Justia Arkansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Bobby Threadford was found guilty of aggravated robbery, residential burglary, fleeing, second-degree forgery, and two counts of theft of property. Petitioner was sentenced as a habitual offender. Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the felony information in his case was flawed and that he should not have been found to be a habitual offender. The circuit court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it did not raise an issue cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Petitioner then filed a motion that referred to a writ of prohibition, which the Supreme Court treated as a motion for belated appeal. The Court denied the motion, holding that the petition did not demonstrate that the trial court was without jurisdiction in this case and that Appellant's nonjurisdictional challenges to the sufficiency of the information were not cognizable as grounds for a writ of habeas corpus.

In this criminal case, the State brought an appeal of a circuit court orer that granted Appellee Kenneth Harrison a new trial on Appellee's petition for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the order because the record did not demonstrate jurisdiction by the trial court in that the record did not contain a timely filed postconviction relief petition. Before the Supreme Court was Appellee's motion for reconsideration of that decision. The Court (1) remanded to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of whether there was a timely petition for postconviction relief filed in this case; and (2) determined that once the findings were returned, Appellee's motion for reconsideration would be considered.

After a jury trial, Appellant Wardell Newsome was found guilty of first-degree murder. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that defense counsel's decision not to call a firearms expert who could have tested and compared shell casings found at the crime scene following the murder with a handgun that was recovered six months later was a strategic one and not an omission resulting in effective assistance of counsel; and (2) the circuit court properly denied Appellant's petition for postconviction relief where counsel's potential errors in failing to pursue information regarding a potential eyewitness who could have provided exculpatory testimony did not establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.

Appellant James Montgomery was convicted of rape of his six-year-old adopted granddaughter and was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, raising several allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in denying Appellant's petition without first holding a hearing where Appellant's trial counsel failed to object to testimony asserting the credibility of the accuser; (2) the circuit court erred in not considering Appellant's argument that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to improper testimony about patterns of behavior of child-sexual-abuse victims and finding that Appellant's objection to the testimony was not supported by specific facts; and (3) it was error for the circuit court to deny relief without first holding a hearing on Appellant's argument that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call Appellant's son as a witness at trial.

Appellant Charielli Glaze was convicted of possession of a firearm by certain persons and sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction but reversed Appellant's sentence to the extent that he was convicted under Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-201 rather than the criminal code's habitual-offender statute, Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-501, which the Court held was repealed by implication with the enactment of the criminal code because the conflict between sections 16-90-201 and 5-4-501 was irreconcilable. The Court additionally held that Appellant was entitled to a jury instruction in accordance with section 5-4-501. Reversed and remanded for resentencing under section 5-4-501.

Appellant pled guilty to murder in the first degree and was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court did not follow proper procedure in taking Appellant's guilty plea to determine whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered, and that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the judgment of first-degree murder. The Supreme Court denied Appellant's motion seeking to have his brief-in-chief duplicated at public expense and dismissed the appeal, holding that because Appellant's claims for relief were not grounds for a writ of habeas corpus, the circuit court did not err in denying the relief sought.

Appellant Ricky Anderson was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Appellant's motion for directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony that the victim was pregnant because part of the State's theory of the case was that Appellant killed the victim because she was pregnant with his child; (3) did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs of the crime scene because the photographs enabled the jurors to better understand testimony about the crime scene; and (4) did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress custodial statements he made before Miranda warnings were given because the statements were spontaneous.

Appellee Bernard Kindall was charged with second-degree sexual assault of K.J., a person less than fourteen years old. Kindall filed a motion pursuant to the rape-shield statute alleging that evidence that K.J. had made similar allegations of sexual misconduct against others was relevant and admissible. After an in-camera hearing, the circuit could ruled that the alleged prior sexual conduct was relevant as to K.J.'s credibility, but the court did not make a finding in its order that the offered evidence was not "relevant to a fact in issue." Pursuant to the rape-shield statute, an exception to the rule that evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct is generally inadmissible exists when the circuit court finds that such evidence is relevant to a fact in issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the circuit court's order was silent on relevancy of the evidence to a fact in issue, the case must be remanded for the circuit court to issue a written order in compliance with the rape-shield statute.

Appellee Joe Cantrell was convicted of multiple crimes relating to the manufacture of methamphetamine and failure to appear and was sentenced to 145 years incarceration. Following affirmance on direct appeal of his convictions, Cantrell filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court granted Cantrell a new trial, finding that the deputy public defender had been ineffective in numerous respects and that Cantrell was prejudiced by the ineffective performance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing Cantrell to proceed with his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the absence of the necessary waiver of attorney-client privilege; and (2) the circuit court clearly erred in its application of the prejudice prong of the Strickland v. Washington test when it concluded that prejudice resulted from counsel's ineffective performance because the outcome of the trial "may" have been different but for trial counsel's errors. Remanded.

Appellant Isaac Russell, who was incarcerated after a criminal conviction, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that he should be released from custody because his initial arrest was invalid. The circuit court denied the petition. Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion seeking to dismiss the appeal without prejudice. The Court denied the motion and dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant's contentions of error in the arrest did not demonstrate that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment entered was facially valid, and therefore, there was no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue.