Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Civitan Center, Inc. brought a declaratory judgment action against the Division of Developmental Disabilities Services of the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DDS). Civitan, a corporation licensed by DDS to operate an adult developmental center, requested a declaratory judgment stating that DDS could not lawfully license a new provider in the county Civitan was servicing pursuant to a proposed policy authorizing DDS to initiate the expansion of the number of service providers in a specific county until the policy was properly promulgated. The circuit court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Civitan, ruling that DDS failed to comply with its own procedures and state law, that DDS denied Civitan due process, and that Civitan was denied a hearing in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Civitan failed to present a justiciable controversy, declaratory judgment in Civitan's favor was not proper, and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in granting Civitan's motion for summary judgment.

Appellant Rodney Williams was found guilty by a jury of felony murder in the first degree and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied. Appellant appealed and filed motions regarding that appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions moot, holding that (1) Appellant failed to state cognizable claims for a writ of habeas corpus because none of his claims raised a question of jurisdiction or established that the commitment was invalid on its face; and (2) therefore, Appellant did not meet his burden of demonstrating a basis for a writ of habeas corpus to issue.

Appellant Sherman Watson appealed the denial of his pro se petition for postconviction relief and filed a number of motions regarding the appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's petition for writ of certiorari and declared his motions moot, holding that the trial court's ruling denying relief on the claims was not clearly error where (1) the trial court properly treated Appellant's postconviction petition as timely filed, but (2) Appellant did not carry his burden to demonstrate a meritorious claim for postconviction relief as (i) several of Appellant's claims were not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 petition, and (ii) Appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective.

Appellant Jonathan Olivarez pled guilty to charges of delivery of methamphetamine, attempted murder in the first degree, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Appellant timely filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to correctly inform him of his parole eligibility. The trial court denied Appellant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the transcript of the plea hearing and the alleged positive misrepresentations of trial counsel regarding Appellant's parole eligibility, there was no conclusive showing that Appellant was entitled to no relief as determined by the trial court. Remanded.

Petitioner Mychael Kinard entered a conditional plea to simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The plea was entered on July 13, 2010, at which time Petitioner filed a statement setting out that he was entering the plea conditioned on an appeal of the issue of whether the denial of his motion to suppress evidence was a correct ruling. Petitioner's attorney never perfected the appeal. Petitioner later filed a motion seeking leave from the Supreme Court to proceed with a belated appeal. The Court granted the motion, holding that because Petitioner's counsel was timely made aware by Petitioner that Petitioner desired to appeal, counsel was obligated to file a timely notice of appeal.

Appellant Charles Green was convicted of four counts of rape and one count of terroristic threatening in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for continuance; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on second-degree terroristic threatening as a lesser-included offense of terroristic threatening in the first degree and first-degree sexual abuse as a lesser-included offense of rape; and (3) the circuit court did not err in refusing to order the victim's counselor to disclose the diagnosis of the victim.

At issue in this case were three trademarks registered to Plaintiff by the secretary of state. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a determination that its trademarks were valid and that it was entitled to the exclusive use of those marks, and claiming trademark infringement against the Arkansas Lottery Commission. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, which the circuit court denied. The Commission appealed, contending that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims because those claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court dismissed the Commission's interlocutory appeal without prejudice because the circuit court did not rule on the sovereign-immunity issue.

Appellant, an inmate incarcerated in the state Department of Correction, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the county where he was incarcerated, alleging several grounds for the writ. The circuit court dismissed the petition and Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court were two motions filed by Appellant. The Court declared the motions moot and dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that because none of Appellant's claims in his petition raised a question of jurisdiction or asserted that the commitment was invalid on its face, Appellant failed to state cognizable claims, and he did not meet his burden of demonstrating a basis for a writ of habeas corpus to issue.

After Appellant was found guilty of two nonviolent felony offenses, Appellant was released on bond subject to the condition that he not leave the state without written permission. Appellant subsequently left the state without written permission. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of escape in the second degree. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the State failed to prove that he was "in custody," which was a required element of the charged offense. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed, holding that although Appellant violated the conditions of the order allowing his release, he did not escape from custody, and the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict.

Teresa Broussard brought a medical malpractice action against, inter alia, Dr. Stephen Seffense and Dr. Michael Coleman, Jr. after she developed and was treated for a burn following a surgery. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Broussard appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding that Ark. Code Ann. 16-114-206(a), which requires that proof in medical malpractice cases must be made by expert testimony by medical care providers of the same speciality as the defendant, was constitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute violated the separation-of-powers doctrine and the inherent authority of the courts to protect the integrity of proceedings and the rights of litigants. Remanded.