Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a trial, Appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, maintaining a drug premises, and simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, for which he was sentenced to twenty-nine years' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging, among other claims, that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice. Appellant had requested a change of counsel on the eve of trial, and the circuit court denied the request despite the fact that Appellant had already obtained substitute counsel. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court wrongly denied Appellant's motion to substitute new counsel because the court failed to consider Appellant's interests when deciding the motion. Remanded for a new trial. View "Arroyo v. State" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of unidentified crimes. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, contending that the circuit court erred in finding that his trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to the circuit court's change of venue and by failing to introduce the testimony of a witness at trial or offer transcribed testimony of the witness from a pretrial hearing to rebut an inference that Defendant had contemplated raping the victim. The Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of Defendant's argument because Defendant's brief did not comply with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(8) and he had failed to file a sufficient record for the Court's review. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 480 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed three postconviction petitions, one filed pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, the second for reduction of sentence under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111, and the third to correct an illegal sentence under 16-90-111. The trial court denied the petitions in one order and denied Appellant's two motions related to the Rule 37.1 petition in a second order. Appellant appealed both orders. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion for extension of time to file his brief-in-chief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that the trial court correctly denied the petitions. View "Murphy v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of rape, kidnapping, and first-degree terroristic threatening and sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, asserting that his defense counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to obtain and present testimony of a medical expert, (2) failing to investigate and present to the jury the lack of physical evidence in his case, (3) failing to present to the jury a timeline of events, and (4) failing to call Appellant as a witness on his own behalf. The circuit court denied the requested relief without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not clearly err in holding that counsel's performance was not ineffective under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington. View "Hickey v. State" on Justia Law

Appellee pleaded guilty to first-degree false imprisonment and aggravated assault. Appellee subsequently filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, asking the circuit court to vacate the entry of his guilty plea due to a lack of advice from counsel about immigration consequences as required under Padilla v. Kentucky. After multiple hearings, the circuit court granted the petition and vacated Appellee's guilty pleas and sentence. The State appealed, contending that the circuit court erred as a matter of law by expanding the grounds for a writ of error coram nobis to include claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the result of the circuit court's decision was to improperly expand the grounds for coram-nobis relief to include claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, and therefore the court erred as a matter of law in granting the writ. View "State v. Tejeda-Acosta" on Justia Law

The circuit court found Defendant guilty, as a habitual offender, to two drug offenses. The court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of five years in the Arkansas Department of Correction with an additional ten years' suspended imposition of sentence plus costs and fees for each conviction. The State appealed, contending that the circuit court (1) illegally sentenced Defendant because the statutory-minimum sentence for a habitual offender was not imposed, and (2) erred by not imposing a fine against Defendant pursuant to the applicable statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) exceeded its statutory authority by imposing a sentence of five years when at least a ten-year sentence was required; and (2) did not err by failing to impose a fine pursuant to the controlled-substances statute. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. O'Quinn" on Justia Law

In 2011, the State filed a petition to remove Sheriff Kenny Cassell from office, alleging that Cassell had pled guilty in 1979 to a violation of 18 U.S.C. 659, that Cassell had committed the crime while serving as a deputy sheriff, that Cassell acknowledged the conviction, that Cassell was elected sheriff in 2010, and that, under the Arkansas Constitution, Cassell was barred from holding office. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Cassell, concluding that Cassell's crime was for theft by receiving, and although the crime involved dishonesty, the theft conviction was not sufficient for removal because it did not impugn the integrity of the office or directly impact Cassell's ability to serve as an elected official. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the offense was an "infamous crime" under Ark. Const. art. V, 9 because it involved dishonesty; and (2) the circuit court erroneously determined that Cassell's theft conviction alone was not enough to require removal without some proof that the conviction impugned the integrity of the elected office or directly impacted Cassell's ability to serve. View "State v. Cassell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced to death and life imprisonment, respectively. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition after a hearing. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in finding Appellant's counsel provided effective assistance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court failed to make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Rule 37.5(i). Remanded for entry of a written order in compliance with Rule 37.5(i). View "Sales v. State" on Justia Law

After a trial, Appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of marijuana. Appellant subsequently filed a timely pro se petition seeking postconviction relief, asserting that his counsel provided ineffective assistance during trial. The trial court denied the petition, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying postconviction relief, holding (1) Appellant failed to demonstrate clear error in the trial court's ruling regarding some of his points on appeal; (2) other issues raised by Appellant were not properly preserved for appellate review; and (3) the trial court's ordered complied with Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3. View "Hogan v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged by felony information with two counts of rape and one count of robbery. After the jury deadlocked, the circuit court declared a mistrial. Prior to the retrial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the circuit court erred in declaring a mistrial and that retrying him would constitute double jeopardy. The circuit cout denied the motion. Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial on the grounds that the jury was deadlocked; and (2) the circuit court erred in sending the bailiff into the jury chambers without counsel, but the court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to dismiss on these grounds, as the proper remedy was a new trial, which Defendant was to receive. View "Gold v. State" on Justia Law