Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) amended its licensing requirements to include certain minimum general-liability-insurance coverage for all child-care centers. Plaintiffs, three school districts that operated child-care centers licensed by DHS, filed a complaint alleging that DHS’s requirement that they purchase general-liability-insurance conflicted with their tort immunity under Ark. Code. 21-9-301(a). Defendants, DHS and John Selig, the director of DHS, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the school districts’ claims were barred by sovereign and statutory immunity. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss on sovereign-immunity grounds as to DHS and John Selig, in his official capacity; (2) to the extent the school district made claims against Selig individually, they were barred by Ark. Code Ann. 19-10-305(a); and (3) the remainder of Plaintiffs’ arguments were not properly before the Court. View "Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Fort Smith Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

When the Arkansas State Medical Board declined the application of Plaintiff, a breast oncology surgeon, for a permit to dispense legend drugs, Plaintiff sued, arguing that Act 515 of 1983, codified at Ark. Code Ann. 17-95-102, was unconstitutional. The circuit court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that section 17-95-102(d) was unconstitutional. The General Assembly subsequently amended the statutory provision the circuit court had declared unconstitutional by passing Act 1169 of 2013. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and other physicians similarly situated, and another individual filed a complaint alleging that Act 1169 was unconstitutional as special legislation, among other things. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) res judicata was not applicable to this case; (2) Appellants’ argument that a statute that was declared unconstitutional and void cannot be amended was without merit; (3) Appellants failed to show that Act 1169 was impermissibly vague in all of its applications; (4) Appellants failed to establish that the Board was prevented from issuing permits upon approval as a mechanism for exercising its authority to carry out Act 1169; and (5) Act 1169 does not constitute unconstitutional special legislation. View "Abraham v. Beck" on Justia Law

Mason Mauldin, an employee of Central Flying Service, Inc. (CFS), was killed when the plane he was flying during the course of his employment crashed. Mauldin’s estate (the Estate) filed a wrongful-death complaint against CFS and Mauldin’s supervisor (collectively, Petitioners), alleging intentional misconduct, respondeat superior, wrongful death, and survival. The Estate then amended its complaint to raise a claim challenging the constitutionality of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act. Petitioners moved to dismiss the Estate’s complaint because of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting that the Estate’s exclusive remedy was provided by the Act. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the circuit court from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the circuit court was wholly without jurisdiction over the Estate’s complaint, as (1) Petitioners were entitled to immunity from tort liability for the Estate’s claims against them; and (2) in order to challenge the constitutionality of the act, the Estate must demonstrate that the Act applies to it, and the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Act. View "Central Flying Serv. Inc. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

The City Manager of the City of Hot Springs unilaterally allowed regular meetings of the Board of Directors for the City, including a public-comment period following the meetings, to be telecast. Later, at a workshop retreat, the Board decided to cease the telecast of the public-comment period. Appellees filed a petition for relief under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Board responded that lawful notice of the workshop had been given and that no action or vote was required for the Board to cease televising the public-comment period. The circuit court concluded that the Board was required to vote in public at a regular meeting in order to cease televising the public-comment period and that the Board’s action was taken in violation of FOIA. The circuit court also awarded attorney’s fees to Appellees. Before this appeal was filed, the Board voted at a regular public meeting to cease televising the public-comment period. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed the Board’s challenge to the circuit court’s finding that it violated FOIA as moot; and (2) affirmed the order awarding attorney’s fees and costs, as the Board did not preserve for appeal its objection to the fees. View "Bd. of Dirs. of the City of Hot Springs v. Pritchett" on Justia Law

