Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Appellant was convicted of two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant now filed a motion to recall the mandate entered following his direct appeal, asserting that the Court’s failure to raise sua sponte the issue of the submission of a single set of penalty-phase verdict forms following his conviction constituted a defect or breakdown in the appellate process sufficient to justify recall of the mandate. The Supreme Court granted the motion and reversed Appellant’s sentence of death, holding that the Court’s failure to raise the issue of the erroneous submission to the jury of a single set of forms constituted a defect in the appellate process. Remanded for resentencing. View "Wertz v. State" on Justia Law

In 1996, Appellant entered a guilty plea to charges of first-degree murder, arson, and first-degree battery. Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of forty years. The Department of Correction calculated Appellant’s earliest possible date for parole eligibility as being August 21, 2023. Appellant filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, asserting that the Department incorrectly calculated his parole-eligibility date because it was required to calculate the date based on his presumptive sentence, not the sentence imposed. The circuit court denied Appellant’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that the petition counted as a “strike” pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-68-607. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Appellant’s petition, but (2) erred in concluding that the petition fell within those that would constitute a “strike” under section 16-68-607. View "Waller v. Kelley" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was ordered to serve five years’ probation after pleading guilty to attempted delivery of cocaine. The circuit court ultimately revoked Defendant’s probation, finding that he had violated the conditions of his probation by committing offenses punishable by imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. In 2013, Defendant filed a Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 petition, alleging several claims of error. The circuit court granted Appellant’s Rule 37 petition, set aside his sentence, and ordered him released from custody. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, where the State failed to file the record within ninety days of the filing of the first notice of appeal. View "State v. Bragg" on Justia Law

In 1984, Appellant was convicted of two counts each of rape, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. Appellant later filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under Act 1780 of 2001 Acts of Arkansas asserting generally that there was scientific evidence available to show his actual innocence. The trial court dismissed the petition, and Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal and mooted the motions Appellant filed related to his appeal, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate clear error in the trial court’s decision to dismiss the petition. View "Hill v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant filed several requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act with the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory seeking copies of all evidence kept or obtained by the laboratory related to his criminal cases. The State Crime Lab denied Appellant access to his records for more than six years. Following the Supreme Court’s statement in Davis v. Deen stating that the State Crime Laboratory has no discretion to refuse a defendant’s request for evidence related to the defendant’s own case, the State Crime Lab still refused to release Appellant’s records to him. The Supreme Court granted Appellant’s request for an order directing the State Crime Lab to provide him with records related to his criminal cases and issued a writ of mandamus to provide Appellant with the evidence he sought. View "Hill v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of capital murder, two counts of attempted capital murder, and seven counts of committing a terroristic act. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder conviction and an aggregate sentence of 165 years for the remaining offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude testimony that a third person had confessed to the crimes; and (3) declining Defendant’s request to provide the jury with instructions on lesser-included offenses. View "Friar v. State" on Justia Law

Chris and Anita Taffner were the adoptive parents of five children who came to their home through foster-care services and were adopted in 2009 and 2011 respectively. On January 2, 2015, the Department of Human Services (DHS) removed the children from the home as a result of allegations that Chris had sexually abused one of his children. On the same day, Chris was arrested for sexual abuse. On January 5, 2015, DHS filed an emergency custody and dependency-neglect petition. On May 19, 2015, DHS filed a petition to terminate Chris and Anita’s parental rights, citing as grounds the circuit court’s finding that Chris had abused B.T. and K.T., that Anita had not protected the children, that she still remained in the home, and that she had refused to submit to a psychological evaluation. Anita responded that the adjudication hearing was not a “meaningful” hearing, it was in violation of her due-process rights, and she had not been afforded effective assistance of counsel. Anita also filed a motion requesting that the circuit judge recuse from the case because “this Court’s conduct has raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.” The circuit court denied this motion. Chris filed a pro se “Motion for a New Lawyer” in which he requested that the circuit court appoint him new counsel. In his motion, Chris argued that his counsel had not adequately represented him in the adjudication hearing, asserting that counsel was not prepared for the hearing, that counsel had not called witnesses or made any attempts to investigate the claims against him, and that counsel had not informed Chris of his right to appeal the order. Chris' appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, stating that she and Chris “have a significant difference in strategy and tactics to defend this matter.” The circuit court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel and appointed new counsel but did not make findings on Chris’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel allegations. In the end, the Taffners' parental rights were terminated, and they appealed, raising a host of alleged errors with the termination proceedings. Finding none, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of the Taffners' parental rights. View "Taffner v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Petitioner Rolandis Chatmon was in jail at the time of his applications to the Arkansas Supreme Court for a writ of coram nobis. He was incarcerated on three counts of aggravated robbery and one count of theft of property. He was sentenced as a habitual offender, with a firearm enhancement, to a term of three life sentences plus 360 months’ imprisonment. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. He filed a second pro se application to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, and alternatively, for a writ of certiorari. Attached to the petition were: a letter of suspension and removal from office issued to Judge Michael Maggio, the trial judge in his aggravated robbery trial; a document reflecting that Chatmon’s case was transferred to Maggio’s court; Chatmon’s pro se motion for appointment of counsel filed in October 2012; and a letter from the Arkansas Public Defender Commission sent to Chatmon addressing complaints about his trial counsel. Chatmon contended that these documents, plus alleged comments the judge made with regard to Chatmon, reflected the trial judge's bias toward criminal defendants. Chatmon further asserted that this bias was the source of Maggio’s refusal to grant a request for a continuance so that a material witness and others could have been called. The Supreme Court had held previously that it would not exercise its discretion to permit a successive application for a writ of error coram nobis if the petitioner was abusing the writ by alleging the same grounds without additional facts sufficient to provide grounds for the writ. Furthermore, the Court found that with regard to certiorari relief, Chatmon failed to demonstrate that there was no other remedy to redress his contentions that he was unfairly denied a continuance and the appointment of other counsel. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of coram nobis and alternatively for a writ of certiorari was denied. View "Chatmon v. Arkansas" on Justia Law

Appellant Bruce Allen Echols was convicted by a jury of four counts of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to four concurrent terms of 360 months’ imprisonment. Echols filed a timely verified petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure (2015) and alleged that both trial counsel and appellate counsel1 were ineffective in litigating the factual and legal issues surrounding Echols’s arrest and the subsequent search of his residence. On September 24, 2015, the trial court entered its order summarily denying relief without a hearing. Finding that the trial court did not clearly err when it denied Echols' claims for postconviction relief, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Echols v. Arkansas" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Randle was found guilty by jury of capital murder in the death of Ranson Harrison, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Randle appealed, and his conviction and sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Randle filed a timely petition under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2008); however, the petition was not verified. In October 2015, the trial court denied relief, and Randle appealed. The State petitioned that the appeal be dismissed, arguing that Randle’s Rule 37.1 petition was not verified, which required dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Rule 37.1(d). The State additionally argued that Randle’s claim on appeal arose out of a pleading he filed challenging the State’s response to his Rule 37.1 petition. Because he had not sought leave to amend, Randle’s responsive pleading could not be considered an amended Rule 37.1 petition. Consequently, the State contended that appellate review of the claim was precluded because it was raised for the first time on appeal. After review, the Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with the State’s claims regarding dismissal of Randle’s appeal. View "Randle v. Arkansas" on Justia Law