Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
by
Appellant school district filed an action on its own behalf and on behalf of its students and taxpayers to enjoin State actions in violation of state law and the Arkansas Constitution, asserting two claims for relief. The circuit court granted Appellant's motion to dismiss its second claim without prejudice. The court then entered an order dismissing Appellant's claims against all Appellees. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the order from which Appellant appealed was not a final, appealable order, as the nonsuit of Appellant's second claim did not operate to make the circuit court's order final because the second claim could be refiled and the requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) had not been met. View "Deer-Mt. Judea Sch. Dist. v. Beebe" on Justia Law

by
This case began as a criminal action filed by the City of Clinton against Southern Paramedic Services, alleging that Southern Paramedic violated two of the City ordinances prohibiting an entity from engaging in the ambulance business within the City without first obtaining a franchise from the City Council. At issue was whether Southern Paramedic qualified for an exemption under Arkansas's Municipal Ambulance Licensing Act as an ambulance service provider who is "not-for-hire on a fee-for-service basis." The City filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking an interpretation of the statute. The circuit court eventually found that Southern Paramedic remained "not for hire" to the general public within the City. The City appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, as the issue of whether Southern Paramedic was "not-for-hire on a fee-for-service basis" and not subject to the City's regulation was moot because the ordinances under which the City sought to regulate Southern Paramedic had been repealed. View "City of Clinton v. S. Paramedic Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

by
Appellant Conray Carroll pled guilty to rape, for which he was sentenced as a habitual offender to 720 months' imprisonment. Approximately fourteen years later, Appellant filed a pro se motion for depositions and discovery pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 26. The motion was denied on the ground that it amounted to an untimely petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. Appellant then filed a petition for writ of certiorari and a motion to amend his appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the petition for writ of certiorari and motion to amend the appeal were moot, as the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's untimely petition. View "Carroll v. State" on Justia Law

by
Appellant Tony Thomas entered a plea of guilty in the circuit court to aggravated robbery and theft of property and was sentenced to serve an aggregate term of 240 months' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied. Appellant appealed, and before the Supreme Court were Appellant's motions related to that appeal. The Court declared the motions moot and dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant did not meet his burden of demonstrating a basis for writ of habeas corpus to issue, and he could not prevail on appeal of the order denying his petition. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

by
Appellant Cameka Sullivan was convicted of permitting the abuse of her minor child and hindering the apprehension or prosecution of her child's abuser and sentenced to a cumulative sentence of 216 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed her convictions. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly concluded that Appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated; (2) did not err in denying Appellant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of hindering the apprehension of her child's abuser; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in allowing certain challenged testimony. View "Sullivan v. State" on Justia Law

by
S.L. was charged with one count of rape in the juvenile division of the circuit court. Before the adjudication hearing, S.L. filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, which the circuit court denied. S.L. then filed another motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, which the circuit court granted. The State appealed. After noting that the State's appeal under these circumstances required the Supreme Court's review for the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law under Ark. R. App. P.-Crim. 3(d) instead of relying on facts unique to the case, the Court dismissed the appeal, as it did not have at issue the correct and uniform administration of justice and, instead, involved the application of the Court's speedy-trial rules to the unique facts of the case. View "State v. S.L." on Justia Law

by
Appellant was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to death. In subsequent proceedings under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5, the trial court granted Appellant a new sentencing hearing based upon trial counsel's failure to object to evidence that was presented as an aggravating circumstance. On resentencing, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Appellant thereafter filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied. Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court were Appellant's motions related to the appeal. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions moot, holding that Appellant did not meet his burden of demonstrating a basis for a writ of habeas corpus to issue. View "Fudge v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

by
An incident at a restaurant resulted in the use of force by police Police Lieutenant David Hudson against Chris Erwin. Erwin was charged with three misdemeanor offenses. Hudson then wrote a use-of-force report to his supervisor, describing why he used force against Erwin. Erwin subsequently filed a petition against Stuart Thomas, chief of police, alleging that Thomas violated the FOIA by failing to produce Hudson's reports regarding his use of force. The City responded to both FOIA requests but withheld all four use-of-force reports, reasoning that the reports were exempt as employee-evaluation or job-performance records because they were created so that supervisors could evaluate whether the police officer performed his or her duties pursuant to departmental policy. The circuit court concluded that the use-of-force reports did not fall within the FOIA exemption for "employee evaluation or job performance records" found at Ark. Code Ann. 25-19-105(c)(1). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the use-of-force reports made by Hudson did not constitute employee-evaluation or job-performance records within the meaning of section 25-19-105(c)(1), and, thus, were subject to disclosure under the FOIA. View "Thomas v. Hall" on Justia Law

by
James Wedgeworth was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence entered in this case, holding (1) Wedgeworth's argument that the circuit court erred in overruling a hearsay objection when the victim's father testified that the victim came to him for help because "there were threats against her life" was not preserved for review on appeal; (2) while the circuit court erred in admitting the victim' writings contained in a spiral notebook, Wedgeworth did not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence; and (3) there was no error in admission of certain photographs of the victim, and therefore, the circuit court did not err by failing sua sponte to exclude the photographs under Wicks v. State. View "Wedgeworth v. State" on Justia Law

by
Appellant Vincent Webb was convicted of the kidnapping and rape of a twelve-year-old girl and was sentenced as a habitual offender to concurrent sentences of forty years and life imprisonment. Appellant appealed, contending that the circuit court erred by refusing his request to instruct the jury that second-degree sexual assault was a lesser-included offense of rape. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's refusal of Appellant's proffered jury instruction, holding that, consistent with Joyner v. State, the circuit court correctly determined that second-degree sexual assault requires proof of additional elements that rape does not, and therefore, it is not a lesser offense included in rape. View "Webb v. State" on Justia Law