Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Decedent was a resident of Searcy Healthcare Center (SHC) from January 7 to January 29. On January 8, Decedent executed a written arbitration agreement with SHC that was binding on Decedent's children, personal representatives, and administrators of Decedent's estate. Decedent died on February 12. The next year, Appellee filed a nursing-home-malpractice action against SHC as administrator of Decedent's estate and on behalf of the statutory wrongful-death beneficiaries. The circuit court denied SHC's motion to compel arbitration against the wrongful-death beneficiaries, concluding that Decedent had not extinguished the substantive rights of the wrongful-death beneficiaries by signing the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in finding that the wrongful-death beneficiaries were not bound by the arbitration agreement executed by Decedent. Remanded. View "Searcy Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Les Marlow filed a complaint against Glenn Petkovsek and United Systems of Arkansas, Inc. for breach of contract and breach of the duties of good faith and fair dealing. Additionally, Appellants, Les Marlow and other individuals, filed claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy against Petkovsek and United Systems. Various counterclaims were filed against Appellants, including breach of contract and conversion. The jury (1) entered verdicts in favor of United Systems on its claims but awarded zero damages, and (2) entered defense verdicts for Petkovsek and United Systems, finding Plaintiffs failed to prove their claims. The circuit court subsequently found United Systems and Petkovsek were entitled to attorney's fees and costs but awarded them only to Petkovsek. Appellants appealed the award. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's award, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) finding that Petkovsek was a prevailing party; and (2) finding that attorney's fees and costs are available to a prevailing party in a wrongful-discharge against public-policy case. View "Marlow v. United Sys. of Ark., Inc." on Justia Law

After Opal Corn was rear-ended by Martha Gafford, she settled with Gafford and Gafford's insurer. Opal and L.B. Corn subsequently filed an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim with their insurer, Farmers Insurance Company, for the remaining damages from the accident. The Corns then filed suit against Farmers and a driver and company also involved in the accident (collectively, Eden). The Corns settled their claims with Eden, but their settlement was for less than the limits of Eden's insurance policy. Farms refused to offer UIM benefits and moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the Corns had failed to exhaust Eden's liability policy, they had not triggered UIM coverage under their policy with Farmers. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Farmers, finding that, based on the exhaustion requirement of UIM coverage and the policy language, the Corns were not entitled to UIM benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) insured persons are required to exhaust all liability insurance policies of all tortfeasors before they are entitled to receive UIM benefits; and (2) under the terms of the policy, UIM coverage was not triggered until all policy limits had been exhausted. View "Corn v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant for breach of a real estate contract after Defendant was unable to acquire financing to purchase a home owned by Plaintiffs. Defendant filed a third-party complaint against his real estate agent and the agent's employer. A jury returned a verdict in the Clines' favor on the breach of contract claim and in favor of Defendant on the third-party negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed the award to Plaintiffs, holding that there was no contract between the parties. On remand, the circuit court dismissed the complaint and third-party complaint. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs based on a provision in the real estate contract. The trial court awarded Defendant fees and costs but at an amount significantly less than the amount Defendant had requested. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's finding that Defendant was not entitled to recover fees and costs under the contract was consistent with the Court's holding in Carter I that there was no contract; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that Appellant was not entitled to recover fees and costs related to his third-party claim and those fees and costs associated with his attorney. View "Carter v. Cline" on Justia Law

Appellant was in the business of extending high-risk loans to customers with poor credit ratings and operated primarily in Louisiana. Appellees, who resided in Arkansas, obtained four loans from Appellant at its location in Louisiana. After Appellees failed to make payments on the loans, Appellant filed in an Arkansas circuit court a notice of default and intention to sell Appellees' home. Appellees asserted the defenses of usury, unconscionability, esoppel, unclean hands, predatory lending practices, and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The circuit court found that the loans constituted predatory lending by a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in Arkansas and that the contract between the parties was unconscionable and could not be given full faith and credit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's findings of unconscionability and predatory lending practices were not clearly erroneous; and (2) court did not err in refusing to enforce the mortgage, as to do so would contravene the public policy of the State of Arkansas. View "Gulfco of La. Inc. v. Brantley" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute among the owners of an oil-drilling rig. Donald Buffington owned 62.5 percent of the rig. Newton Dorsett, through his company, Diamond Transport & Drilling, owned the remaining 37.5 percent of the rig. Two lawsuits brought by the owners were resolved when the parties entered into a compromise agreement. The third case was brought by Buffington against Diamond and Dorsett in the Lafayette County circuit court and alleged causes of action for breach of contract and conversion arising out of the agreement. The fourth case was filed by Diamond in Louisiana seeking an order enforcing the agreement. Thereafter, Louisiana court found, inter alia, that the compromise agreement remained in effect. Subsequently, the Lafayette County circuit court found that, in light of the Louisiana judgment, res judicata applied to a majority of the issues brought by Buffington in the Lafayette County circuit court. The case proceeded to trial, and the circuit court entered judgment against Dorsett. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) res judicata did not bar Buffington's action in Arkansas court; and (2) there was substantial evidence to support the jury's award of damages. View "Dorsett v. Buffington" on Justia Law

