Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Roosevelt Abernathy was convicted by a jury of capital murder and first-degree battery. Abernathy filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that his capital murder conviction was void because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment and commitment order as the felony information was flawed. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Abernathy failed to make the requisite showing that his commitment was facially invalid or that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, and (2) Abernathy's claims were the type that should be raised on direct appeal.

Appellant was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault in the second degree. Subsequently, Appellant filed in the circuit court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that the writ should issue on the grounds that (1) he was not afforded a speedy trial and was denied due process with respect to his right to a speedy trial, (2) he was subjected to abuse while in custody awaiting trial, and (3) he did not enjoy effective assistance of counsel at trial. The petition was denied, and Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court were Appellant's motions seeking an extension of time to file his brief-in-chief and for the State to duplicate the brief for him. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions moot, concluding that Appellant could not prevail on appeal because Appellant's claims were not cognizable in a habeas proceeding.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of kidnapping, rape, and burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. Many years later, Appellant filed a petition to vacate or set aside the judgment, alleging his actual innocence and requesting relief pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-201. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition, finding that Appellant failed to rebut the presumption of timeliness and failed to meet the requirements of the statute. Appellant appealed, contending that (1) the circuit court denied him of due process of law by denying his petition without first holding an evidentiary hearing; (2) the circuit court erred in finding that his petition failed to properly state a claim for relief, was untimely, and was not properly verified or made under penalty of perjury; and (3) he was entitled to a default judgment on his petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding (1) Appellant's due process claim was not preserved for appellate review; (2) the circuit court properly denied Appellant's petition for relief; and (3) Appellant was not entitled to a default judgment on his opinion.

Bennie Guy entered a negotiated plea of guilty to rape in circuit court. More than a decade later, Guy filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court that asserted his actual innocence, alleged that his attorney had withheld from him DNA test results exculpating him, and sought relief under Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-201 to -208 (Act 1780). The trial court appointed counsel to represent Guy. Defense counsel filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis and, in the alternative, declaratory relief requesting relief under Act 1780. The trial court denied relief. Guy appealed the order and filed a motion that requested permission to file a motion to submit evidence. The Supreme Court denied the motion and, because it was clear that Guy could not prevail, dismissed the appeal. The Court further held that the trial court did not err in declining to issue a writ of error coram nobis or in denying relief or any further proceedings under Act 1780.

A jury found Appellant Joe Clem guilty by a jury of rape and accomplice to rape. Appellant later filed in the circuit court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petition was denied, and Appellant lodged an appeal. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion for extension of time to file his brief-in-chief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, concluding that it was clear from the record that Appellant could not prevail on appeal and holding (1) Appellant did not demonstrate that the trial court in his case lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment entered was illegal on its face, and (2) Appellant's allegations concerning his counsel's effectiveness and sufficiency of the evidence were not cognizable in a habeas proceeding.

In 2008, appellant Mark Williams entered a plea of guilty to rape in the circuit court. In 2010, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in his case because he was not afforded a DNA test to prove his innocence. The petition was denied and appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court was appellant's motion for extension for time to file his brief-in-chief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, finding appellant could not prevail on appeal as he failed to demonstrate in his petition that the writ was warranted. Appellant's contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction on the ground that a DNA test was not performed did not establish a lack of jurisdiction, and while the lower court treated appellant's allegation as an assertion that his attorney was ineffective, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not within the purview of a habeas proceeding.

In 1996, appellant Lamont Van was convicted of capital murder. In 2010, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, that he was not put on notice that the information in his case was amended prior to trial, that he was innocent of the offense of which he was convicted, that there was error at trial in the admission of evidence, and that he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel. The petition was denied, and appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court was appellant's motion for extension for time to file his brief-in-chief. Because it was clear from the record that appellant could not prevail on appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot. The Court held that appellant failed to demonstrate in his petition that the writ was warranted with respect to each of his arguments.

In 1992, appellant Brenda Owens was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed. in 2010, appellant filed in the trial court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-201, or Act 1780. The court denied the petition. Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court were two motions filed by appellant seeking an extension of time to file her brief-in-chief and appointment of counsel. The Court did not reach the merits of the motions because it was evident appellant could not prevail on appeal. The Act requires a motion for relief be made in a timely fashion and provides for a rebuttable presumption against timeliness for a motion not made within thirty-six months of the date of conviction. Because appellant failed to rebut the presumption that her petition under the Act was untimely filed, the Court dismissed the appeal and declared appellant's motions moot.

After appellant N.D. escaped from a juvenile detention center and attacked a security guard, who later died, the state filed a felony information in circuit court, charging N.C. with capital murder, escape in the first degree, and six other criminal counts. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss and to declare the juvenile-transfer statute, Ark. Code Ann 9-27-318(e), unconstitutional. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to transfer to juvenile court. The circuit court denied appellant's motion to dismiss and to declare the transfer statute unconstitutional and subsequently denied appellant's motion to transfer to juvenile court. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing two witnesses to testify who were not disclosed in discovery, erred in ruling that the transfer statute was constitutional, and erred in denying his motion to transfer. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying appellant's motion to transfer, holding that based on prejudicial discovery violations, the circuit court abused its discretion by not excluding the testimony of the two witnesses. Because the circuit court's decision was reversed on this basis, the Court did not address the remaining arguments on appeal.

Defendant Lee Croy was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault. Following his conviction and appeal, Croy filed in the trial court a petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 for ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective on four alleged bases. After assessing the effectiveness of counsel under the two-prong standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that counsel was not ineffective. Affirmed.