Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A citizen of Cleburne County submitted a petition for a local ballot initiative, titled the “Hand Marked, Hand Counted Paper Ballot Ordinance of 2024,” to the county clerk for inclusion in the 2024 general election. The county clerk rejected the petition, determining that there were insufficient valid signatures because some paid canvassers were not Arkansas residents as required by law. The canvassers later submitted supplemental affidavits listing Arkansas addresses, but the clerk still refused to count those signatures.The petitioner then filed suit in the Cleburne County Circuit Court, seeking a writ of mandamus and an injunction to compel the clerk to count the disputed signatures and certify the petition if it met the signature requirements. After an expedited hearing, the circuit court granted both the writ and the injunction, ordering the clerk to count all signatures, including those “cured” by the supplemental affidavits, and to certify the petition if it was sufficient.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the circuit court could require the county clerk to certify a local ballot initiative that was not timely filed under the Arkansas Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution sets the exclusive timeline for filing local initiative petitions—no sooner than ninety days and no later than sixty days before the election. The petition in question was filed too early for the 2024 election and, by operation of statute, would have been certified for the 2026 election, but it was also untimely for that election under the constitutional timeline. The Supreme Court held that the relevant statutory provisions were unconstitutional to the extent they conflicted with the constitutional timeline. The court reversed the circuit court’s order and dismissed the case, holding that a circuit court cannot require certification of an untimely initiative. View "EVANS v. HARRISON" on Justia Law

In this case, the owners of a residential property in Fayetteville, Arkansas, sought to rent their home as a short-term rental when not in residence. The City of Fayetteville had enacted an ordinance regulating short-term rentals, requiring a license for all such properties and a conditional-use permit for certain types in residential zones. The ordinance also imposed a cap on the number of these rentals. After applying for a conditional-use permit, the property owners’ application was denied by the Fayetteville Planning Commission, which found the proposed rental incompatible with the neighborhood due to the number of similar rentals nearby.Following the denial, the property owners attempted to appeal to the Fayetteville City Council, but their appeal was not sponsored by the required number of council members. They then filed an administrative appeal in the Washington County Circuit Court, along with claims for declaratory and constitutional relief. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance while their case was pending. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing the administrative appeal was untimely. The circuit court denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but left the constitutional claims pending.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed only the denial of the preliminary injunction, as the dismissal of the administrative appeal was not properly before it due to the absence of a final, appealable order. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction, finding no irreparable harm and no likelihood of success on the merits at this stage. The denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed, and the appeal of the administrative dismissal was dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. View "HAUSE v. CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS; THE FAYETTEVILLE PLANNING COMMISSION" on Justia Law

A man was convicted by a jury in Greene County, Arkansas, of five counts of rape involving a minor victim. The case involved evidence obtained from the defendant’s cell phone, including pornographic images, and testimony from the victim describing multiple incidents of sexual abuse, the use of sex toys, and exposure to child pornography. The victim’s account was corroborated by physical evidence, DNA analysis, and expert testimony from a sexual assault nurse examiner. The defendant denied the allegations, attributing the accusations to the victim’s desire to avoid blame for unrelated misconduct.After the conviction, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding error in the admission of certain evidence. The State petitioned for review, which the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted, thereby reviewing the case as if it had been originally filed there. The defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from his cell phone, claiming the search warrant was facially deficient and lacked probable cause, and that the court improperly allowed cross-examination about prior orders of protection involving his girlfriend, in violation of evidentiary rules.The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the circuit court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, finding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers acted in good faith and the warrant was not so deficient as to preclude reliance on it. The court also found that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting evidence about the orders of protection, but concluded that the error was harmless because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the prejudicial effect was slight. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the convictions and vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals. View "VASQUEZ v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

