Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1992, appellant Brenda Owens was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed. in 2010, appellant filed in the trial court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-201, or Act 1780. The court denied the petition. Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court were two motions filed by appellant seeking an extension of time to file her brief-in-chief and appointment of counsel. The Court did not reach the merits of the motions because it was evident appellant could not prevail on appeal. The Act requires a motion for relief be made in a timely fashion and provides for a rebuttable presumption against timeliness for a motion not made within thirty-six months of the date of conviction. Because appellant failed to rebut the presumption that her petition under the Act was untimely filed, the Court dismissed the appeal and declared appellant's motions moot.

After appellant N.D. escaped from a juvenile detention center and attacked a security guard, who later died, the state filed a felony information in circuit court, charging N.C. with capital murder, escape in the first degree, and six other criminal counts. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss and to declare the juvenile-transfer statute, Ark. Code Ann 9-27-318(e), unconstitutional. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to transfer to juvenile court. The circuit court denied appellant's motion to dismiss and to declare the transfer statute unconstitutional and subsequently denied appellant's motion to transfer to juvenile court. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing two witnesses to testify who were not disclosed in discovery, erred in ruling that the transfer statute was constitutional, and erred in denying his motion to transfer. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying appellant's motion to transfer, holding that based on prejudicial discovery violations, the circuit court abused its discretion by not excluding the testimony of the two witnesses. Because the circuit court's decision was reversed on this basis, the Court did not address the remaining arguments on appeal.

April Forrester, individually and as a representative of all similarly situated voters-citizens, appealed from an order entered in circuit court denying Forrester's request for injunctive relief and writ of mandamus against the Arkansas Secretary of State regarding a proposed constitutional amendment. The same day the requests were denied, voters adopted the proposed amendment, now codified as amendment 89, which concerns public and private debt obligations as well as issuance of energy efficiency bonds. On appeal, Forrester argued that the circuit court erred (1) because amendment 89 violated Ark. Const. art. 19, 22 in that it actually included three separate constitutional amendments instead of the permitted one amendment, and (2) in failing to find that the Secretary of State perpetrated a manifest fraud on the voters in the wording on the ballot title by failing to meet the requirements of Ark. Code Ann 7-9-204. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no violation of the separate-issue requirement because all of the amendment parts were reasonably germane to each other and to the general subject of the amendment, and (2) no evidence was offered to show that there was an open and obvious fraud committed by the ballot title.

Defendant Lee Croy was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault. Following his conviction and appeal, Croy filed in the trial court a petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 for ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective on four alleged bases. After assessing the effectiveness of counsel under the two-prong standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that counsel was not ineffective. Affirmed.

Appellant Joe Moore was found guilty by a jury of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to 600 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant then filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and other claims of deprivation of constitutional rights. The petition was denied. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, concluding it was clear from the record that appellant could not prevail on appeal if the appeal were permitted to go forward. Based on a totality of the evidence under the Strickland v. Washington standard, the trial court did not clearly err in holding that counsel's performance was not effective. In addition, because the appellant presented no citation to authority or convincing argument in his support of his constitutional claims, the appellant did not meet his burden under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 to provide facts that affirmatively support his claims.

Appellant James Lumley, a prisoner incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending his sentence was illegal because it exceeded the presumptive sentence to be imposed under the sentencing grid and because his guilty plea was taken in violation of Ark. R. Crim. P. 24. The circuit court denied the writ. Lumley appealed, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the matter or to include written findings of fact in its order, (2) the state and circuit court misconstrued his Rule 24 argument, and (3) the trial court was not permitted to exceed the presumptive sentence without a jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is no requirement that the trial court provide findings of fact in its order denying the request for the writ; (2) Lumley failed to state probable cause for issuance of the writ and no hearing was warranted; (3) claims concerning compliance with Rule 24 are not cognizable in habeas proceedings; and (4) Lumley did not allege that his sentence falls outside the statutory range and thus the petition did not state a basis to warrant issuance of the writ.

In 2009, the Arkansas Teacher Retirement System (ATRS) petitioned the county court seeking a determination that a shopping center it owned was exempt from ad valorem taxation. The county court rejected ATRS's contention that the property qualified for an exemption. ATRS appealed. The circuit court held that the shopping center was not exempt under article 16, section 5 of the Arkansas Constitution because the property was not used exclusively for public purposes. ATRS appealed, arguing the shopping center is public property used exclusively for public purposes and therefore is exempt from taxation under the constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court's decision was not clearly erroneous. The evidence was undisputed that the property in question is a retail shopping center that is leased to private business. As such, the ATRS failed to demonstrate the structure is used exclusively for public purposes.

Appellant appealed a conviction and sentence to life imprisonment without parole. The appellant made several arguments, including the arguments that the circuit court erred (1) by failing to suppress evidence derived from his DNA sample and statements he made to police officers; (2) by allowing the introduction of evidence of other crimes; and (3) by excluding expert evidence vital to his defense. The Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. The Court determined that (1) appellant voluntarily accompanied police officers to the station and made a valid waiver of his rights, and therefore the circuit court correctly denied the motion to suppress evidence based on an illegal seizure; (2) pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 403, introducing evidence of previous crimes was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; and (3) pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 702, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony on the relationship between diminished IQ and false confessions when the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the officers about the confession and the proffered testimony would have invaded the jury’s function as trier of fact.

Appellant was sentenced to a cumulative term of 552 months’ imprisonment pursuant to a plea agreement. Appellant first petitioned the trial court for a sentence reduction based partly on the grounds that appellant’s attorney had failed to inform the court prior to sentencing that the victim was also armed, which would have helped appellant obtain a more lenient sentence. The trial court denied relief, holding that appellant should have instead brought a petition for post-conviction relief, which appellant subsequently filed. The trial court denied this second petition, and appellant appealed both orders. Before the Supreme Court was appellant’s pro se motion for appointment of counsel. The Court dismissed this motion as moot because it was clear that appellant could not prevail if his appeal were permitted to go forward. Appellant could not establish that trial counsel had a duty to present evidence of the victim’s weapon to the court in the hopes of obtaining a lower sentence or that the failure to present this evidence prejudiced appellant because of the nature of the plea agreement.

In 2008, a jury found Appellant Benjamin Carter guilty of possession of drugs and weapons charges. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and fined approximately $70,000. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. Subsequently, Appellant filed a pro se motion for post conviction relief which the trial court denied. Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, and asked the Court for additional time to file his brief-in-chief. The Court held that it "need not address the merits of the motion because it [was] clear from the record that appellant could not prevail on appeal if the appeal were permitted to go forward. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed, and the motion is moot."