Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Rodney Webb was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine and sentenced to twenty-two years' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court committed reversible error in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine found on his person on the basis that Appellant was provided a lesser expectation of privacy because of his status as a parolee. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of suppression on the basis that the search of Appellant's person was consensual following a valid traffic stop, and therefore, the Court did not address the issue of Appellant's status as a parolee.

Appellant Ira Vankirk pled guilty to three counts of rape and was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court erred during the sentencing proceedings by allowing the State to introduce a videotaped interview of an investigator for the Arkansas State Police Crimes Against Children division asking the victim in this case about the rape allegations. Specifically, Appellant contended the admission of the evidence violated Appellant's constitutional right to confrontation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the right of confrontation extended to Appellant's sentencing proceeding before a jury, (2) the circuit court erred in admitting the videotaped interview of the victim, and (3) such error was not harmless. Remanded for resentencing.

After a jury trial, Appellant Charles Rodgers was found guilty of rape and sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a timely pro se petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition, and the Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Appellant then filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that the writ should issue on the grounds that he was not afforded a speedy trial. The circuit court denied the petition. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion seeking an extension of time to file his brief-in-chief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that Appellant's speedy-trial issue was not cognizable in a habeas proceeding.

Appellant Clifford Ritter was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and committing a felony with a firearm and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Ritter appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found in his residence because the premises to be searched were not identified with particularity as is required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.2(b). Specifically, Ritter contended that, because the name and address in the search warrant incorrectly identified his residence, police officers had no authority to enter his property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Ritter's motion to suppress where (1) a search warrant is not automatically rendered invalid if it contains an incorrect address of the property to be searched, (2) the likelihood of searching the wrong residence was mitigated by the fact that the officers executing the warrant personally knew which premises were to be searched, and (3) the premises that were intended to be searched were, in fact, searched.

Appellant Calvin Perry was found guilty by a jury of second-degree battery, kidnapping, being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, and committing a felony in the presence of a child. After the jury fixed Appellant's sentences, the circuit court imposed an additional 180 months' imprisonment for commission of a felony with a firearm. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that the performance of his counsel at trial was deficient because counsel failed to object when the trial court decided to impose sentence on the firearm enhancement rather than submitting the question to the jury. The circuit court denied the petition, finding no merit in Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's claim of prejudice was speculative and bereft of factual support for the assumption that the jury would have assessed a more lenient sentence than the trial court; and (2) Appellant's claim of prejudice based on the severity of the sentence was unavailing in a postconviction relief petition.

After a jury trial, Appellant Brian Nelson was convicted of four counts of sexual assault of a minor and was sentenced to 672 months' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the constitutionality of the Arkansas Rape Shield Statute, and contending that his custodial statement should have been excluded and that the evidence regarding the victim's character for truthfulness should have been admitted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict; (2) the rape shield statute was constitutional and did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine; (3) Appellant's argument that his custodial statement should have been excluded was not supported by citation to authority of any kind and therefore need not be addressed; and (4) Appellant's failure to proffer testimony regarding the victim's character for truthfulness precluded the Court's review of Appellant's final issue.

A jury found Appellant Jesse Manning guilty of delivery of cocaine and sentenced him as a habitual offender to forty years' incarceration. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus, requesting that the circuit court declare that, despite his convictions for at least eight felonies, he was only a third-time offender and was eligible for parole. Appellant also asked the circuit court to issue a writ of mandamus to the Department of Correction ordering officials to treat him as being eligible for parole. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims regarding his sentence and parole eligibility under the circumstances here were direct challenges to the judgment of conviction and were not cognizable in a suit for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus.

In 1985, Appellant Kenny Halfacre was convicted of burglary and theft of property. In 2007, Appellant filed a petition to correct his sentence, seeking relief on the basis that his conviction was illegally imposed as a result of testimony of his wife that was impermissibly admitted into evidence under the holding in Ricarte v. State. The trial court treated the petition as one for postconviction relief and dismissed on the basis that the petition was successive. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the trial court's basis for dismissal was in error because the petition could not be treated as one for postconviction relief, but (2) the record did not establish that the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition because the petition was not timely filed.

Appellant Charles Goodman was found guilty by a jury of two counts of rape and sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently timely filed a petition for postconviction relief, challenging the effectiveness of trial counsel, the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's jurisdiction, and the fact that the trial court engaged in ex parte communications with the jury. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant either provided only conclusory statements without factual substantiation in support of his arguments, the issues were not properly before the Court, or the issues were not cognizable in a postconviction relief proceeding.

Appellant Jerry Eaton was found guilty by a jury of rape and incest and was sentenced to 240 months' imprisonment for rape and thirty-six months for incest, with the sentences to run concurrently. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that it was not timely filed. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant's appeal because it was not timely filed pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2, and (2) Appellant presented no compelling reason or argument for the Court to overrule its prior case law holding that the filing requirements of rule 37.2 are jurisdictional.