The Arkansas Board of Corrections filed a complaint against the Governor of Arkansas, the Secretary of the Arkansas Department of Corrections, and the Arkansas Department of Corrections, challenging the constitutionality of Acts 185 and 659 of 2023. The Board argued that these acts unlawfully transferred its power to manage the Department of Corrections to the Governor and the Secretary, in violation of amendment 33 of the Arkansas Constitution. The Board sought a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction to prevent the enforcement of the challenged legislation.The Pulaski County Circuit Court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a preliminary injunction, finding that the Board demonstrated irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. The court also denied motions to dismiss the Board’s complaint and to disqualify the Board’s special counsel. The appellants, including the Governor and the Secretary, appealed the preliminary injunction, arguing that the Board failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and denied the appellants' motion to remand with instructions to vacate the preliminary injunction and dismiss as moot. The court found that the dispute was not moot despite the firing of Secretary Profiri, as the Board's complaint concerned the constitutionality of the legislation, not the individual holding the Secretary position. The court also dismissed the appellants' motion to disqualify the Board’s counsel, as it was outside the scope of interlocutory review.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Board demonstrated irreparable harm in the absence of the preliminary injunction. The court emphasized that the dispute over the Board’s authority would continue until the constitutionality of the challenged legislation was resolved. View "Sanders v. Arkansas Board of Corrections" on Justia Law

In October 2016, BAS, LLC purchased commercial property in Paragould, Arkansas, listing its mailing address as 3735 Winford Drive, Tarzana, California. BAS failed to pay property taxes for 2017 and 2018, leading the Greene County Clerk to certify the property to the Commissioner of State Lands for nonpayment. The Commissioner sent a notice of the upcoming tax sale to the Tarzana address via certified mail in August 2021, but did not receive a physical return receipt. USPS tracking data indicated the notice was delivered. In June 2022, the Commissioner sent another notice to the Paragould property, which was returned undelivered. The property was sold in August 2022, and BAS filed a lawsuit contesting the sale, alleging due process violations and unlawful taking.The Greene County Circuit Court denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Commissioner violated BAS’s due process rights, thus preventing a determination on sovereign immunity. The Commissioner appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and concluded that the Commissioner’s efforts to notify BAS were constitutionally sufficient. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and determined that the Commissioner’s actions met due process requirements. The court held that BAS failed to allege an illegal or unconstitutional act to overcome sovereign immunity. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. View "Land v. BAS, LLC" on Justia Law

Aaron Spencer was charged with second-degree murder and a firearm enhancement for the shooting death of Michael Fosler. Fosler had been charged with sexual offenses against Spencer’s daughter and was out on bond. On the night of the incident, Spencer found his daughter in Fosler’s truck and forced it off the road, resulting in an altercation where Spencer shot Fosler, who died at the scene. The case garnered significant media attention, leading the State to request a gag order to preserve the integrity of the jury pool and ensure a fair trial.The Lonoke County Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for a gag order without holding a hearing. The order restricted various parties, including attorneys, public officials, and Spencer’s family, from making public statements about the case. Spencer opposed the gag order, arguing it violated his constitutional rights to a fair and public trial and free speech. He filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Arkansas Supreme Court, seeking to vacate the gag order.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the gag order was overly broad, vague, and lacked a factual basis. The court held that the order constituted a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion. The court emphasized that gag orders should be a last resort and must be narrowly tailored based on specific factual findings. The court granted Spencer’s petition for writ of certiorari, issued the writ, and vacated the circuit court’s gag order. The court did not preclude the possibility of a subsequent, more narrowly tailored gag order after an evidentiary hearing. View "SPENCER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

A student, C.S., transferred from one high school to another within the Fort Smith School District and was rendered ineligible to participate in sports for one year due to the district's policy on intradistrict transfers. This policy contrasts with the immediate eligibility granted to students transferring from outside the district. Vincent Standridge, C.S.'s father, challenged this policy, arguing it violated state law, equal protection, parental rights, and constituted an abuse of power.The Sebastian County Circuit Court dismissed Standridge's complaint, holding that the policy did not violate Arkansas Code subsection 6-18-1904(f), which the court interpreted as applying only to interdistrict transfers. The court also found no constitutional violations or abuse of power.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court's decision in part. The Supreme Court held that Arkansas Code subsection 6-18-1904(f) applies to both intra- and interdistrict transfers, thus prohibiting the district's policy of excluding intradistrict transfer students from sports based solely on their transfer status. The court remanded the case for entry of judgment in Standridge's favor on this statutory claim.However, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Standridge's equal protection, parental rights, and abuse of power claims. The court found that the district's policy had a rational basis and did not violate equal protection. It also held that there is no constitutional right to participate in sports and that the policy did not interfere with parental rights. The court concluded that there is no recognized claim for "abuse of power" in this context.The Supreme Court directed the clerk to issue the mandate immediately to allow C.S. to participate in extracurricular activities before the end of the spring semester. View "STANDRIDGE V. FORT SMITH PUBLIC SCHOOLS" on Justia Law

