Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1992, appellant Brenda Owens was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed. in 2010, appellant filed in the trial court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-201, or Act 1780. The court denied the petition. Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court were two motions filed by appellant seeking an extension of time to file her brief-in-chief and appointment of counsel. The Court did not reach the merits of the motions because it was evident appellant could not prevail on appeal. The Act requires a motion for relief be made in a timely fashion and provides for a rebuttable presumption against timeliness for a motion not made within thirty-six months of the date of conviction. Because appellant failed to rebut the presumption that her petition under the Act was untimely filed, the Court dismissed the appeal and declared appellant's motions moot.

After appellant N.D. escaped from a juvenile detention center and attacked a security guard, who later died, the state filed a felony information in circuit court, charging N.C. with capital murder, escape in the first degree, and six other criminal counts. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss and to declare the juvenile-transfer statute, Ark. Code Ann 9-27-318(e), unconstitutional. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to transfer to juvenile court. The circuit court denied appellant's motion to dismiss and to declare the transfer statute unconstitutional and subsequently denied appellant's motion to transfer to juvenile court. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing two witnesses to testify who were not disclosed in discovery, erred in ruling that the transfer statute was constitutional, and erred in denying his motion to transfer. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying appellant's motion to transfer, holding that based on prejudicial discovery violations, the circuit court abused its discretion by not excluding the testimony of the two witnesses. Because the circuit court's decision was reversed on this basis, the Court did not address the remaining arguments on appeal.

Defendant Lee Croy was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault. Following his conviction and appeal, Croy filed in the trial court a petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 for ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective on four alleged bases. After assessing the effectiveness of counsel under the two-prong standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that counsel was not ineffective. Affirmed.

Appellant Joe Moore was found guilty by a jury of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to 600 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant then filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and other claims of deprivation of constitutional rights. The petition was denied. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, concluding it was clear from the record that appellant could not prevail on appeal if the appeal were permitted to go forward. Based on a totality of the evidence under the Strickland v. Washington standard, the trial court did not clearly err in holding that counsel's performance was not effective. In addition, because the appellant presented no citation to authority or convincing argument in his support of his constitutional claims, the appellant did not meet his burden under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 to provide facts that affirmatively support his claims.

Appellant James Lumley, a prisoner incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending his sentence was illegal because it exceeded the presumptive sentence to be imposed under the sentencing grid and because his guilty plea was taken in violation of Ark. R. Crim. P. 24. The circuit court denied the writ. Lumley appealed, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the matter or to include written findings of fact in its order, (2) the state and circuit court misconstrued his Rule 24 argument, and (3) the trial court was not permitted to exceed the presumptive sentence without a jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is no requirement that the trial court provide findings of fact in its order denying the request for the writ; (2) Lumley failed to state probable cause for issuance of the writ and no hearing was warranted; (3) claims concerning compliance with Rule 24 are not cognizable in habeas proceedings; and (4) Lumley did not allege that his sentence falls outside the statutory range and thus the petition did not state a basis to warrant issuance of the writ.

Appellant appealed a conviction and sentence to life imprisonment without parole. The appellant made several arguments, including the arguments that the circuit court erred (1) by failing to suppress evidence derived from his DNA sample and statements he made to police officers; (2) by allowing the introduction of evidence of other crimes; and (3) by excluding expert evidence vital to his defense. The Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. The Court determined that (1) appellant voluntarily accompanied police officers to the station and made a valid waiver of his rights, and therefore the circuit court correctly denied the motion to suppress evidence based on an illegal seizure; (2) pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 403, introducing evidence of previous crimes was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; and (3) pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 702, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony on the relationship between diminished IQ and false confessions when the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the officers about the confession and the proffered testimony would have invaded the jury’s function as trier of fact.

Appellant was sentenced to a cumulative term of 552 months’ imprisonment pursuant to a plea agreement. Appellant first petitioned the trial court for a sentence reduction based partly on the grounds that appellant’s attorney had failed to inform the court prior to sentencing that the victim was also armed, which would have helped appellant obtain a more lenient sentence. The trial court denied relief, holding that appellant should have instead brought a petition for post-conviction relief, which appellant subsequently filed. The trial court denied this second petition, and appellant appealed both orders. Before the Supreme Court was appellant’s pro se motion for appointment of counsel. The Court dismissed this motion as moot because it was clear that appellant could not prevail if his appeal were permitted to go forward. Appellant could not establish that trial counsel had a duty to present evidence of the victim’s weapon to the court in the hopes of obtaining a lower sentence or that the failure to present this evidence prejudiced appellant because of the nature of the plea agreement.

Approximately twenty years after being found guilty of rape and sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment, petitioner petitioned pro se to the Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the case. As grounds for issuance of the writ, petitioner contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the judgment and that he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that petitioner’s assertions were not grounds for a writ of error coram nobis. A rare remedy, the function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the circuit court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of judgment. The Court found both of petitioner’s assertions to be outside the purview of the writ.