Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Harrill & Sutter filed a complaint in the circuit court alleging a violation of Arkansas's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Appellant had previously filed a medical-malpractice action against three physicians, who were employed by the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS). Mariam Hopkins was hired to represent the physicians. Appellant subsequently filed a FOIA request asserting that because Hopkins represented public employees, Hopkins's file was a public record. Hopkins refused to allow Appellant to inspect the file, and Appellant filed the present case. The circuit court found (1) Hopkins, her firm, and the physicians were not the custodians for the FOIA request to UAMS or to the University of Arkansas Board of Trustees; (2) Appellees did not have administrative control of the public records of those entities; (3) the records sought by Appellant were not public records under FOIA and, therefore, were not subject to a FOIA request; and (4) the litigation files and documents sought by the FOIA request were subject to attorney-client privilege and were work-product. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that FOIA did not apply. View "Harrill & Sutter, PLLC v. Farrar" on Justia Law

Petitioner Detrick Croston was convicted of aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's motion for belated appeal. Petitioner subsequently tendered a motion for belated appeal of the same case. Before the Supreme Court was Petitioner's motion for rule on clerk seeking to have the clerk file the tendered motion for belated appeal. The Court denied the motion, holding (1) Petitioner did not demonstrate that there was good cause for his own failure to comply with the time limitations for filing his motion for belated appeal, and (2) Petitioner did not establish good cause to grant an exception to the rule that Petitioner was not entitled to file a subsequent motion for relief after his original motion for belated appeal was denied. View "Croston v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Nickol Carter entered a negotiated plea of guilty to aggravated robbery, possession of a firearm by certain persons, and robbery. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged that his guilty plea had been coerced and that the State had withheld material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal and declared the motions he filed in connection with the appeal moot, holding that the circuit court correctly followed the Arkansas rules of criminal procedure during Appellant's plea hearing and that none of the allegedly withheld evidence would have prevented the circuit court from accepting the plea. Therefore, the denial of Appellant's petition was not an abuse of discretion. View "Carter v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Williamson was convicted of aggravated robbery and kidnapping. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed four petitions for postconviction relief in the trial court, one original petition and three amended and supplemented petitions. Only Appellant's original petition was within the time limitations, but it was not otherwise in compliance with the rules of procedure because it was not verified. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that because Appellant did not file a timely petition for postconviction relief that was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court to consider his claims for relief, the trial court had not jurisdiction to consider Appellant's later-filed amended petitions. View "Williamson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Chase Prater was convicted of rape, kidnapping, sexual assault in the second degree, and felony impersonation. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no defective performance of trial counsel under Strickland v. Washington because (1) Appellant failed to show that counsel had a meritorious basis for making a motion for directed verdict on the issue of the amount of restraint used to commit the kidnapping; (2) Appellant failed to show that counsel made an unreasonable professional judgment in failing to use photographs showing the victim at a party in the days after the rape occurred; and (3) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a Doyle violation of Appellant's right to remain silent or for not properly preparing him for his testimony. View "Prater v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Lee Millsap entered a plea of guilty to multiple offenses and was sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without parole. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se "third motion for appointment of counsel," contending that he was entitled as an indigent prisoner charged with a capital offense to appointment of an attorney to process a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the circuit court. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court were two motions filed by Appellant related to the appeal. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions moot, holding that, as Appellant did not establish that he was entitled to the relief sought, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion. View "Millsap v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Miller was placed under arrest for the offense of driving while intoxicated. Appellant's driver's license was suspended for six months and his commercial driver's license was disqualified for one year. At an administrative hearing, a hearing officer upheld the suspension of Appellant's driving privileges. Appellant appealed, asserting that his administrative hearing was flawed. The circuit court found (1) the administrative hearing did not violate Appellant's due process right, and therefore, Ark. Code Ann. 5-65-402, which governs the administrative suspension of driver's licenses, was not unconstitutional as applied to Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 5-64-402 was no unconstitutional as applied to Appellant in this case. View "Miller v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Petitioner Greg Hogue was convicted of capital murder. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for forensics testing, seeking to challenge his conviction through a writ of habeas corpus. The lower court denied the petition. Petitioner subsequently filed a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court clerk declined to lodge the appeal because its tender was untimely. Before the Court was Petitioner's motion seeking to proceed with the appeal and requesting that the Court permit him to lodge the record belatedly. The Court denied the motion, holding that Petitioner did not show good cause for his failure to tender the record within the ninety-day period required by Ark. R. App. P.-Crim 4(b). View "Hogue v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Gilliland was convicted of the rape and second-degree sexual assault of his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to make specific and timely objections to the State's rebuttal testimony. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant opened the door to the testimony he found objectionable, the showing of prejudice required under Strickland v. Washington was lacking, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in finding that Appellant's counsel was not ineffective. View "Gilliland v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Davis was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and kidnapping with a firearm enhancement. Appellant was sentenced as a habitual offender to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County circuit court where he was incarcerated. The court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because Appellant had been transferred to Jefferson County after he filed his petition, and therefore, Appellant did not meet the procedural requirements of Act 1780 for a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus. View "Davis v. Hobbs" on Justia Law