Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Lemuel Whiteside, a juvenile who was seventeen at the time the offense was committed, was convicted of capital-felony murder and aggravated robbery. Whiteside was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the capital-murder conviction and thirty-five years imprisonment for the aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was more than sufficient to convict Appellant of capital-felony murder; (2) Appellant's sentence of life without the possibility of parole was did not violate the Eighth Amendment under Graham v. Florida because Appellant was convicted of a homicide; (3) under existing case law, the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile capital-felony-murder offender does not violate the Arkansas Constitution prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment and thus, Appellant's sentence did not violate the Arkansas Constitution; and (4) the imposition of the mandatory life-without-parole sentence did not violate Appellant's right to a jury trial or due process.

Appellant Calvin Washington was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, Washington argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress a statement he gave to the police while in custody. Specifically, Appellant argued that his question of "when he would get a chance to see a lawyer" reflected a past tense usage of the question that clearly indicated his intention to invoke his right to an attorney. The circuit court's ruling was based on a finding that the officers' testimony was more convincing and entitled to more weight, and both officers testified that Appellant did not question them about when he would see an attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's finding of voluntariness was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

Appellants Lucille Smith and Brenda Spencer were found guilty by a jury in Arkansas County of murder in the first degree. More than thirty-seven years after their trial for first-degree murder, Appellants filed in Arkansas County a pro se motion to dismiss the information with an absolute bar to prosecution, arguing that neither appellant had been formally sentenced in accordance with Arkansas law in violation of their constitutional right to a speedy trial. The circuit court dismissed the motion, finding that it was without jurisdiction because the motion was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to rule on Appellants' speedy-trial argument because the motion Appellants filed, over three decades after their trial, was untimely.

Appellant Mitchell Skinner entered into a negotiated plea of guilty to capital murder and was sentenced to life without parole. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing (1) the trial court failed to comply with the rules of criminal procedure during the guilty-plea proceeding, (2) his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered into, and (3) his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The circuit court dismissed the petition, ruling (1) Appellant failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, and (2) because Appellant had previously made his claims on direct appeal and in a petition for postconviction relief, the doctrine of law-of-the-case precluded reconsideration of the issues. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed Appellant's petition because Appellant failed to state a cognizable claim, and therefore, he failed to show any basis for a finding that a habeas writ should issue.

Appellant entered a plea of guilty to first-degree murder and received a life sentence. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief. At the time of Appellant's conviction, Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c) required that a petition claiming relief must be filed within three years of the date of commitment unless the ground for relief would render the judgment absolutely void. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition on procedural grounds as the petition was not filed within the requisite three years, and on substantive grounds as the allegations were insufficient to void the conviction. Appellant appealed, contending that the three-year period did not control because his conviction was void as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims were not sufficient to render his conviction absolutely void, and thus his petition, which was filed well beyond the three-year limit rule, was untimely filed.

In a dependency-neglect case, the circuit court awarded permanent custody of two children to their maternal grandmother and awarded standard visitation to their father, appellant Jamie Mahone. On appeal, Mahone contended that the circuit court erred by basing its decision on the goal of not separating siblings rather than by applying the preferred goals set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-338. Specifically, Mahone asserted that reunification with him was the first preference set forth in the statute and that, because he was fit to take his children, the circuit court erred in choosing the fifth preference listed, a fit and willing relative, on the basis of its desire not to separate the children from their half-sibling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the first statutory preference applied to Mahone, and (2) as it was not certain that the circuit court would have awarded custody to the grandmother had it applied the statutory preference afforded to parents in its best-interest analysis, a remand was necessary. Remanded.

Appellant Thernell Hundley pled guilty to capital murder and was sentenced to a life term of imprisonment without parole. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition to dismiss the judgment, arguing that he was seventeen years of age at the time of his conviction and that his life sentence violated, among other things, the Eighth Amendment. In support of his Eighth Amendment claim, Appellant cited as authority Graham v. Florida, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant pled guilty to a homicide offense, his sentence of life imprisonment did not violate the Eighth Amendment under Graham.

Appellant Jim Henson pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault and failure to appear. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err as (1) the evidence supported the circuit court's findings that Appellant's guilty pleas were voluntarily and intelligently made; (2) the evidence showed that Appellant's guilty pleas were made on the advice of competent counsel; (3) Appellant failed to show there was a reasonable probability that, had a mental evaluation been requested by counsel on the day Appellant pled guilty, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different; and (4) Appellant did not demonstrate prejudice by his sentence.

A jury convicted Levonia Gray of first-degree battery and first-degree terroristic threatening. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant then filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict and that counsel's failure to address whether the victim was battered by means of a firearm in a directed-verdict motion resulted in prejudice to him. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's denial of relief was not clearly erroneous because (1) Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict and failed to establish a reasonable probability that the circuit court would have acquitted him if counsel had presented the "by means of a firearm" argument to the court in a motion for directed verdict, and (2) therefore, Appellant failed to satisfy the second prong of Strickland v. Washington in his argument that his trial counsel was ineffective.

A jury found Appellant David Fuson guilty of computer child pornography, for which Appellant was sentenced to twenty years' incarceration. On appeal, Appellant contended that the circuit court erred in denying his motions to suppress his custodial statements and to exclude the evidence seized in search of his vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction, holding (1) the circuit court did not clearly err in denying the motion to suppress Appellant's custodial statements as he waived the suppression issue by testifying at trial and adopting as true the material portions of the challenged pretrial statement, and (2) because the circuit court based its decision regarding Appellant's argument concerning the denial of the motion to suppress evidence on two independent grounds and Appellant challenged only one ground on appeal, the merits of Appellant's argument could not be addressed on appeal.