Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Frank Randolph was found guilty by a jury of robbery, theft of property, and kidnapping and was sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty-five years' imprisonment for each offense to be served consecutively. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending (1) his consecutive sentences were illegal because the trial judge referred to the terror experienced by the victim, which was not a fact admitted by Appellant or found by the jury, and (2) it was a violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy for him to be sentenced for kidnapping. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's petition because the petition did not state a basis to warrant issuance of the writ.

Petitioner Jamie Lee was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and four counts of first-degree battery. Petitioner (1) filed a petition with the Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that certain testimony was deleted from the trial transcript, and the court reporter, prosecutor, and trial judge committed egregious misconduct by misleading the appellate court; and (2) asked the Court grant him leave to proceed with a belated petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court (1) denied Petitioner's petition because Petitioner did not state a ground for the writ; and (2) denied Petitioner's request because there was no provision in Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 for a belated petition.

Appellant Billy Kelley was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual offender. Kelley filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial attorney was ineffective for not preserving a Confrontation Clause challenge for appellate review. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's denial of postconviction relief was not clear error where, pursuant to the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, Kelley failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's failure to obtain a ruling on his Confrontation Clause objection, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

After a jury trial, Gary Williams was found guilty of first-degree murder, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana. Williams subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses and for misadvising him concerning his right to testify. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not clearly err in denying Williams's petition because (1) trial counsel's decision not to call certain witnesses was a matter of trial strategy, and counsel's performance was not deficient as a result; (2) pursuant to case law, an attorney's advice to a defendant on whether to testify and the defendant's decision to take or not take the stand are not grounds for postconviction relief predicated on ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) there was no defective representation by trial counsel where counsel failed to make a record of the waiver of William's fundamental right to testify.

Appellant Myka Talley was found guilty by a jury of kidnapping and seven counts of rape and was sentenced to eight consecutive terms of life imprisonment. Sixty-one days after the mandate issued, Appellant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. The trial court denied the petition. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion for an extension of time to file his brief-in-chief. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition because the petition filed in the trial court was not filed within sixty days after the mandate was issued pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c).

Appellant Ricky Reese was convicted of capital murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant subsequently filed in the trial court a petition seeking postconviction relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the petition. On appeal, Appellant contended that the trial court erred in denying his petition because of his counsel's failure to raise at trial and on direct appeal the material-witness rule in Smith v. State, which states that the requirement of producing all material witnesses is a necessary component of the State's burden of proof to show that a confession is voluntary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show that an objection to the prosecution's failure to produce witnesses based on the material-witness rule would have been successful because the rule was inapplicable in this case, and therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to make the objection on that basis.

A jury found petitioner Greg Hogue guilty of capital murder for the death of an owner of a convenience store and sentenced Hogue to life imprisonment without parole. Hogue subsequently filed a petition in the Supreme Court seeking leave to file a petition in the circuit court for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that the prosecution withheld five documents from the defense in violation of the requirements of Brady v. Maryland. The Supreme Court denied Hogue's petition, holding that Hogue failed to set forth a basis for issuance of the writ because (1) defense counsel was aware of the existence of four of the documents, and (2) Hogue failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the judgment of conviction would not have been rendered had the document in the last document been disclosed at trial.

Appellant Adam Davis was convicted of capital murder and attempted first-degree murder, each having a firearm enhancement, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that counsel was not ineffective where (1) Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to properly renew his motion for directed verdict as to both charges; and (2) Appellant's remaining allegations regarding trial counsel's ineffectiveness were entirely conclusory in nature in that there was no factual substantiation to demonstrate how counsel's conduct specifically prejudiced his defense.

Appellant was serving terms on three sentences for three convictions when he filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by not conducing a hearing on Appellant's petition because Appellant failed to demonstrate probable cause for the issuance of the writ; (2) the circuit court committed no error if it did not make written findings to support its decision; (3) Appellant's claim that his conviction for delivery of a controlled substance was invalid stated no grounds upon which the writ could properly issue and therefore failed; and (4) any challenges to Appellant's convictions for second-degree escape were moot because the sentences he received for those offenses expired.

Appellant Justin Anderson was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the murder of an elderly woman. Anderson filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) (a) Anderson did not overcome the presumption that trial counsel's handling of the issue of Anderson's mental retardation was the result of reasonable professional judgment, (b) the fact that a doctor who participated in the issue of Anderson's mental retardation was later discredited did not warrant a remand, and (c) Anderson was not allowed to revisit the issue of conflicting expert evidence regarding Anderson's mental retardation and mental health presented at his trial; (2) Anderson failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the admission of statements Anderson to police and counsel's failure to challenge aspects of the statements in relation to his mental retardation; and (3) the circuit court did not err in ruling that no mental impairment on the part of defense counsel had been proven.