Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Michael Williams was found guilty of murder in the first degree, kidnapping, and aggravated assault. Williams subsequently filed a pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis with respect to the first-degree murder conviction, claiming that exculpatory evidence was withheld from the defense at Petitioner's trial. The Supreme Court denied the writ where Petitioner did not establish that (1) the evidence was not available to the defense at the time of trial, (2) the evidence was suppressed by the State, and (3) there was a reasonable probability that the judgment of conviction would not have been rendered, or would have been prevented, had the information at issue been disclosed at trial.

After a jury trial, Petitioner Frank Williams was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. The circuit court denied Williams' subsequent motion for postconviction relief, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Williams next filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was denied. Williams eventually moved the Supreme Court to recall the mandates of its judgments denying Williams relief on both his direct appeal and petition for postconviction relief. At issue before the Court was the fact that the Williams jury erroneously marked a jury form, indicating that no evidence of mitigation was offered where evidence was clearly presented. The Court granted the motion and reversed the death sentence, concluding that the jury eliminated from its consideration all evidence presented of mitigating circumstances and sentenced Williams to death solely based on the aggravating circumstance, which was reversible error. Because the error was not discovered during Williams' direct appeal, there was a defect or breakdown in the appellate process in this death-penalty case, requiring a recall of the mandate and a reopening of Williams' direct appeal. Remanded for resentencing.

A jury found Appellant Kenneth Tucker guilty of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's petition for writ of certiorari to complete the record and his amended motion for a copy of the record, appointment of counsel, and a stay of the briefing schedule. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion and petition moot, holding that the petition for postconviction relief was not properly verified because the petition did not include the appropriate affidavit required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 and there was not explicit leave from the trial court for Appellant to file an unverified petition.

Appellees were charged with five felonies involving the manufacture, possession, and delivery of methamphetamine and paraphernalia. The charges resulted from a single incident when sheriff's deputies attempted a "knock and announce" at a residence after receiving information that a methamphetamine laboratory was active and currently in progress. The State granted Appellees' motion to suppress. The State appealed, contending that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the "reasonably foreseeable" test concerning police-created exigent circumstances adopted in Mann v. State. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) it was not a proper State appeal under Ark. R. App. P.-Crim. 3 because the State failed to produce a record on appeal that demonstrated that the circuit court actually relied on Mann and misinterpreted that case in reaching its decision; and (2) therefore, the State could not satisfy the requirement of Rule 3(d) that the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law required the Court's review of the appeal.

Appellant David Smoak was convicted by a jury of internet stalking of a child. Smoak appealed, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (2) the circuit court erred as a matter of law by denying his attempt to utilize an entrapment defense and by failing to instruct the jury on entrapment. The Supreme Court (2) affirmed the circuit court's holding that there was sufficient evidence to support Smoak's conviction; but (2) reversed the court's denial of Smoak's attempt to utilize an entrapment defense, holding that a defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment, even if the defendant denies one or more elements of the crime. Remanded.

A jury found Appellant Jose Mendez guilty of rape, attempted murder, aggravated residential burglary, and aggravated assault. Appellant, who spoke only Spanish, asserted that the circuit court erred in admitting the State's translation of a statement he gave to the police in Spanish because it was not prepared by a qualified certified translator as required by Ark. R. Evid. 1009. The circuit court ruled that the statement was admissible and that the translator's certification went to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the statement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State's translation should not have been admitted because not only was the State's translator uncertified, but the translator had taken and failed the certification exam; and (2) because the unqualified translation of Appellant's statement was introduced as an admission of guilt, the introduction of the translation was not harmless. Remanded.

Appellant Michael Cowan was convicted of two counts of sexual assault in the second degree and sentenced as a habitual offender. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting four bases for the requested relief. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Appellant's first three assertions were not properly before the Court; but (2) the trial court erred in denying Appellant the requested relief on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to allow him to testify on his own behalf where the court did not enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its determination that Appellant was entitled to no relief, and where Appellant's original petition for postconviction relief supported his claim.

Petitioner Antonio Coley was found guilty of aggravated robbery and forgery for a criminal episode at a convenience store. The Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner later filed a pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that a fellow inmate at the department of correction confessed to Petitioner that he had committed the offenses. The Supreme Court denied the petition after noting that coram-nobis proceedings require that the claim of a third-party confession be raised before affirmance of the judgment, which was not done in this case.

James Butler was charged with engaging in sexual acts with a nine-year-old girl. After a trial, Butler was found guilty of two counts of rape and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Butler subsequently filed a pro se petition with the Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the case, alleging almost twenty grounds for issuance of the writ. The Court denied the petition, holding (1) Butler's attacks on the sufficiency of the evidence, complaints of trial error, and allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were not grounds for the writ; and (2) Butler's contention that a third party admitted to abuse of the victim did not contain a confession to the offenses of which Butler was accused and convicted, and therefore, did not warrant coram-nobis relief.

After Kenneth Middleton was convicted of first-degree murder but before a judgment was entered against him in a wrongful-death suit, Kenneth conveyed property he owned in Arkansas to his brother. The sale was found to be fraudulent and was set aside by decree. Appellees, several individuals, filed a petition for writ of scire facias more than ten years later to allow more time to sell the property in an effort to satisfy the Missouri judgment. Appellants, the Middleton brothers, filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court dismissed. Appellants subsequently filed a motion for clarification as well as a notice of appeal. Appellants' motion was subsequently deemed denied. Appellees then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that a second notice of appeal was required after the denial of the consolidated motion for clarification. The Supreme Court denied Appellees' motion, holding that the notice of appeal in this case was effective.