Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John Mercer was charged with two counts of driving while intoxicated (DWI) in Garland County, Arkansas, in 2017. He pled no contest to both charges in 2018. The Garland County District Court imposed fines, required alcohol education, and placed Mercer on at least six months of probation, which included a $25 monthly probation fee and conditions such as random drug and alcohol testing. Mercer made several probation-fee payments as a result. Mercer later filed a lawsuit, alleging that probation and associated fees in DWI cases are not authorized under Arkansas law and therefore constitute an illegal exaction. He also asserted federal and state due-process claims, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and repayment of the fees collected.The Garland County District Court moved to dismiss Mercer’s complaint in the Garland County Circuit Court, arguing that it was entitled to sovereign immunity under the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, rejecting the sovereign immunity defense. After further proceedings and amended complaints, the district court again sought dismissal, but the circuit court denied the motion. The district court then filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, challenging the denial of sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that Mercer’s illegal-exaction claim may proceed because the Arkansas Constitution expressly authorizes such claims, overriding sovereign immunity. The court also held that Mercer’s federal due-process claim survives dismissal, as state sovereign immunity cannot categorically bar federal causes of action in state courts of general jurisdiction. However, the court ruled that Mercer’s Arkansas Civil Rights Act claim is barred by sovereign immunity, as there is no constitutional authorization for such suits against the state. The court affirmed the circuit court’s order in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "GARLAND COUNTY DISTRICT COURT v. MERCER" on Justia Law

Raunona Mays, an African American woman employed as a Sergeant with the Arkansas Highway Police, applied for four promotions between 2022 and 2023 but was denied each time. She alleges that less qualified Caucasian males or individuals with less experience and education received the positions. After filing an internal grievance regarding one promotion and receiving no relief, Mays filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint alleging race and sex discrimination, as well as retaliation. The EEOC dismissed her charge and issued a right-to-sue letter, after which Mays brought suit seeking damages, a promotion, and injunctive relief.The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied the Arkansas Highway Police’s motion to dismiss, which was based on sovereign immunity. The agency argued that it could not be sued under the United States Constitution and federal statutes, as well as the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, because it is protected by sovereign immunity. The circuit court rejected this argument, allowing all claims to proceed.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal and held that Mays’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act could not proceed against the state agency because the agency is not considered a “person” under these statutes and is protected by sovereign immunity. The court reversed and remanded those claims for dismissal. However, the court determined that claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are not barred by sovereign immunity when brought against a state agency, and that Mays had pleaded sufficient facts to state a Title VII claim. The decision of the Pulaski County Circuit Court was affirmed as to the Title VII claim but reversed and remanded for dismissal of the other claims. View "ARKANSAS HIGHWAY POLICE v. MAYS" on Justia Law

A candidate for the Arkansas House of Representatives, District 92, was certified to appear on the Republican primary ballot. Another Arkansas citizen, who did not reside in District 92, sued to have the candidate declared ineligible based on a past guilty plea to a felony public trust crime. The plaintiff sought to prevent election officials from counting or certifying any votes cast for the candidate.The Pulaski County Circuit Court considered the statutory framework that allows any Arkansas citizen to bring an action to enforce eligibility requirements for public office if the responsible prosecuting attorney fails to act. The court found that the prosecuting attorney knew of the candidate’s prior conviction and failed to act, and that the plaintiff, as a citizen, had standing. The court ruled the candidate ineligible to run or hold office and ordered that votes for the candidate not be counted. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and expenses.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s findings that the plaintiff had standing, that the prosecuting attorney’s failure to act was sufficient, and that the candidate was ineligible under the plain language of Arkansas’s statutory disqualification provisions for those pleading guilty to public trust crimes, even if records were sealed. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings. On cross-appeal, the Supreme Court held that the statute mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses to a prevailing citizen plaintiff. Thus, it reversed the denial of fees and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. The Supreme Court’s disposition was to affirm on the direct appeal and reverse and remand on the cross-appeal. View "Reed v. Yang" on Justia Law

