Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of two counts of rape following a jury trial. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant's convictions. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel as to procuring DNA testing, and other claims. The circuit court denied relief on each claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding (1) Appellant failed to demonstrate that the circuit court erred in denying his claims for postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) Appellant was mistaken in his argument that because he was denied the opportunity for discovery and a hearing to advance his postconviction claim in circuit court his convictions required reversal. The Court concluded that Appellant's petition advanced no meritorious position.

Alvin Biggs was found guilty by a jury of the first-degree murder of his stepfather. Biggs filed a pro se petition with the Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for a writ of error coram nobis on the ground that the State withheld evidence of the victim's prior criminal history of abuse, assaults, and threats against Biggs and others that revealed his aggressiveness. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Biggs did not meet his burden to show the writ was warranted by demonstrating that the evidence would have been sufficient to have prevented rendition of the judgment.

In 2008, appellant Mark Williams entered a plea of guilty to rape in the circuit court. In 2010, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in his case because he was not afforded a DNA test to prove his innocence. The petition was denied and appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court was appellant's motion for extension for time to file his brief-in-chief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, finding appellant could not prevail on appeal as he failed to demonstrate in his petition that the writ was warranted. Appellant's contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction on the ground that a DNA test was not performed did not establish a lack of jurisdiction, and while the lower court treated appellant's allegation as an assertion that his attorney was ineffective, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not within the purview of a habeas proceeding.

In 1996, appellant Lamont Van was convicted of capital murder. In 2010, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, that he was not put on notice that the information in his case was amended prior to trial, that he was innocent of the offense of which he was convicted, that there was error at trial in the admission of evidence, and that he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel. The petition was denied, and appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court was appellant's motion for extension for time to file his brief-in-chief. Because it was clear from the record that appellant could not prevail on appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot. The Court held that appellant failed to demonstrate in his petition that the writ was warranted with respect to each of his arguments.

In 1992, appellant Brenda Owens was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed. in 2010, appellant filed in the trial court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-201, or Act 1780. The court denied the petition. Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court were two motions filed by appellant seeking an extension of time to file her brief-in-chief and appointment of counsel. The Court did not reach the merits of the motions because it was evident appellant could not prevail on appeal. The Act requires a motion for relief be made in a timely fashion and provides for a rebuttable presumption against timeliness for a motion not made within thirty-six months of the date of conviction. Because appellant failed to rebut the presumption that her petition under the Act was untimely filed, the Court dismissed the appeal and declared appellant's motions moot.

After appellant N.D. escaped from a juvenile detention center and attacked a security guard, who later died, the state filed a felony information in circuit court, charging N.C. with capital murder, escape in the first degree, and six other criminal counts. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss and to declare the juvenile-transfer statute, Ark. Code Ann 9-27-318(e), unconstitutional. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to transfer to juvenile court. The circuit court denied appellant's motion to dismiss and to declare the transfer statute unconstitutional and subsequently denied appellant's motion to transfer to juvenile court. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing two witnesses to testify who were not disclosed in discovery, erred in ruling that the transfer statute was constitutional, and erred in denying his motion to transfer. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying appellant's motion to transfer, holding that based on prejudicial discovery violations, the circuit court abused its discretion by not excluding the testimony of the two witnesses. Because the circuit court's decision was reversed on this basis, the Court did not address the remaining arguments on appeal.

Defendant Lee Croy was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault. Following his conviction and appeal, Croy filed in the trial court a petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 for ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective on four alleged bases. After assessing the effectiveness of counsel under the two-prong standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that counsel was not ineffective. Affirmed.

Appellant Tywan Winston was convicted on a charge of capital murder and received a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Winston then filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition was denied. Winston appealed, asserting error in the trial court's finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain an independent mental-health evaluation or for failing to pursue a defense of involuntary intoxication rather than raising self-defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the Strickland v. Washington standard, the trial court did not clearly err in ruling that counsel was not ineffective.

Janet Jacefield sought an order of protection against Martin Wills. The circuit court entered an order of protection and scheduled a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, the circuit court denied Wills's motion for a continuance and entered a permanent order of protection. Wills later filed a motion and brief to set aside the order of protection, asserting that he was served only seven days prior to the hearing, which deprived him of enough time to respond under Ark. R. Civ. P. 6(c). The court of appeals dismissed the motion. At issue on appeal was whether the proceedings in the lower courts were special proceedings within the meaning of Ark. R. of Civ. P. 81. The Supreme Court concluded that the proceedings filed under the Domestic Abuse Act were special proceedings, so that to the extent the statutes creating the special proceedings provide for a procedure that is different from the state's rules of civil procedure, the rules of civil procedure do not apply. The Court affirmed, holding Wills was timely served before the hearing.

Appellant Jacquelyne Velcoff was found guilty by a jury of twenty counts of rape and sentenced to an aggregate term of 168 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant then filed in the trial court a pro se petition to correct an illegal sentence. The petition was denied on the ground it was not timely filed. Appellant filed to motion for reconsideration that was also denied. Appellant appealed from the order that denied the motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, declaring the motion moot because the petition filed in the trial court was not timely filed.