Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Charielli Glaze was convicted of possession of a firearm by certain persons and sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction but reversed Appellant's sentence to the extent that he was convicted under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-201 rather than the criminal code's habitual-offender statute, Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-501, which the Court held was repealed by implication with the enactment of the criminal code because the conflict between sections 16-90-201 and 5-4-501 was irreconcilable. The Court additionally held that Appellant was entitled to a jury instruction in accordance with section 5-4-501. Reversed and remanded for resentencing under section 5-4-501.

Appellant pled guilty to murder in the first degree and was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court did not follow proper procedure in taking Appellant's guilty plea to determine whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered, and that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the judgment of first-degree murder. The Supreme Court denied Appellant's motion seeking to have his brief-in-chief duplicated at public expense and dismissed the appeal, holding that because Appellant's claims for relief were not grounds for a writ of habeas corpus, the circuit court did not err in denying the relief sought.

Appellant Ricky Anderson was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Appellant's motion for directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony that the victim was pregnant because part of the State's theory of the case was that Appellant killed the victim because she was pregnant with his child; (3) did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs of the crime scene because the photographs enabled the jurors to better understand testimony about the crime scene; and (4) did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress custodial statements he made before Miranda warnings were given because the statements were spontaneous.

Perroni Law Firm filed a complaint against Ben Still to recover unpaid legal fees for Samuel Perroni's representation of Still and his wife in connection with a previously dismissed indictment. The circuit court granted Perroni's motion for summary judgment, finding that Perroni's action was not time-barred because it was filed within five years after the cause of action accrued. At issue on appeal was (1) whether the action fell under Ark. Code Ann. 16-56-105, which provides that actions founded on contract but are not in writing shall be commenced within three years, or Ark. Code Ann. 16-56-111, which provides that actions to enforce written agreements shall be commenced within five years; and (2) whether the parties' agreement acknowledging the debt by Still was an oral or written agreement for purposes of the statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the three-year statute of limitations applied and the suit was time-barred.

Appellee Bernard Kindall was charged with second-degree sexual assault of K.J., a person less than fourteen years old. Kindall filed a motion pursuant to the rape-shield statute alleging that evidence that K.J. had made similar allegations of sexual misconduct against others was relevant and admissible. After an in-camera hearing, the circuit could ruled that the alleged prior sexual conduct was relevant as to K.J.'s credibility, but the court did not make a finding in its order that the offered evidence was not "relevant to a fact in issue." Pursuant to the rape-shield statute, an exception to the rule that evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct is generally inadmissible exists when the circuit court finds that such evidence is relevant to a fact in issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the circuit court's order was silent on relevancy of the evidence to a fact in issue, the case must be remanded for the circuit court to issue a written order in compliance with the rape-shield statute.

Appellee Joe Cantrell was convicted of multiple crimes relating to the manufacture of methamphetamine and failure to appear and was sentenced to 145 years incarceration. Following affirmance on direct appeal of his convictions, Cantrell filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court granted Cantrell a new trial, finding that the deputy public defender had been ineffective in numerous respects and that Cantrell was prejudiced by the ineffective performance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing Cantrell to proceed with his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the absence of the necessary waiver of attorney-client privilege; and (2) the circuit court clearly erred in its application of the prejudice prong of the Strickland v. Washington test when it concluded that prejudice resulted from counsel's ineffective performance because the outcome of the trial "may" have been different but for trial counsel's errors. Remanded.

Appellant Isaac Russell, who was incarcerated after a criminal conviction, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that he should be released from custody because his initial arrest was invalid. The circuit court denied the petition. Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion seeking to dismiss the appeal without prejudice. The Court denied the motion and dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant's contentions of error in the arrest did not demonstrate that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment entered was facially valid, and therefore, there was no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue.

Appellant Robert Maldonado pled guilty to eight counts of hot-check violations, and the circuit court sentenced him to probation with several conditions. The circuit court later revoked Appellant's probation after Appellant was found to have violated his probation and to have committed new criminal offenses. Appellant was then sentenced to a total of eighty years' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his original probationary sentence was illegal and void and that his counsel was ineffective. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court had jurisdiction over Appellant's criminal proceeding, and the circuit court's order was not invalid as it accurately reflected the hot-check convictions and appropriate sentences; and (2) because Appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice, the court court properly denied relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims regarding his sentence.

After a jury trial, Appellant Kevin Dixon was convicted of capital-felony murder with aggravated robbery as the underlying felony and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting statements that Appellant objected to during the trial as hearsay where the first statement was not hearsay and any error in admission of the second statement was harmless; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting autopsy photographs; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial; and (4) there was sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of capital-felony murder.

Appellant Roderick Williams was first convicted for several offenses, after which the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. Upon remand, Appellant was convicted of capital murder, first-degree domestic battering, endangering the welfare of a minor, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict on the capital-murder and child-endangerment charges and by denying his motion for a mistrial when the State's witness referred to Appellant's previous trial during her testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported Appellant's conviction of capital murder with premeditation and deliberation as well as Appellant's child-endangerment conviction; and (2) the witness's statement was not so patently inflammatory that it would cause the drastic relief of granting a mistrial.