The Hernandezes (Hernandez) entered into a real-estate contract to buy 100 acres of land in Van Buren County from the Humphries (Humphries). The sales contract included the mineral rights to the property. However, Humphries subsequently leased the oil-and-gas rights to New Century, which assigned the rights to SEECO. Humphries then sold the oil-and-gas rights to Paraclifta and Claughton. Therafter, Hernandez entered into a contract for sale of the property to the Walls (Walls). Hernandez and Walls (Appellants) filed suit against New Century, SEECO, Paraclifta, and Claughton (Appellees), alleging that Appellees were not innocent purchasers the oil-and-gas rights and seeking cancellation of the lease issued to New Century and the assignment to SEECO, as well as the deed conveying the rights to Paraclifta and Claughton. The circuit court granted Appellees' motions for summary judgment and Appellees' requested attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) a question of fact remanded as to whether Hernandez was in exclusive possession of the property, thus imputing notice of Hernandez's interest in the property; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. View "Walls v. Humphries" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a class action complaint against TV Guide Online Holdings, claiming that, upon accessing TV Guide's website, TV Guide downloaded a Flash cookie onto their computers without their knowledge or consent. Appellants alleged that they were residents of Washington County and that a substantial part of the events giving rise to their claims occurred in Washington County. TV Guide filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that Appellants had not pleaded facts sufficient to show that venue was proper in Washington County. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that Appellants had not pleaded sufficient facts to avoid jurisdiction and venue in Los Angeles, California because, by using TV Guide's website, Appellants had consented to venue in Los Angeles. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be created or waived by agreement between the parties; (2) TV Guide did not meet its burden of showing that an enforceable agreement existed between it and Appellants relating to the proper venue in which to bring claims; and (3) TV Guide failed to establish that venue was improper in Washington County. View "Roller v. TV Guide Online Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellees, Sherry and Kevin Wilburn, purchased a vehicle that they financed by executing a retail installment sales contract with Appellant. After Appellees failed to make payments as agreed in the contract, Appellant sold the vehicle at a private sale. Appellant later filed an action against Appellees to recover the balance due on the contract. Appellant obtained a default judgment against Appellees. Appellant then filed a writ of garnishment, naming as garnishee the alleged employer of Sherry. The circuit court issued a garnishment order. Sherry later filed a motion to set aside the garnishment, asking the court to cancel the garnishment as of January 8, 2012, the date the judgment allegedly became stale, and to direct Appellant to return the funds received after that date. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court's conclusion that the judgment became stale and expired were clearly erroneous. View "Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Wilburn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition against Defendants alleging a single cause of action for fraud. Plaintiff claimed that he purchased a house only after Defendants had misrepresented the location of the property's corners and lot lines, the location of the water well serving the property, and the availability of an easement to access the driveway leading to the house. Defendants filed a counterclaim for breach of contract relating to a waiver and release, alleging that, in the real-estate-sales contract, Plaintiff had agreed to forgo a survey and to hold them harmless for any boundary line or corner discrepancies that may exist and that in a closing document, Plaintiff agreed to release Defendants from any claims relating to the negotiation of the real-estate contract. The circuit court concluded that Defendants committed constructive fraud, awarding damages of $34,094 against Defendants and dismissing Defendants' counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) ruling that the waiver and release were vitiated by the constructive fraud; (2) ruling that Plaintiff's reliance on Defendants' marking of the boundaries was reasonable; (3) calculating damages; and (4) applying the burden of proof. View "Henry v. Mitchell" on Justia Law