Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Michael Davis was convicted of first-degree murder and kidnapping and was sentenced to life plus 480 months' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to proffer at trial a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter and thus failing to adequately preserve for appeal Appellant's claim that he was entitled to an instruction on manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in denying Appellant's petition as Appellant failed to demonstrate any merit to the argument that he was entitled to an instruction on manslaughter.

After a jury trial, Appellant Ellis Butler was convicted of three counts of rape and four counts of violation of a minor in the first degree. The case was retried, and Appellant was convicted of three counts of rape. After retrial, Appellant was sentenced twenty years longer on each count of rape than he had originally been sentenced. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. On the second remand, the circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in rejecting Appellant's arguments that trial counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to object, move for mistrial, or move for a reduction of sentence on the basis of vindictive sentencing; (2) for failing to specifically inquire, object, or move for mistrial when the trial court had communications with a juror and when the trial judge gave an implied dynamite charge; (3) for failing to move to strike a potential juror for cause during voir dire; and (4) for referring during voir dire to the fact that Appellant had previously been tried for rape.

Appellant Ernest Wade was convicted, as an accomplice and habitual offender, of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and was sentenced to 360 months' imprisonment. Appellant filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's petition as Appellant did not meet his burden of establishing that counsel was ineffective under the Strickland v. Washington standard or otherwise show he was entitled to postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1.

A jury found Appellant Jerry Sykes guilty of capital murder, kidnapping, robbery, and theft of property. Appellant subsequently timely filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition after a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court did not clearly err in finding no merit in Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as (1) counsel's decision to inform the jury about Appellant's pending drug charges fell within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) the decision not to introduce mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of trial was of Appellant's own making.

In 1996, Appellant Kiara Smith pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment with ten years suspended. Appellant was paroled in 2002. In 2006, Appellant pled guilty to violating the terms of his suspended sentence and was sentenced to forty-eight months' imprisonment. While incarcerated, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence was illegal because the circuit court did not have the authority to revoke his suspended sentence in 2006. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that because Appellant was no longer incarcerated, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of the matter.

Appellant Tilton Rhodes was convicted of rape and second-degree sexual assault of a twelve-year-old girl and was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment for each offense. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel allegedly failed to prepare witnesses and to introduce evidence. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's findings were not clearly erroneous as Appellant (1) failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the amount of time that defense counsel spent with witnesses, and (2) Appellant failed to carry his burden of proving deficient conduct and prejudice with regard to counsel's failure to anticipate a hearsay objection to certain evidence that counsel was unable to introduce.

Appellant Kenneth Osburn was convicted of capital murder and kidnapping and was sentenced to life without parole and life respectively. Osburn appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case based on trial error in the admission of evidence. On interlocutory appeal, Appellant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to prohibit the State from seeking the death penalty on retrial of the charge of capital murder, asserting that because he was sentenced to life without parole as a matter of law when the jury deadlocked in the penalty phase at his first trial, principles of double jeopardy precluded imposition of the death penalty on retrial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that upon remand, the State may seek the death penalty as (1) the failure of a jury to reach a decision fails to act as an acquittal on the death penalty, and (2) the mandatory entry of a sentence of life without parole as a matter of law involves no findings and does not trigger a double-jeopardy bar on retrial.

Appellant Dan Huffman was convicted of second-degree murder and was sentenced as a habitual offender to fifty years' imprisonment. Appellant was sentenced pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-505, which provided for an extended term of imprisonment for fifteen years when a defendant employed a firearm in furtherance of the felony. Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County circuit court, alleging that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enhance his sentence and that the order improperly reflected the enhanced sentence. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that although Appellant was incarcerated in Lincoln County when he filed the petition, because he was no longer incarcerated in Lincoln County at the time of the appeal, he could not prevail on appeal because the Lincoln County circuit court could no longer grant the requested relief.

Appellant James Hill was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 360 months' incarceration. Appellant filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied without a hearing. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, prosecutorial misconduct, temporary mental incompetency, and denial of due process based on the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for a mistrial. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion for photocopying at public expense. The Court declared the motion moot and dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant could not prevail on appeal because he failed to raise a single claim that was cognizable in a postconviction relief petition.

Appellant Jose Fernandez was convicted of rape and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, raising a number of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition. Appellant then filed a pro se motion for belated appeal. The Supreme Court granted the motion because the trial court failed to provide the required notice to Appellant of the entry of the order denying his petition. Before the Court was Appellant's motion to file a belated reply brief. The Court declared the motion moot and dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court did not err in denying relief and that Appellant could not prevail on appeal because none of the claims raised in Appellant's petition had merit.