Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Chris and Anita Taffner were the adoptive parents of five children who came to their home through foster-care services and were adopted in 2009 and 2011 respectively. On January 2, 2015, the Department of Human Services (DHS) removed the children from the home as a result of allegations that Chris had sexually abused one of his children. On the same day, Chris was arrested for sexual abuse. On January 5, 2015, DHS filed an emergency custody and dependency-neglect petition. On May 19, 2015, DHS filed a petition to terminate Chris and Anita’s parental rights, citing as grounds the circuit court’s finding that Chris had abused B.T. and K.T., that Anita had not protected the children, that she still remained in the home, and that she had refused to submit to a psychological evaluation. Anita responded that the adjudication hearing was not a “meaningful” hearing, it was in violation of her due-process rights, and she had not been afforded effective assistance of counsel. Anita also filed a motion requesting that the circuit judge recuse from the case because “this Court’s conduct has raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.” The circuit court denied this motion. Chris filed a pro se “Motion for a New Lawyer” in which he requested that the circuit court appoint him new counsel. In his motion, Chris argued that his counsel had not adequately represented him in the adjudication hearing, asserting that counsel was not prepared for the hearing, that counsel had not called witnesses or made any attempts to investigate the claims against him, and that counsel had not informed Chris of his right to appeal the order. Chris' appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, stating that she and Chris “have a significant difference in strategy and tactics to defend this matter.” The circuit court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel and appointed new counsel but did not make findings on Chris’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel allegations. In the end, the Taffners' parental rights were terminated, and they appealed, raising a host of alleged errors with the termination proceedings. Finding none, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of the Taffners' parental rights. View "Taffner v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

The circuit court granted Nancy Moore a divorce from David Moore on the ground of general indignities. David appealed, challenging the division of the parties’ property and the award of alimony. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal without prejudice, finding that the divorce decree was not a final, appealable order because it did not fully dispose of the parties’ property. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and held (1) because the decree in this case adequately addresses every issue presented by the parties and reserves no issues for later determination, the order is final and appealable; (2) the circuit court did not make the requisite statutory findings to justify a distribution of nonmarital property; (3) because property division and alimony are complementary devices, the issue of alimony is remanded for the circuit court to reconsider when it redistributes the parties’ property; and (4) there was no support in the record for David’s argument that the court considered the property division and alimony award in isolation, resulting in an inequitable award. View "Moore v. Moore" on Justia Law

Owen and Mandy Kelly divorced by a decree. The circuit court divided the marital property, awarded primary custody of the children to Mandy and ordered Owen to pay child support and alimony. Owen sought to appeal the award of alimony. The court of appeals dismissed without prejudice, holding that the divorce decree was not final for purposes of appeal because it contemplated further action in regard to the former marital residence. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, holding that because the decree did not specifically contemplate further judicial action or direct the parties to return to court for final resolution on any issue, the court made a final disposition regarding the parties’ marital home, and the divorce decree was a final, appealable order. View "Kelly v. Kelly" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a decree of adoption granting the adoption of Appellant’s biological daughter to Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed the adoption decree, holding (1) the circuit court acquired jurisdiction of the case because of Appellees’ failure to strictly comply with relevant adoption statutes; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the adoption without Appellant’s consent; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the record to allow Appellees to introduce further evidence; and (4) the evidence supported the circuit court’s finding that the adoption was in the best interest of the child. View "Lagios v. Goldman" on Justia Law

The circuit court granted Cheryl Davis a divorce from Don Davis on the ground of general indignities. Don appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in its division of the martial assets and in refusing to award him attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court accepted certification of this case from the court of appeals to answer the question of whether a divorce decree, such as the decree in this case, is a final and appealable order when it contains language permitting the parties to agree on a division of marital property prior to sale or language permitting the parties to agree on the details of the sale. The Supreme Court held that the divorce decree in this case was a final, appealable order because it was not a conditional judgment whose finality depended on certain contingencies that may or may not occur. View "Davis v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were three female same-sex married couples and their children. One spouse in each married couple gave birth to a child, but the Arkansas Department of Health declined to issue a birth certificate with both spouses listed as parents. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaration that Defendant, the Director of the Department, violated their constitutional rights and that certain statutory provisions were unconstitutional. After a hearing, the circuit court announced its intention to order the Department to amend the birth certificates of the child-plaintiffs. Before the written order was entered, Defendant requested a stay pending appeal. The circuit court denied Defendant’s request, ordered Defendant to issue amended birth certificates to Plaintiffs, and struck portions of a statute and made substantial additions to a provision of the Arkansas Code. The Supreme Court (1) denied the petition for emergency stay as to the portions of the order and memorandum opinion ordering Defendant to provide amended birth certificates to Plaintiffs, as Defendant did not challenge this portion of the order; but (2) granted the petition as to the remainder of the order and memorandum opinion, holding that it was best to preserve the status quo ante with regard to the statutory provisions while the Court considered the circuit court’s ruling. View "Smith v. Pavan" on Justia Law

In 2011, Parents’ three children, including M.A.E., were adjudicated dependent-neglected due to environmental neglect. Appellants, the children’s maternal grandparents, intervened in the matter and filed a motion for child custody. Appellants subsequently filed an amended petition seeking to be appointed the guardians of the children. The circuit court denied Appellants’ motion for custody of M.A.E., ordering that she remain in foster care. The court also ceased all visitation between the three siblings and dismissed Appellants from the case, including a certificate pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) in its order. Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the order denying custody of M.A.E. was not final or otherwise appealable, and the included certificate failed to comply with Rule 54(b), the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "Edwards v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Mother and Father divorced in 2004. The circuit court approved the parties’ child-custody arrangement, and the parties were awarded joint custody of their minor children. In 2013, Father filed a petition to modify custody and visitation. Mother counterfiled for modification of the custody agreement. The circuit court determined that there had been a material change of circumstances and that it was in the children’s best interest to be in the primary custody of Father. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the circuit court’s determination that there a material change of circumstances had transpired since the agreement. View "McCoy v. Kincade" on Justia Law

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for termination of Father’s parental rights to his son. Father had been incarcerated for most of the nine-year-old child’s life. After a termination hearing, the circuit court terminated Father’s parental rights and granted DHS the power to consent to adoption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father’s parental rights were properly terminated on the imprisonment ground, which states that “[t]he parent is sentenced in a criminal proceeding for a period of time that would constitute a substantial period of the juvenile’s life”; and (2) the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. View "Brumley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

After W.L. was born, Mother and Father consented to Mother’s parents’ exercising a guardianship over W.L. A year after the guardianship’s inception, Father filed a petition to terminate the guardianship. The circuit court denied Father’s petition. Thereafter, Mother and Father both filed petitions to terminate the guardianship and for custody. The circuit court denied relief, concluding that Father and Mother were unfit and that termination of the guardianship was not in W.L.’s best interest. Father appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court clearly erred in finding that Father was an unfit parent, and therefore, the court should have terminated the guardianship once Father revoked his consent to it; and (2) once the guardianship was terminated, the court should have determined which parent was the proper custodian. Since Mother did not appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the court to enter an order terminating guardianship and granting custody of W.L. to Father. View "In re Guardianship of W.L." on Justia Law