Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Phillip Harrison was convicted of two counts of theft of property. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. The trial court denied the petition, finding that it was not timely filed, but provided a ruling on two issues raised in the petition, despite that finding. Appellant appealed, and before the Supreme Court were several motions related to the appeal. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions moot, holding (1) the trial court erred in reaching issues not related to whether the petition met the procedural requisites of the Court's rules; and (2) the trial court correctly denied relief on the petition because no relief could be granted on an untimely petition. View "Harrison v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Damont Ewells, who was incarcerated, filed a civil complaint against Appellees, three law enforcement officers, seeking compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. In his complaint, Appellant alleged that Appellees violated his constitutional rights, specifically claiming due process and excessive force violations. The circuit court granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment and dismissed Appellant's complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant, as the opposing party, failed to meet proof with proof and to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. View "Ewells v. Constant" on Justia Law

William Eubanks was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. Eubanks subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge his prosecution based on speedy trial and for failing to mount a constitutional challenge to the pedophile exception recognized by the Supreme Court under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b). The Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no violation of Eubanks' right to a speedy trial, and therefore, Eubanks' trial counsel was not ineffective for failure to assert a violation of Eubanks' right to a speedy trial; and (2) the failure of counsel to make a constitutional challenge to the established evidentiary rule of allowing for a pedophile exception in admission of evidence did not constitute an error so serious to rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Eubanks v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Lesa Menne was found guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use, and possession of marijuana. On appeal, Menne challenged the circuit court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence recovered in a search of her vehicle after she was stopped by a law enforcement officer for a traffic violation. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling, holding that the circuit court correctly found that a number of factors gave the officer a reasonable suspicion during the course of the traffic stop that Menne was committing, had committed, or was about it commit a crime involving danger to persons or property, and that reasonable suspicion was a sufficient basis to detain Menne further. View "Menne v. State" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellants Angel Romero and Conrado Cordona-Duarte of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals affirmed Appellants' felony drug convictions, as well as the convictions of their co-defendant, Luis Camacho-Mendoza. The court of appeals issued the mandate for the appeal, but the clerk's certificate named only Camacho-Mendoza as appellant. Appellants then filed an Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 petition, which the circuit court denied as prematurely filed because no mandate listing Appellants had been filed with the county circuit clerk. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the trial court may not have had the correct information available to it upon which to make a decision at the time it issued the order, Appellants' petition was timely filed. Remanded. View "Romero v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant David Paschal was convicted of four counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of witness bribery. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part, and reversed and dismissed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Appellant's motion for directed verdict on the witness-bribery charge; and (2) erred in finding the sexual-degree sexual-assault statute constitutional as it was applied to Appellant because the statute, as applied in this case, infringed on Appellant's fundamental right to engage in private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy with an adult and was not the least restrictive method available for the promotion of a state interest. View "Paschal v. State" on Justia Law

In the early 1990s Appellant Kenneth Middleton was convicted of murdering his wife and sentenced to life in prison. In 1992, a default judgment was entered against Appellant in a wrongful death action brought by Appellees, Appellant's wife's siblings. In 1999, a chancery court entered a decree finding that a conveyance Appellant had made to Appellant Lynn Middleton after the 1992 judgment was fraudulent. In 2009, Appellees filed a petition for writ of scire facias to revive the 1999 decree. The circuit court denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment and ordered that the 1999 decree be revived for another ten-year period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the 1999 decree, which was entered in the chancery court prior to the adoption of an amendment merging law and equity, was entitled to "the same footing" as a judgment, and the circuit court did not err in concluding it could be revived by a writ of scire facias; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that Appellees timely revived the 1999 decree where they filed their writ of scire facias on May 13, 2009, within ten years from May 25, 1999, the effective date of the decree. View "Middleton v. Lockhart" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Hoover was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to two life sentences. Hoover subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden to show that the writ is warranted, as only one of Petitioner's three claims was of the ilk that may be cognizable in proceedings for the writ, and that claim was without merit because the asserted error did not raise a reasonable probability that the judgment of conviction would not have been rendered, or would have been prevented, if the facts Petitioner alleged were withheld had been available at trial. View "Hoover v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Charles Goodwin was convicted of attempted capital-felony murder with aggravated robbery as the underlying offense and sentenced to life imprisonment. Petitioner timely filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. Approximately three-and-one-half years afterwards, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus, contending that the circuit court judge had not acted on the Rule 37.1 petition in a timely manner. The judge explained the cause of the delay, and the Rule 37.1 petition was acted on by the court. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the mandamus action was moot. View "Goodwin v. Keaton" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Daniels was found guilty by a jury of possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se motion seeking at public expense a copy of the transcript lodged on direct appeal, contending that the transcript was necessary to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus and that he was entitled to a copy. Appended to the motion was Petitioner's affidavit of indigency. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that Petitioner failed to show the transcript should be provided to him at no cost because he did not establish that there was a timely postconviction remedy available to him. View "Daniels v. State" on Justia Law