Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Michael Hatcher was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Following the affirmance of the judgments, Appellant filed in the trial court a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court's decision to deny Appellant's petition was not clearly erroneous where (1) Appellant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to testimony given by a chemist at the crime lab and a narcotics officer, and (2) Appellant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a meritless argument with regard to jury instructions.

Appellant George French entered a negotiated plea of guilty to seven counts, including kidnapping, intimidating a witness, possession of firearms by certain persons, aggravated assault on a family or household member, and terroristic threatening. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty based on an alleged breach of the plea agreement. The circuit court entered an order treating Appellant's petition to withdraw as a petition for postconviction relief under the rule stating that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is untimely if filed after entry of the judgment, but in such an instance, the trial court may consider the motion as one for postconviction relief. The court denied the petition on the basis that Appellant had previously sought postconviction relief and could not file a subsequent petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was procedurally barred from filing a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.

Appellant Timothy Edwards was convicted of aggravated robbery and theft of property and was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Edwards subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him, that the circuit court failed to rule on the probable-cause issue during a pretrial suppression hearing, and that, as a result, he was being illegally detained. The circuit court denied the petition, finding that Edwards' claims were not the type allowed in a habeas proceeding as Edwards failed to allege or demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction or that the committment order was invalid on its face. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly denied Edwards' petition because he failed to raise a cognizable claim in his petition.

Appellant James Clemons was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se brief to support his petition for postconviction relief. The trial court declined to consider the brief as it exceeded the ten-page limit for petitions, and also denied the petition. Appellant appealed and sought by motion an extension of time to file his brief-in-chief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition for postconviction relief because the petition was not timely filed with the circuit clerk.

Appellant Harold Cassell was found guilty of capital murder. Appellant subsequently filed a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of the county in which he was incarcerated. The circuit court denied the petition. On appeal, Appellant contended (1) he was convicted of capital murder as an accomplice pursuant to statutes that were not in effect at the time the offense was committed and that the application of those statutes violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws, (2) he should have been indicted as an accessory under the statutes that were in effect when the murder occurred, and (3) he was tried on charges that were not contained in the information. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ of habeas corpus was not the appropriate form of relief for Appellant's claims.

Appellant Jimmy Bumgardner was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of pseudoephedrine. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, which was denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial. Appellant then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Lincoln County. After Appellant filed his petition, he was transferred to Jefferson County. The circuit court denied the petition, finding that Appellant's arguments had been addressed in his petition for postconviction relief and that he failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that because Appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus was not filed pursuant to the procedural requirements of Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-105, he could not seek relief until he filed the petition in the county in which he was currently held in custody.

Appellant Joseph Bienemy was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Subsequently, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective. The trial court denied Appellant's original petition as well as his request to file an amended petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's requested relief as he failed to satisfy the Strickland v. Washington test establishing that his counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) Appellant's constitutional rights were not violated when the circuit court denied him the right to file an amended petition because the court (a) did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, and (b) required Appellant to comply with a page-length limitation.

Carlos Aguilar pled guilty to second-degree murder and residential burglary and was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling thirty years' imprisonment. Subsequently, Aguilar filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the department of corrections to recompute his parole eligibility date. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding Aguilar failed to show he was entitled to declaratory judgment or a writ of mandamus where (1) Aguilar did not show the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to hold a hearing after Aguilar filed his petition, and (2) Aguilar's classification as a second-time violent offender for purposes of parole eligibility did not violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Appellant Roosevelt Abernathy was convicted by a jury of capital murder and first-degree battery. Abernathy filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that his capital murder conviction was void because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment and commitment order as the felony information was flawed. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Abernathy failed to make the requisite showing that his commitment was facially invalid or that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, and (2) Abernathy's claims were the type that should be raised on direct appeal.

Appellant was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault in the second degree. Subsequently, Appellant filed in the circuit court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that the writ should issue on the grounds that (1) he was not afforded a speedy trial and was denied due process with respect to his right to a speedy trial, (2) he was subjected to abuse while in custody awaiting trial, and (3) he did not enjoy effective assistance of counsel at trial. The petition was denied, and Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court were Appellant's motions seeking an extension of time to file his brief-in-chief and for the State to duplicate the brief for him. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions moot, concluding that Appellant could not prevail on appeal because Appellant's claims were not cognizable in a habeas proceeding.