Keeling Grubb, acting as president and CEO of Eureka Gun and Pawn, LLC, sought a conditional-use permit (CUP) from the City of Eureka Springs to operate the business as a gun and pawn shop. Grubb submitted the application in May 2023, but the City’s Planning Commission denied it at a special meeting, and the denial was subsequently upheld by the Eureka Springs City Council. After these denials, Grubb and Eureka Gun filed a complaint in Carroll County Circuit Court, challenging the City’s actions and advancing multiple constitutional and statutory claims related to due process, equal protection, property rights, freedom of association and speech, as well as the right to bear arms.In Carroll County Circuit Court, the bench trial was expressly limited to count one of the complaint: an appeal of the City Council’s administrative decision denying the CUP. The remaining claims were reserved for future resolution. During trial, evidence was presented on the nature of the business and community views, but the primary issue was whether Eureka Gun was entitled to a CUP under the City's ordinance. The circuit court denied the appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted the City’s motion for directed verdict, finding that Eureka Gun was not entitled to the permit. Additionally, the court ruled that Arkansas Code Annotated § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A) did not apply to the commercial sale of firearms.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. It held that the orders appealed from were not final because the circuit court had only adjudicated one of multiple claims, leaving the others pending, and no Rule 54(b) certificate was issued to permit an immediate appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of a final order and declined to address the merits. View "EUREKA GUN AND PAWN, LLC V. THE CITY OF EUREKA SPRINGS" on Justia Law

Mark Howerton was convicted in 2010 of computer child pornography and three counts of internet stalking of a child, based on offenses committed in 2009. He received a total prison sentence of 24 years, with some sentences suspended. Howerton was paroled in 2017 but returned to prison in 2020 for a parole violation. He was denied parole in 2022 for two years and again in 2024 for another two years. Howerton filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, alleging that the chairperson of the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board, Lona McCastlain, acted without legal authority in denying his parole, arguing that the denial was based on statutes applied ex post facto and an unauthorized “detriment to the community” rationale.The Pulaski County Circuit Court, Sixth Division, granted McCastlain’s motion to dismiss Howerton’s petition. The court found that Howerton failed to state sufficient facts to support his claims, noting that Arkansas parole statutes and regulations do not create a protectable liberty interest in discretionary parole decisions, and that parole eligibility is determined by the law in effect at the time the crime was committed. The court also found that Howerton did not demonstrate that the incorrect statute was applied or that the Board’s regulations were violated.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the dismissal for abuse of discretion and for the existence of a justiciable controversy. The court held that Howerton failed to present sufficient facts to establish that McCastlain acted outside her authority or violated applicable statutes or regulations. The court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal, concluding that Howerton’s allegations were insufficient to warrant declaratory or mandamus relief. View "HOWERTON v. MCCASTLAIN" on Justia Law

In October 2016, BAS, LLC purchased commercial property in Paragould, Arkansas, listing its mailing address as 3735 Winford Drive, Tarzana, California. BAS failed to pay property taxes for 2017 and 2018, leading the Greene County Clerk to certify the property to the Commissioner of State Lands for nonpayment. The Commissioner sent a notice of the upcoming tax sale to the Tarzana address via certified mail in August 2021, but did not receive a physical return receipt. USPS tracking data indicated the notice was delivered. In June 2022, the Commissioner sent another notice to the Paragould property, which was returned undelivered. The property was sold in August 2022, and BAS filed a lawsuit contesting the sale, alleging due process violations and unlawful taking.The Greene County Circuit Court denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Commissioner violated BAS’s due process rights, thus preventing a determination on sovereign immunity. The Commissioner appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and concluded that the Commissioner’s efforts to notify BAS were constitutionally sufficient. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and determined that the Commissioner’s actions met due process requirements. The court held that BAS failed to allege an illegal or unconstitutional act to overcome sovereign immunity. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. View "Land v. BAS, LLC" on Justia Law

