Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant James Lowe entered a plea of no contest to a charge of first-degree sexual abuse. More than a decade later, Appellant pled guilty to a charge of failing to register as a sex offender. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing (1) his sentence in the sexual-abuse case was illegal because it exceeded the maximum sentence allowed, and there was a speedy-trial violation; and (2) his sentence in the failure-to-register case was a direct result of the first illegal sentence and, thus, was also illegal. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition, finding that he failed to demonstrate a basis for habeas relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant could not demonstrate that he was being illegally detained as a result of his sentence in the sexual-abuse case because (1) he completed his sentence before he filed his habeas petition, and (2) petitioners cannot obtain habeas relief from a sentence that has already been served in full.

A jury convicted Appellant Melvin Lockhart of first-degree murder and theft of property. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that because Appellant did not move for a directed verdict on the offense of first-degree felony murder, the court was precluded from reaching the issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court properly denied Appellant's petition where (1) Appellant did not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's error in failing to make a directed-verdict motion; and (2) Appellant failed to show that trial counsel prejudiced the defense with respect to Appellant's not testifying at trial.

Appellant Gregory Holt was convicted of aggravated residential burglary and first-degree domestic burglary. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the aggravated residential burglary charge and forty years on the first-degree domestic battery charge, with the sentences to run concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly denied Appellant's directed-verdict motion as there was sufficient evidence to support his aggravated residential burglary conviction; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Appellant to be shackled in front of the jury as the restraints were reasonably necessary to maintain order and security in the courtroom; and (3) Appellant's remaining arguments were not preserved for appellate review.

Appellant Lamarcus Christopher entered a plea of guilty to various drug offenses. Six months later, Appellant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by certain persons. More than a year later, the circuit court entered two amended judgments on each of the two cases, altering only the name of the offenses to include that Appellant was charged "as habitual." Appellant's sentences were not altered in either amendment. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing (1) he had not been properly notified that he was being charged as a habitual offender, (2) the amended judgment conflicted with the sentence as ordered in open court where he was not pronounced a habitual offender, and (3) but for this misrepresentation, he would not have pled guilty to the charges. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was correct to deny Appellant's petition because he made neither a claim that his judgment-and-commitment order was invalid on its face nor a claim that the sentencing court was without jurisdiction.

Appellant Ke'ondra Chestang, an inmate incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) at a facility in Lincoln County, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County circuit court. The circuit court denied the petition. Appellant then filed motions seeking an order directing the circuit clerk in Lincoln County to provide him with certain documents and an extension of time in which to file his brief. At that point Appellant had been transferred to an ADC facility located in Jefferson County. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal and declared the motions moot, holding that because Appellant was in Jefferson County when he filed the motions, the Lincoln County circuit court could no longer grant the relief requested by Appellant because it did not have jurisdiction.

After a jury trial, Appellant Marcus Atkins was convicted of first-degree battery, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by certain persons. Appellant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, arguing that he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object when the trial judge sentenced him to a firearm enhancement rather than submitting the issue to a jury. After holding a joint hearing on the petitions filed by Appellant and two codefendants, the trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the appeal of one of Appellant's codefendants from the same circuit court order. The Supreme Court then affirmed the denial of Appellant's petition, holding (1) Appellant's petition and the arguments he made on appeal were virtually identical to those made by his codefendant; and (2) for the reasoning explained in the appeal of the codefendant, the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's petition.

Appellant Vera Arnold was convicted of criminal solicitation to commit capital murder and criminal conspiracy to commit theft by deception. After she was paroled, Appellant filed petitions to seal the records of both convictions pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-105(a)(2) and Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-1201 to -1210. The circuit court denied the petitions. Appellant subsequently filed new petitions to seal the records of her convictions, asserting she had been sentenced under Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-105(a)(1) and Ark Code Ann. 16-93-301 to -303. Along with the petitions, Appellant filed a motion for relief from the circuit court's previous order, arguing (1) because sections 16-93-1201 to -1210 were not in effect as of the date of her offenses, she was eligible to refile her petitions under sections 16-93-301 to -303; and (2) sections 16-93-301 to -303 were unconstitutional. The circuit court denied the petitions and the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in applying rational-basis review to the statutes in question; (2) the trial court did not err in finding the statutes in question constitutional; and (3) the statutes in question did not violate Appellant's constitutional right to a legal sentence.

Appellant Lemuel Whiteside, a juvenile who was seventeen at the time the offense was committed, was convicted of capital-felony murder and aggravated robbery. Whiteside was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the capital-murder conviction and thirty-five years imprisonment for the aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was more than sufficient to convict Appellant of capital-felony murder; (2) Appellant's sentence of life without the possibility of parole was did not violate the Eighth Amendment under Graham v. Florida because Appellant was convicted of a homicide; (3) under existing case law, the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile capital-felony-murder offender does not violate the Arkansas Constitution prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment and thus, Appellant's sentence did not violate the Arkansas Constitution; and (4) the imposition of the mandatory life-without-parole sentence did not violate Appellant's right to a jury trial or due process.

Appellant Calvin Washington was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, Washington argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress a statement he gave to the police while in custody. Specifically, Appellant argued that his question of "when he would get a chance to see a lawyer" reflected a past tense usage of the question that clearly indicated his intention to invoke his right to an attorney. The circuit court's ruling was based on a finding that the officers' testimony was more convincing and entitled to more weight, and both officers testified that Appellant did not question them about when he would see an attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's finding of voluntariness was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

Appellants Lucille Smith and Brenda Spencer were found guilty by a jury in Arkansas County of murder in the first degree. More than thirty-seven years after their trial for first-degree murder, Appellants filed in Arkansas County a pro se motion to dismiss the information with an absolute bar to prosecution, arguing that neither appellant had been formally sentenced in accordance with Arkansas law in violation of their constitutional right to a speedy trial. The circuit court dismissed the motion, finding that it was without jurisdiction because the motion was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to rule on Appellants' speedy-trial argument because the motion Appellants filed, over three decades after their trial, was untimely.