Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and attempted first-degree murder. Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole and an aggregate terms of 720 months’ imprisonment. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. Now before the Supreme Court was Petitioner’s second pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Petitioner alleged no facts in his second petition that were sufficient to distinguish it from his first petition or to establish meritorious grounds for relief. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with an enhancement of 180 months’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner later filed two petitions for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. The trial court denied both petitions. Petitioner then brought a pro se petition for writ of mandamus requesting the Supreme Court to direct the circuit judge to file and sign documents concerning an appeal of the order denying his second Rule 37.1 petition. The Supreme Court denied the mandamus petition, holding that Petitioner did not clearly establish a duty that the judge failed to perform. View "Airsman v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to breaking and entering, possession of firearms by certain persons, and possession of drug paraphernalia. At the time of the entry of the guilty plea, Appellant entered a drug court admission form stating that his sentence would begin if he were to be expelled from drug court. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to 420 months’ imprisonment for his alleged violation of the drug-court program. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, arguing that he was deprived of due process from his expulsion from the drug court program without a hearing and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court violated Appellant’s due process rights by failing to hold a hearing prior to his expulsion from the drug court program. Remanded. View "Neal v. State" on Justia Law

Appellees were prisoners under sentences of death for capital murder. Appellees filed an amended complaint against the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) challenging the constitutionality of Act 1096 of 2015, which establishes the current method by which executions are to be conducted in Arkansas. The circuit court granted summary judgment in part to ADC but denied ADC summary judgment on Appellees’ substantive due-process claim and cruel-or-unusual-punishment claim, concluding that these issues could not be decided as a matter of law because material questions of fact remained in dispute. ADC appealed, arguing that Appellees failed sufficiently to plead and prove the alleged constitutional violations in order to overcome ADC’s defense of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Appellees’ amended complaint, holding that the Act does not offend the Constitution. View "Kelley v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with one count of rape. When Gerald Crow was a circuit judge he authorized the issuance of an arrest warrant for Appellant. Crow also presided over Appellant’s plea-and-arraignment hearing. Crow then left his position as circuit judge. Crow subsequently entered an appearance as an attorney for Appellant. The State moved to disqualify Crow based on his former participation in the case as a judge. The circuit court concluded that Crow was prohibited from representing Floyd. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Crow previously participated in the case “personally and substantially” as a judge, Rule 1.12 of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct applied, and the State’s consent was required before Crow could participate as a lawyer. View "Floyd v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate, was convicted in 2008 of aggravated robbery. Petitioner was sentenced as a habitual offender to 600 months’ imprisonment. In 2016, Petitioner filed pleadings that the Supreme Court treated as a motion for rule on clerk, asking the Court to direct a circuit judge and circuit clerk to permit him to file pro se petitions for writs of habeas corpus and petitions for writs of mandamus. Petitioner contended that because he had not been granted indigent status, he was ordered to submit a filing fee that he could not afford, and because his pleadings and accompanying orders were not filed, he was prevented from appealing them. The Supreme Court noted that because it did not have a certified record, it was unable to determine what precisely occurred and whether Petitioner’s motion was moot. The Court then appointed a special master to ascertain what occurred in this case and the current status of Petitioner’s petition. View "Dunahue v. Dennis" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant contended that his trial counsel erroneously informed him regarding his parole eligibility under a plea offer, and, as a result, he rejected the plea offer and went to trial, where he received a less favorable outcome. The circuit court denied Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s findings were clearly erroneous. Remanded. View "Beavers v. State" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant was convicted of two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant now filed a motion to recall the mandate entered following his direct appeal, asserting that the Court’s failure to raise sua sponte the issue of the submission of a single set of penalty-phase verdict forms following his conviction constituted a defect or breakdown in the appellate process sufficient to justify recall of the mandate. The Supreme Court granted the motion and reversed Appellant’s sentence of death, holding that the Court’s failure to raise the issue of the erroneous submission to the jury of a single set of forms constituted a defect in the appellate process. Remanded for resentencing. View "Wertz v. State" on Justia Law

In 1996, Appellant entered a guilty plea to charges of first-degree murder, arson, and first-degree battery. Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of forty years. The Department of Correction calculated Appellant’s earliest possible date for parole eligibility as being August 21, 2023. Appellant filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, asserting that the Department incorrectly calculated his parole-eligibility date because it was required to calculate the date based on his presumptive sentence, not the sentence imposed. The circuit court denied Appellant’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that the petition counted as a “strike” pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-68-607. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Appellant’s petition, but (2) erred in concluding that the petition fell within those that would constitute a “strike” under section 16-68-607. View "Waller v. Kelley" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was ordered to serve five years’ probation after pleading guilty to attempted delivery of cocaine. The circuit court ultimately revoked Defendant’s probation, finding that he had violated the conditions of his probation by committing offenses punishable by imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. In 2013, Defendant filed a Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 petition, alleging several claims of error. The circuit court granted Appellant’s Rule 37 petition, set aside his sentence, and ordered him released from custody. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, where the State failed to file the record within ninety days of the filing of the first notice of appeal. View "State v. Bragg" on Justia Law