The Attorney General of Arkansas sued the Arkansas Board of Corrections for violating the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The complaint alleged that the Board violated the open-meetings provision of the FOIA and failed to adequately respond to the Attorney General’s open-records request. The Attorney General sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including enjoining the Board’s employment of special counsel. The circuit court ordered the Attorney General to either certify special counsel for the Board or reach an accommodation regarding the Board’s legal representation within thirty days, or the complaint would be dismissed without prejudice. The Attorney General argued that he could not legally comply with the court’s order.The Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice after the Attorney General failed to comply with the order. The court found that the Attorney General had not made material and good faith efforts to help the Board obtain special counsel and cited email correspondence showing a lack of communication with the Board’s current special counsel. The Attorney General appealed the dismissal, arguing that he could not legally comply with the court’s order.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and held that the Attorney General could not legally comply with the circuit court’s order. The court found that the Attorney General had no statutory duty to represent the Board until the Board certified its need for representation. Additionally, the Attorney General alone could not authorize or pay for special counsel without approval from the Governor and the Legislative Council. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order dismissing the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also denied the Attorney General’s motion to disqualify the Board’s special counsel without prejudice, allowing the circuit court to address the issue on remand. View "GRIFFIN v. ARKANSAS BOARD OF CORRECTIONS" on Justia Law

Boyle Ventures, LLC (Boyle) operates franchised retail pet stores selling cats and dogs from USDA-regulated breeders. After obtaining a business license in Fayetteville, the City Council passed Ordinance No. 6587, prohibiting such sales unless the animals were obtained from approved shelters or rescue organizations. Boyle filed suit against the City, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance violated Arkansas statutes, injunctive relief, and damages under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. The parties agreed to a temporary restraining order, preventing the Ordinance from taking effect. Before the circuit court could rule, the City repealed the Ordinance, rendering the declaratory relief moot. The circuit court ultimately ruled in favor of the City, finding the Ordinance conflicted with state law but that the City was protected by qualified immunity.The Benton County Circuit Court dismissed Boyle's complaint, finding that the Ordinance conflicted with state law but that the City was immune from damages as it did not violate clearly established constitutional rights. Boyle appealed, arguing the Ordinance violated the Arkansas Constitution and that the City was not immune from damages. The City cross-appealed, arguing the Ordinance did not violate state law.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and held that the circuit court erred in finding the Ordinance violated state law because it never went into effect and did not deprive Boyle of any rights or cause damages. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit court's decision on the cross-appeal and remanded for dismissal. The direct appeal and any remaining issues were dismissed as moot. View "BOYLE VENTURES, LLC V. CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE" on Justia Law

Jeremy Kennedy filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) to seek a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus regarding a decision by the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board (Board). The Board had denied his request for transfer to the Arkansas Division of Community Correction (DCC) and his subsequent request for a six-month reconsideration hearing. Kennedy argued that he was eligible for transfer under Arkansas law and that the Board acted outside its statutory authority by denying his transfer eligibility.The Izard County Circuit Court denied Kennedy’s IFP petition, finding that his claim was a duplicate of a previous lawsuit (case number 33CV-23-123) that was on appeal and another case (33CV-23-57) that he had voluntarily dismissed. The circuit court concluded that Kennedy’s petition did not state a colorable cause of action.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kennedy’s IFP petition. The Supreme Court found that Kennedy’s latest filing did not present a legitimate claim that could be reasonably asserted based on the facts and current law. Therefore, the denial of Kennedy’s IFP petition was upheld. View "Kennedy v. Felts" on Justia Law

In 1995, Grady McGowan was convicted of residential burglary. In 2020, he pleaded guilty to residential burglary again and was sentenced to nine years in prison with an additional eleven-year suspended sentence. His sentencing order noted that he might be ineligible for parole due to a prior felony conviction. The Arkansas Division of Correction initially determined McGowan was eligible for parole and provided him a parole hearing, but later rescinded this decision based on a 2022 opinion from the Arkansas Attorney General, which led to a recalculation of his parole-eligibility date.McGowan filed a petition in the Pulaski County Circuit Court seeking declaratory judgment on his parole eligibility under Act 683 of 2023. The circuit court granted declaratory relief in favor of McGowan, finding that the sentencing order did not expressly designate his ineligibility for parole as required by the statute. The court ordered the appellants to modify his parole-eligibility date but denied further relief, stating that McGowan's release was an issue for the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that McGowan's sentencing order did not contain the express designation required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B) to render him ineligible for parole. The court also declined to remand the case for the sentencing order to be amended nunc pro tunc. The decision was consistent with the court's reasoning in a companion case, Rodgers v. Arkansas Parole Board. View "Post-Prison Transfer Board v. McGowan" on Justia Law