Jonathan and Melissa Brizendine applied to become foster parents in January 2022. After completing their application, a DHS employee conducted a home visit and asked various questions, including about their religious affiliation. The Brizendines, who are non-religious, were also asked to provide additional information on Melissa’s PTSD and medical-marijuana use. On May 19, 2022, DHS denied their foster-parent application. The Brizendines filed a complaint on June 8, 2023, alleging that their application was denied due to their atheism and medical-marijuana use, claiming violations of the Arkansas Constitution, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment.The Pulaski County Circuit Court granted the State appellees' motion to dismiss, concluding that the Brizendines' complaint failed to state a claim under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and that the State appellees were entitled to sovereign immunity. The court found that the Brizendines did not plead sufficient facts to show that the State’s actions were illegal or unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the Brizendines' complaint was speculative and did not meet the fact-pleading requirements necessary to overcome sovereign immunity. The court noted that the complaint lacked specific facts to support the claim that DHS denied the application based on religious preferences and medical-marijuana use. Additionally, the complaint did not establish any involvement of Governor Sanders or the Child Welfare Agency Review Board in the application process. Therefore, the State appellees were entitled to sovereign immunity, and the dismissal was affirmed. View "Brizendine v. Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Progress for Cane Hill, a local-option ballot committee, collected enough signatures to propose a local ordinance to make two precincts in Cane Hill "wet." However, Washington County Clerk Becky Lewallen rejected the initiative because 332 of the signatures were collected by paid canvassers who were not Arkansas residents.Progress for Cane Hill challenged the rejection in the Washington County Circuit Court. The circuit court found that the residency requirement in Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-9-103(a)(6) did not apply to local-option ballot initiatives and ordered Lewallen to certify the initiative's sufficiency. Lewallen appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and focused on statutory interpretation. The court held that the residency requirement for paid canvassers in section 7-9-103(a)(6) does apply to local-option ballot initiatives. The court reasoned that the Local Option Code incorporates the general Election Code, which includes the residency requirement. The court found that the circuit court erred in its interpretation and reversed and remanded the case, ordering that votes on the ballot measure not be counted. View "LEWALLEN v. PROGRESS FOR CANE HILL" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jennifer McGill and Cherokee Nation Entertainment, LLC challenged the sufficiency of a proposed constitutional amendment regarding the Pope County casino license. They alleged that the Arkansas Secretary of State, John Thurston, improperly certified the amendment for the ballot. The petitioners claimed that the number of valid signatures was insufficient and that the popular name and ballot title were inadequate. Local Voters in Charge (LVC), the sponsor of the amendment, and Jim Knight intervened in the case.The Arkansas Supreme Court had previously granted expedited consideration and bifurcated the proceedings into two counts. For Count I, the court appointed a special master to resolve factual disputes about the number of valid signatures. The special master found that LVC had properly certified that no paid canvasser had disqualifying offenses and that LVC did not violate the pay-per-signature ban. The special master disqualified some signatures but concluded that LVC still had enough valid signatures to meet the requirement.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the special master’s findings and determined that LVC complied with the statutory requirements for certifying paid canvassers. The court also found that the petitioners did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that LVC violated the pay-per-signature ban. As a result, the court denied the petition on Count I, allowing the proposed amendment to remain on the ballot. The court’s decision was based on the lack of clear error in the special master’s findings and the petitioners' failure to meet their burden of proof. View "McGill v. Thurston" on Justia Law