Outdoor Cap Co., Inc., a headwear company, had been paying ad valorem personal-property taxes in Benton County since 1976. In 2011, Outdoor Cap sought a refund of certain taxes paid in 2008 and 2009 that Outdoor Cap asserted were exempt under the “manufacturer’s exemption” pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 26-26-1102. Benton County denied the request for a refund. The circuit court also found that Outdoor Cap was not entitled to a refund of any portion of the 2008 and 2009 personal-property taxes it had paid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) finding that the personal-property tax was not exempt from taxation; (2) determining the personal property was not erroneously assessed; and (3) applying the voluntary payment doctrine. View "Outdoor Cap Co. v. Benton County Treasurer" on Justia Law

Jess Clayton was working at a nuclear facility owned and operated by Entergy Arkansas, Inc. and Entergy Operations, Inc. (collectively, Entergy) when he was injured by a falling steel beam. Clayton was an employee of Precision Surveillance Corporation at the time of the accident. Clayton sued Entergy and DP Engineering, Ltd., which was retained to provide engineering advice regarding the crane. Entergy and DP both filed motions to dismiss. The circuit court denied the motions. Entergy and DP petitioned for writ of prohibition, claiming that the circuit court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction over Clayton’s claims because jurisdiction lay exclusively with the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission to determine the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Supreme Court granted the petitions,, holding that the circuit court acted without jurisdiction in deciding whether an employer-employee relationship existed between Walter, Entergy, and DP, as these determinations lay exclusively with the Commission. View "Entergy Ark. Inc. v. Pope County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Entergy Arkansas, Inc. and Entergy Operations, Inc. (collectively, Entergy), the owner and operator of a nuclear plant, contracted with Precision Surveillance Company (PSC) to provide civil engineers for a project. Wade Walters, a PSC employee, died as the result of an accident at the plant. Plaintiff filed a personal-injury action in the circuit court, naming several defendants, including Walters, Entergy, and DP Engineering, Ltd. Co. Entergy filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act, or, in the alternative, a motion to stay pending a review by the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission. DP also filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss. Entergy and DP filed petitions for writ of prohibition, contending that the circuit court was wholly without jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Act to the facts of this case. The Supreme Court granted the petitions,, holding that the circuit court acted without jurisdiction in deciding whether an employer-employee relationship existed between Walter, Entergy, and DP, as these determinations lay exclusively with the Commission. View "Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Pope County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Appellee, the current Pine Bluff mayor, filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that she held the office of mayor through 2016 and a writ of mandamus to prohibit Appellants - the Jefferson County Election Commission and Commissioners - from taking any actions with regard to municipal elections in either the May 2014 primary election or the November 2014 general election. The circuit court found in Appellee’s favor and prohibited Appellants from holding any elections for the Pine Bluff municipal offices of mayor, treasurer, and city clerk and directing them to not count votes or certify winners in such races. After Appellants appealed, the May 2014 primary election was held, and no candidate was certified as the winner of any of those three municipal offices. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) any review of this appeal as it related to the May 2014 primary election was necessarily moot; and (2) because a decision by this Court could not have any practical legal effect with regard to the impending November 2014 election, review of the circuit court’s order prohibiting Appellants from holding elections in November 2014 was also moot. View "Jefferson Cnty. Election Comm'n v. Hollingsworth" on Justia Law

Appellee, a construction company, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Appellants, the Arkansas State Claims Commission, the General Assembly’s Claims Review Subcommittee, the General Assembly’s Joint Budget Committee, the Arkansas State Highway Commission, and the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department. The circuit court granted in part and denied in part Appellants’ motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on direct appeal and granted Appellants’ motion to dismiss the cross-appeal, holding (1) Appellee’s equal-protection claim was barred by sovereign immunity; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction over Appellee’s cross-appeal. View "Ark. State Claims Comm'n v. Duit Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant filed a pro se petition for judicial review pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 25-12-212 of the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the chairman of the Arkansas Parole Board had improperly denied him release on parole. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal and mooted his motions related to the appeal, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the petition for judicial review where the petition was untimely filed, failed to state a valid claim of a due process violation, and was barred by sovereign immunity. View "Crossno v. Felts" on Justia Law