismissed the claims. The circuit court also dismissed Comcasts's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Comcast's challenge to its assessment; and (2) because Comcasts's claim did not challenge the validity of the underlying tax, but rather alleged that the assessment was carried out in an illegal fashion, the suit did not come within Arkasnas's illegal-exaction provision, and therefore, Comcast's avenue of relief for its assessment grievance lay with the Commission.

This appeal was the second of two appeals involving the same issue, the first of which was Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 407. At issue in the appeal was Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. Appellant Howard Curry appealed a circuit court's order finding that improvements made to his property prior to his sixty-fifth birthday were "substantial improvements" within the meaning of amendment 79 and that Appellees, the Pope County Equalization Board and the county tax assessor, would be allowed to include these improvements in the assessment of Appellant's property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in labeling the changes Appellant made to his property before he turned age sixty-five as substantial improvements, and (2) the assessor did not err in assessing Appellant's property at a higher amount than the assessment value in place when Curry turned age sixty-five due to the timing of the date of assessment value in relation to the date of property owners' birthdays.