Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5, holding that the circuit court failed to make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law on Appellant's last claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing adequately to investigate and challenge aggravation factors. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court failed to make findings of fact or conclusions of law addressing Appellant's last claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as required under Rule 37.5(i). The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for entry of an order that complies with Rule 37.5(i). View "Gay v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction fo multiple drug crimes, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion.On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions because the State's expert identified the drugs only via visual inspection and that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the search warrant was defective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sufficient evidence supported both possession convictions; (2) the incorrect information on the warrant was mitigated by the fact that the officers executing the warrant knew which home was to be searched; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it limited certain evidence. View "Kellensworth v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment, holding that the per se improper political activity of the prosecutor campaigning for a judicial position during trial so infected the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant a new trial.This was Defendant's third trial for the murder of Jesse Hamilton. The first conviction was reversed on appeal, and a mistrial occurred on remand. After a third trial, Defendant was again convicted of murder. Prosecutor Stephanie Barrett prosecuted the case, and at the time of the third trial, Barrett was campaigning for a position in the Arkansas Court of Appeals. Defendant moved for a mistrial based on an appearance of impropriety. The motion was denied. Following his conviction, Defendant appealed the circuit court's decisions related to the prosecutor's campaigning and solicitation of signatures at the courthouse. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecutor's improper political activity and the failure of the trial court to resolve the situation so compromised the integrity of Defendant's trial as to warrant a new trial. The Court remanded the case for a fourth trial. View "Stanton v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing charges against Defendant based on a speedy-trial violation, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the necessary conditions for implementation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), Ark. Code Ann. 16-95-101, had been met.Defendant filed a motion to dismiss all pending criminal actions against him arguing that he had not been brought to trial within 180 days of the date his notice and request for final disposition were filed, in violation of the IAD's speedy-trial provision. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a detainer, unless based upon an untried indictment, information or complaint, will not trigger application of the IAD; and (2) the circuit court erred in finding that the IAD applied in Defendant's case. View "State v. Higginbotham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant failed to state a ground on which the writ could issue.Appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced as a habitual offender to eighty years' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus Appellant alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment sentencing him as a habitual offender and that the judgment was illegal on its face because he was convicted under a habitual offender statute that was not in effect when he committed the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's allegations were not cognizable in habeas proceedings. View "Rainer v. Director, Arkansas Department of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant failed to state a claim for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus because he failed to demonstrate that his sentence was illegal on its face.Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and kidnapping and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In his habeas petition, Appellant argued that his sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree murder was illegal because the order did not abide by the requirements set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-804. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, section 16-90-804 does not apply; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to habeas relief on the claims presented. View "Owens v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se third petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate in the petition that the writ should issue.Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree. The court of appeals affirmed. In his third coram nobis petition Petitioner argued that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose favorable treatment granted to a key witness in exchange for her trial testimony and by failing to disclose the transcript of a 911 call made by the witness, and that exculpatory findings from his codefendant's trial would have changed the outcome in Petitioner's trial. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the writ should issue and that some of his claims were successive. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's denial of Appellant's petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5, holding that Appellant's trial attorneys were ineffective.Appellant was convicted of capital murder, kidnapping, and abuse of a corpse. In his petition for postconviction relief, Appellant argued, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective because they abandoned their objection to instructing the jury that the death of the victim's unborn child could be considered an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. The circuit court rejected Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in presenting to the jury the death of the victim's unborn child as an aggravating factor, and Appellant's trial attorneys were ineffective when they abandoned their objection to this instruction; and (2) there was a reasonable probability that the fact-finder's decision would have been different absent counsels' errors. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) miscalculated his parole eligibility, holding that the circuit court failed to address Appellant's primary claim that the ADC erred in applying a 2007 amended version of Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-120(e) requiring defendants sentenced to a firearm enhancement to serve seventy percent of the enhanced sentence.Defendant was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment for aggravated robbery and an additional fifteen years' imprisonment for use of a firearm in the robbery pursuant to section 16-90-120. In dismissing Appellant's mandamus petition, the circuit court agreed with the State's argument that Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-911(a)(1)(c) authorized the ADC to require Appellant to serve seventy percent of his aggregate sentence of forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that remand was required for the circuit court to address whether the seventy-percent requirement was applicable to the fifteen-year sentence enhancement and to address the language found in the amendment to section 16-90-120. View "Rogers v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying and dismissing the petition on the basis that issues surrounding parole eligibility are not cognizable in habeas proceedings.Appellant appeared before the parole board on September 5, 2019 and was denied parole for two years. The parole board affirmed the two-year denial. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus Appellant argued that the parole board's actions were illegal and in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-615. The circuit court denied and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not meet his burden of establishing probable cause that he was detained without lawful authority. View "Cervantes v. Kelley" on Justia Law