Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Archie Ross was found guilty by a jury of attempted second-degree murder and attempted manslaughter. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to an aggregate term of 432 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner filed in the trial court a pro se petition for postconviction relief. The court denied the order. Petitioner did not timely file a notice of appeal and sought leave to proceed with a belated appeal pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.-Crim. 2(e). The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that petitioner failed to act to preserve his right to appeal the postconviction order and did not meet his burden of demonstrating that there was good cause for the failure to do so.

Appellant Joe Moore was found guilty by a jury of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to 600 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant then filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and other claims of deprivation of constitutional rights. The petition was denied. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, concluding it was clear from the record that appellant could not prevail on appeal if the appeal were permitted to go forward. Based on a totality of the evidence under the Strickland v. Washington standard, the trial court did not clearly err in holding that counsel's performance was not effective. In addition, because the appellant presented no citation to authority or convincing argument in his support of his constitutional claims, the appellant did not meet his burden under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 to provide facts that affirmatively support his claims.

Appellant James Lumley, a prisoner incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending his sentence was illegal because it exceeded the presumptive sentence to be imposed under the sentencing grid and because his guilty plea was taken in violation of Ark. R. Crim. P. 24. The circuit court denied the writ. Lumley appealed, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the matter or to include written findings of fact in its order, (2) the state and circuit court misconstrued his Rule 24 argument, and (3) the trial court was not permitted to exceed the presumptive sentence without a jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is no requirement that the trial court provide findings of fact in its order denying the request for the writ; (2) Lumley failed to state probable cause for issuance of the writ and no hearing was warranted; (3) claims concerning compliance with Rule 24 are not cognizable in habeas proceedings; and (4) Lumley did not allege that his sentence falls outside the statutory range and thus the petition did not state a basis to warrant issuance of the writ.

Chancey Baird was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-121. Baird filed a complaint for declaratory relief against the department of correction, arguing that the department erroneously interpreted the statute to mean that Baird's entire thirty-year sentence had to be served without eligibility for good time, and, therefore, the department erroneously denied him the opportunity to be eligible for parole. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment in favor of Baird, finding that based on the applicable statute, at the conclusion of ten years of his sentence, Baird's sentence could become subject to meritorious good-time credit. Ray Hobbs appealed on behalf of the department, arguing that the proper interpretation of the statute as it was written at the time of the crime is that it prohibited parole for any sentence, no matter how long. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the language in the statute instructing that the sentence would be "subject to reduction by meritorious good-time credit" applies in those cases where an inmate is sentenced to more than ten years.

The State appealed an order of the circuit court transferring appellee’s criminal case to the juvenile division of circuit court, asserting that the circuit court’s order granting the transfer was clearly erroneous. According to Ark. R. of App. P. Crim. 3, the appellant may not bring an interlocutory appeal from a juvenile-transfer order. The State argued it was not required to satisfy the requirements of Rule 3, as its right to appeal is derived from Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318(l), which provides that any party may appeal from a transfer order. Based on precedent, when there is a conflict between the court’s procedural rules and a statutory provision, the statute is given deference only to the extent it is compatible with the rules. The Court held Rule 3 and Section 9-27-318(l) to be in direct conflict with each other and determined that Rule 3 governed the appeal. Because the appeal was not specifically permitted by the rule, the appeal was dismissed.

Appellant appealed a conviction and sentence to life imprisonment without parole. The appellant made several arguments, including the arguments that the circuit court erred (1) by failing to suppress evidence derived from his DNA sample and statements he made to police officers; (2) by allowing the introduction of evidence of other crimes; and (3) by excluding expert evidence vital to his defense. The Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. The Court determined that (1) appellant voluntarily accompanied police officers to the station and made a valid waiver of his rights, and therefore the circuit court correctly denied the motion to suppress evidence based on an illegal seizure; (2) pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 403, introducing evidence of previous crimes was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; and (3) pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 702, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony on the relationship between diminished IQ and false confessions when the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the officers about the confession and the proffered testimony would have invaded the jury’s function as trier of fact.

Appellant was sentenced to a cumulative term of 552 months’ imprisonment pursuant to a plea agreement. Appellant first petitioned the trial court for a sentence reduction based partly on the grounds that appellant’s attorney had failed to inform the court prior to sentencing that the victim was also armed, which would have helped appellant obtain a more lenient sentence. The trial court denied relief, holding that appellant should have instead brought a petition for post-conviction relief, which appellant subsequently filed. The trial court denied this second petition, and appellant appealed both orders. Before the Supreme Court was appellant’s pro se motion for appointment of counsel. The Court dismissed this motion as moot because it was clear that appellant could not prevail if his appeal were permitted to go forward. Appellant could not establish that trial counsel had a duty to present evidence of the victim’s weapon to the court in the hopes of obtaining a lower sentence or that the failure to present this evidence prejudiced appellant because of the nature of the plea agreement.

Approximately twenty years after being found guilty of rape and sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment, petitioner petitioned pro se to the Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the case. As grounds for issuance of the writ, petitioner contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the judgment and that he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that petitioner’s assertions were not grounds for a writ of error coram nobis. A rare remedy, the function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the circuit court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of judgment. The Court found both of petitioner’s assertions to be outside the purview of the writ.

In 2006, appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated robbery. The Arkansas Department of Correction applied Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-609, which required appellant to serve 100% of his sentences. In 2010, appellant filed in circuit court a petition for declaratory judgment and petition for writ of mandamus, alleging that the trial court had sentenced appellant to seventy percent of thirty years and that the motivating factor in his accepting the plea offer was the assurance by the state that the state’s seventy percent rule would apply. The circuit court denied appellant’s petitions for relief, holding that appellant was attempting to collaterally attack his guilty plea and such an attack should have been brought in a timely petition for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court agreed and dismissed appellant’s appeal, finding the motions moot.

In 2008, a jury found Appellant Benjamin Carter guilty of possession of drugs and weapons charges. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and fined approximately $70,000. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. Subsequently, Appellant filed a pro se motion for post conviction relief which the trial court denied. Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, and asked the Court for additional time to file his brief-in-chief. The Court held that it "need not address the merits of the motion because it [was] clear from the record that appellant could not prevail on appeal if the appeal were permitted to go forward. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed, and the motion is moot."